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This dissertation is a study of Edgar Allan Poe that illustrates the values for originality and 
creativity that he sought to institute for literature, and the connections that these values have to 
literary criticism.  This dissertation seeks to accomplish this, first, by performing close readings 
of Poe’s criticism and fiction – especially the Marginalia
UNTIMELY FIGURES: EDGAR ALLAN POE, JOURNALISM AND THE 
LITERARY IMAGINATION 
, which is a cornerstone of this study – 
in order to demonstrate the importance of discontinuity in Poe’s understanding of creativity and 
historical emergence.  I argue that Poe attempted to figure the work of the creative imagination 
in literature and criticism as a temporal and spatial discontinuity in order to confront the 
mechanical entrainment produced by the new forms and technologies of mass print.  Secondly, 
the readings performed in this dissertation address and respond to the problems raised recently 
by Poe studies, which question Poe’s relation to the US.  This recent work on Poe claims that 
Poe scholarship has suffered in light of a-historical and foreign studies that have concealed Poe’s 
relation to history.  Critics, therefore, have lately proposed a closer contextualization of Poe’s 
work to return him to his rightful place in history as an American author.  In disclosing the 
ongoing intention of Poe’s writing to seek discontinuity from temporal entrainment, however, 
this dissertation illustrates how the contextualization of Poe within “America” proposed by 
recent Poe studies colludes with the practices that Poe confronted.  Further, this dissertation 
illustrates the discontinuous as an affirmation of historical emergence rather than a desire for an 
a-historical withdrawal, as numerous contextualizing studies of Poe have done.  The readings of 
Lope Lopez, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
 
 v 
Poe offered here serve to illustrate how recent Poe studies – far from offering the authentic 
version of Poe that they promise – actually function as an effect of the tendencies expressed in 
journalism that produce a static, linear-chronological conception of time.  This dissertation 
concludes, therefore, that much recent work in Poe studies obscures Poe’s understanding of 
creation, as well as the value for literature and criticism that Poe tied to possibilities for historical 
emergence. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: ON THE CURRENT OCCASION OF POE STUDIES 
Poe scholarship has arrived at a moment in which it asks, more emphatically than before, of 
Poe’s relation to America.  Rarely do any recent American studies of Poe begin without mention 
of his popularity abroad, especially in France, only to lament, in passing, that Poe’s work has 
served only foreign interests that have garnered attention on isolated pieces of Poe’s oeuvre, at 
different times, for the purpose of constructing either universalizing or a-historical systems of 
thought.1
 In many ways, this dissertation offers this broader, contextualizing effort to understand 
Poe’s work in relation to his historical moment.  It does so, however, without necessarily 
dismissing foreign receptions of Poe as offhandedly as many American studies of Poe have done, 
and, perhaps most importantly, without limiting the study of Poe to a search for a context, which, 
  Recent scholarship in Poe seems to agree wholeheartedly that Poe studies has suffered 
for lack of more comprehensive studies of Poe’s work, and for lack of a solid foundation on 
which to build.  What has been missing in Poe scholarship, these critics argue, is a fuller, broader 
engagement with Poe’s life and work that would return him to his rightful place as an American 
writer so as to establish a national and periodic field where scholarship might grow and build, 
rather than leaving Poe’s work to be recovered and reused whenever another fashionable literary 
movement might arise to take hold of it. 
                                                 
1 Most notably, this has occurred with psychoanalysis, specifically with Jacques Lacan’s famous 
use of “The Purloined Letter,” but also Marie Bonaparte’s earlier study of Poe and his work. 
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in many recent “Americanizing” works on Poe, acquires success as accuracy only insofar as it 
“finds” a seamlessness between Poe’s work and his surroundings.  The reason for this is that 
contextualization, first of all, would result only in thinking of art as a material making, rather 
than thinking art as the possibility for the emergence of non-material forms – the creation of 
ideas – of which I will say much more below.  One of the bigger goals of this dissertation, 
therefore, is to think contextualization for the sake of specificity, but to do so beyond mere 
arrangement of Poe’s work with respect to an overarching model of historicism that situates 
Poe’s work into cultural and chronological order.  In working out Poe’s context with respect to 
America, therefore, I proceed in distinct contrast to the methods and assumptions of the critics 
who believe that they have successfully historicized Poe’s work by situating him within lines of 
influence, trends in publishing, and within popular practices and understandings of the culture 
and the press of the early American 19th century.  Too often, scholars organize their work on Poe 
by beginning with the problem of history as a question of how America “appears” in Poe’s work.  
There is no better example of this than the recent anthology of essays entitled The American 
Face of Edgar Allan Poe, organized by Stephen Rachman and Shawn Rosenheim.2
                                                 
2 In the introduction to The American Face of Edgar Allan Poe, Stephen Rachman and Shawn 
Rosenheim formulate the problem I have been describing here by quoting from Terence 
Whalen’s book, Edgar Allan Poe and the Masses, in which Whalen remarks that “to explore the 
relation between literary production and what has been thought of as production in general [we] 
must first confront an accumulated mass of Poe lore celebrating the isolation of art from 
‘external’ social pressures.”  Rachman and Rosenheim continue: “Which naturally leads Whalen 
to the query: “If Poe isn’t in step with his time where is he?” The task of this kind of work, 
therefore, is to uncover Poe’s “American face” by assuming that the social exists as a 
predeterminant for literature, and that previous work has not been successful at explaining how 
such a relation – between the social and literature, and “literary production and production in 
general” – exists in Poe’s work.  See Shawn Rosenheim and Steven Rachman, “Introduction: 
Beyond ‘The Problem of Poe,’” in The American Face of Edgar Allan Poe, eds. Shawn 
Rosenheim and Steven Rachman (Baltimore: The John Hopkins UP, 1995). 
  These 
descriptions of Poe, these methods of situating his work in proximity to “America,” always 
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assume that literature begins either in a pre-existing sphere of the social (rather than thinking of 
literature as a social embodiment or as an expression of sociality or action), or, much worse, in a 
sphere of reality, either of which are thought as primary and antecedent to the work of the 
imagination or literature.  The contextualization I produce in this dissertation seeks to understand 
Poe’s work in relation to its contingent circumstances not to “situate” him for the sake of 
accuracy, but, rather, to disclose the motivation in Poe’s work, a desire in the writing, that seeks 
future readers.  This dissertation, therefore, attempts to reflect on the notion of origin with 
respect to the literary work, where origin does not remain as a specific moment in the production 
of the work.  This is an important point not just for the sake of Poe studies, but for the sake of 
criticism: in establishing a critical study of Poe, this dissertation seeks what is the interminable or 
inexhaustible work of the imagination and action, which has a relation to the creative dimension 
of Poe’s fiction, as well as to the creative work of criticism. 
This creative aspect and role of criticism, as criticism approaches and engages Poe’s 
work, was a point of reflection throughout this dissertation.  One of the guiding principles in this 
study of Poe was to inaugurate a criticism that might establish a life for Poe’s work, and confront 
the assimilation of Poe’s oeuvre into a procession of figures of cultural history.  The creative 
aspect of criticism calls for a way of rethinking history and our relationship to the past, and 
discloses how the recovery of “America” for Poe scholarship into a field of arrangement limits 
and destroys the inherent properties of Poe’s work.  Further, this understanding of criticism 
makes its work primary, and seeks to rescue literary criticism from subjection to applications of 
secondary nature, as if literary criticism followed primary works in a way that made these 
“primary” texts closer to “reality” – and its constant constitution – than criticism itself.  With this 
respect, my understanding of criticism, and the work of the language of criticism in relation to 
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the language of the text it studies, formed closely with respect to Walter Benjamin and a figure 
that he offered to explain the relation between material content and truth content: 
If, to use a simile, one views the growing work as a funeral pyre, then the 
commentator stands before it like a chemist, the critic like an alchemist.  Whereas, 
for the former, wood and ash remain the sole objects of his analysis, for the latter 
only the flame itself preserves an enigma: that of what is alive.  Thus, the critic 
inquires into the truth, whose living flame continues to burn over the heavy logs 
of what is past and the light ashes of what has been experienced.3
 
 
What is most important in Benjamin’s insights for this dissertation is the relationship between 
the material content and the truth content elaborated as the opposition between studying the 
wood, its material, etc, and studying the enigma of life as the fire that burns, destroys, gives off 
heat, and dies.  This insight shapes an understanding of criticism as a relationship with the life of 
the text, of a participation in how the life of the text changes over time, grows, and forms 
relations, rather than building for criticism only a system that seeks to arrange the past as 
empirically available and finished, or as a search for the properties of material sources for 
“production.”  It is in this sense that the truth content as opposed to the material content takes on 
importance: the material out of which one builds a fire might establish a source, and possibly a 
context, but does not completely contain the possibility of the fire, nor does it “illuminate” the 
“work” of the fire, itself; I will say more about this important notion between material and truth – 
what I call material and non-material making – below. 
I argue throughout this dissertation that, without attention to this creative aspect of 
criticism and its relation to the life of a work of literature, we miss fundamental aspects of Poe’s 
writing, as well as the motivation he found for his writing and what it could mean for us today.  
Further, when historicist arrangement leads to the offhanded repudiation of foreign 
                                                 
3 Walter Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” in Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926, 
eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000), 298.  
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“applications” of Poe’s work, critics fail to see in even the generation of “universal” principles, 
such as psychoanalysis, a fecundity in Poe’s literature.  This fecundity is related to the creative I 
describe above: Poe’s work, in its appropriation by different “applications,” does not encounter a 
system, finally, that exhausts explication of his work as an object, even when critics attempt to 
obtain the object by placing it in the lineage of influence, of production “in general,” or of the 
history of genre and literary technique.  The context for Poe’s work that this dissertation seeks, 
therefore, elaborates on the specificity of his moment as a particular manifestation, which does 
not mean that we have found the past, but that we have participated in making this past readable 
for us at this moment. 
This dissertation, therefore, brings into question the very notion of America as a 
continuity in fields of understanding (influence and so forth), especially since Poe’s criticism 
asks that we refuse the notion of America as a defined set of problems, or as a clear thematic 
presence in literature.  Poe announced a very conscious and deliberate resistance to “American” 
themes in his work in an entry in his Marginalia
Much has been said, of late, about the necessity of maintaining a proper 
nationality in American Letters; but what this nationality is, or what is to be 
gained by it, has never been distinctly understood.  That an American should 
confine himself to American themes, or even prefer them, is rather a political than 
a literary idea – and at best is a questionable point.
 in October, 1845; there, Poe states, 
4
 
 
This insistence on refusing American themes is what often leads critics to describe Poe’s desire 
for his fiction as a desire for an a-historical withdrawal, which critics refuse to take seriously, 
citing it as an error of a romantic mind, or a utopian wish for a historical beyond.  These sorts of 
attitudes have motivated, for the most part, the call in recent Poe studies for the alignment of 
                                                 
4 Edgar Allan Poe, “Marginalia,” in The Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Volume 7, eds. Edmund 
Clarence Stedman and George Edward Woodberry (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries P), 
259. 
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Poe’s work into chronological continuity with American history as a recuperation of his work.  
What is important here, and all too often ignored, however, is Poe’s claim that the figure of 
“America” is undecided.  For Poe, it is not clear what America had been, what it was for an 
American author, or what it might produce for literature.  In fact, Poe wrote in a moment that had 
no notion of a continuous and unified America.  Poe, in his conscious refusal of American 
themes, seems to understand literature differently than the critics that want it to recover notions 
of American nationhood as pre-determinants of literary creation.  Because Poe understood 
“America” as undecided, he did not wish to reduce the production of literature to themes that 
might close over the possibilities of an emergent creativity.  Poe did not have American 
archetypes available to him, nor did he think that archetypes should be prescriptive of literary 
production.  Further, Poe did not clearly see literature itself as a capacity to produce such 
archetypes for the nation; this may be one reason for his refusal not only of American themes, 
but of didacticism in general.  Literature itself was not a capacity for Poe – volitional or 
otherwise – but the articulation of creativity. 
For these reasons, Poe sought a criticism that could think with the conditions of his 
moment, and that could exist together with literature as the possibility of separating from our 
terms, evaluating them, and reflecting on the conditions in which the terms we create will 
circulate as “reality.”  This is a notion of criticism, therefore, that does not recuperate “reality,” 
but participates in its creation.  This understanding of criticism does not seek to arrange the past, 
but seeks a discontinuity in order to think toward the future.  This is the reason that the creative 
imagination was so important to Poe: he was interested in the creation of images that were not 
merely produced as the passive apperception of our senses.  To this end, this dissertation tries to 
think of the possibilities of imaginative literature and criticism as Poe imagined them: as the 
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possibility to produce a future that is different from the past and present.  With this regard, I am 
critical of any naturalized psychology, or of notions of hardwired faculties of mind, to discuss 
the creative process.  It is only in this way that the notion of criticism might give meaning to 
“America” even as it remains undecided in letters, as Poe describes in the quote I offer above.  
The “Americanness” of such a criticism would not stand as a mere social determination, or a 
successful description of the faculties of mind, but must figure as a possibility for immanent and 
transformational change.  What is “American” emerges with criticism if criticism can work 
freely; America cannot be a continuity of terms, nor a complete withdrawal either.  Criticism is 
the possibility of freedom established not by overthrow of what exists (which would amount to 
withdrawal, or to the negative freedom associated with the revolutionary mythos), nor by 
definition through a continuity of terms, but in the promise of immanent possibilities for change. 
All of this is quite important with regards to the context for Poe’s writing, which cannot 
exist merely as a lineage in which to place Poe’s work.  Rather, the context provides a shaping 
influence in which the desire to write arises, and culminates in a form that emerges within limits 
given by the historical protocols and knowledges available to it.  The context for the work of 
imaginative literature and criticism takes its form in its relation with and against the forces of 
history that have engendered and delimited their particular possibilities – that is, that have given 
it form – and with and against the limits and possibilities of their immediate surroundings which 
are also responding to historical pressures.  With this regard, this dissertation argues that Poe’s 
work thinks, in the wake of romanticism and with the burgeoning capitalist print industry, the 
taxation of the imaginative capacity of language – and, therefore, prefigures many of the 
problems manifested by recent critics trying only to situate Poe – rather than merely representing 
these technologies in his fiction and criticism, or trying to reclaim the past.  The “America” Poe 
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confronted, therefore, did not appear as a nation state in the traditional, cultural sense of the term.  
Poe wished to participate, uncover, and make visible the modernizing tendencies that produced a 
literature that was no longer a cultural formation – in terms of human action in communities – 
but took form in the face of technological innovation, and urban organizations. 
This context for Poe’s writing, and the pressures it exerted on literature, formed 
specifically around the demands of the mass press and journalism for which he worked for most 
of his life.  The press, its insistence on speed, mass circulation, and a mass readership as its 
target, affected the possibilities of speech and writing.  In particular, the speed of journalistic 
production, both in terms of production and dissemination of information and literature, was 
fundamentally significant in Poe’s engagement with the press.  For the writer, as well as for the 
reader, journalistic speed changes the “moment” of thinking, where “moment” is to be 
understood in both its temporal and physical connotations.  On the one hand, the writer faces 
smaller and smaller increments of time, which changes the experience of time and brings him 
closer to the instrumental time of capitalist production and the machine.  On the other hand, the 
reader faces a barrage of material, which begins to change the time of attention and the impact of 
readership.  All of this begins to change the nature of artistic experience by “thinning” out the 
time of thinking, imagination and reflection.  The technology (both in the sense of its production, 
and in the sense of the development of a new literacy) of the journal and magazine pre-disposed 
the emerging mass readership to a temporal and imaginative mechanization that would change 
the very nature of thinking and imagination. 
What this dissertation produces in contextualizing Poe in this way is that, first, it defines 
Poe’s intentions in relation to his surroundings not as a work to be finished, but as a 
confrontation with his surroundings that seeks change for the future.  Importantly, addressing 
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these contingent circumstances as context for Poe’s work illustrates the desire out of which Poe’s 
literature and criticism arose – a desire which resists assimilation into systematicities of writing, 
or into factual structures of production.  In denying Poe’s work the status of a finished product, 
one finds in his work that writing is never exhausted upon its completion, but continues to find 
further articulation in relation to criticism.  This comprised, in many ways, the critical 
significance of Poe’s Marginalia.  The entries Poe prepared for the Marginalia strike a strong 
discord with the clearly appointed temporality and dates of journals by refusing such dated 
organization; the marginal comments, therefore, do not respond to linear-chronological temporal 
arrangements, but attempt, rather, to speak the present without temporal/spatial relations to other 
moments.  Poe’s Marginalia is a writing that occurs in an undefined present, as if the present 
figured as something intermediary that participates in a continuing process, without clear 
outcomes or pre-determinants, in which the thought of the present is always pending, and only 
occurs if the critic happens to have a thought of which to unburden himself.  The purpose of 
these notes, therefore, was to confront the idea of the present as instantly available, as in 
reportage or journalism.  Furthermore, the form of the note itself is important, in that the 
marginal note is never thought of as a text that might be published on its own.  Critics usually 
think of marginal notes as appendages to the texts they study, and treat them as an intermediary 
between the text an author reads, and the text that he will write.  The entries that appear in the 
Marginalia, therefore, force what would normally be the “object” of literary analysis into 
intermediary state, and withdraws from the literary its status as a finished object.  The marginal 
notes, therefore, refuse a totalizing image of the present that journalism seeks to describe and 
name by insisting on an unfinishedness and uselessness for the notes that persist even for future 
readers.  Perhaps most importantly, the Marginalia occur at the margins of other texts, which 
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breaks the circuit between language and reality sought by many critics – and instituted 
aggressively by journalism and reportage – by orienting language not to a real referent, but to 
other language.  The Marginalia
This, again, recalls Walter Benjamin’s important insights, from which I quote above, 
about the difference between the material and truth content of a work of art.  The material 
content is important for the original “building” of the work of art, but art’s tendency is to look 
forward, to live, in such a way that it no longer makes sense to look for the work’s significance 
in the past.  For this reason, I make much use of the term “discontinuity” as a way to describe the 
creative exertion – in relation to Poe’s use of the leap in 
, therefore, in the face of a reality that loomed over the language 
of the press, announces the task of criticism as an outlook for the creative in this confrontation of 
language with other language. 
Eureka, and the conversation in the 
colloquys – required to abandon systematic arrangements and create the future.  The meaning of 
such creation is connected to a historical domain of thinking in the West that arises out of the 
split between the Greek terms techne and poesis, and it is perhaps in this way that we may best 
describe the difference between truth and material content, on the one hand, and material making 
and non-material making, on the other.  The Greek notion of techne, often translated as “craft,” 
organizes a very particular form of making: it assumes a predetermined idea – often in relation to 
the transcendent, Platonic eidos – that the craftsman, through techne, materializes in his practice 
in the application of materials and tools that are at hand.  Techne is very important in that it 
establishes, through its practice, the possibility for human action to bring into existence forms 
that nature, on its own, cannot.  These forms, however, are already available to thinking as idea 
in the Platonic eidos, as I say above.  The emergence of poesis in distinction to techne introduces 
a split in the notion of creation, and manifests a creation that does not begin with an idea that is 
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already available, or with what one already has at hand, but might, itself, create a new idea that 
would, in turn, grant new habits of making, of doing and of being.  This possibility of creation 
exists as the sign of man’s self invention, where man is not destined to repeat the past, but can 
create a future that is discontinuous from the present – this resides as the strong possibility for 
freedom in its promise of immanent change within history and institutions, and should lead us to 
rethink the “undecided” of America in Poe’s refusal of American themes that I quote above. 
As it pertains to this dissertation, Poe worked to claim this possibility of creation for 
language as the task of criticism.  In the material of language, there is a ceaselessness that 
embodies the action of social life in history: this is the unique condition of language – that, as a 
material, it bears the force of creation over time (history).  Poe attended very carefully to the 
material forms of the dissemination of language, as well as its technologies in the press and its 
techniques in journalism.  The importance he placed on the creative imagination, however, 
cannot finally be built by craftsmanship – material making – which is why the chemist, in 
Benjamin’s analogy, is the weak figure in relation to the alchemist.  In foregrounding the sense 
of creation as poesis, this dissertation seeks to highlight the significance Poe wished to give 
criticism and its relation to an America for which there was not yet any national literature.  This 
is especially important in light of the fact that we find Poe studies in the US at a moment in 
which critics promise to retrieve him from his potential disappearance into post-structuralism, 
psychoanalysis or romantic isolation by placing him in an empty time of American 
“culturalism.”  In light of Poe’s confrontation with the technologies of mass print and journalism, 
we might begin to see that the current occasion of American Poe studies that calls for a 
contextualization of Poe to place him into an American pantheon of culture is inimical to the 
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value he placed on spatial and temporal discontinuity as the proper mode, at his moment, for 
thinking, creation, and the literary imagination. 
1.1 TRAJECTORIES IN POE 
The four chapters that comprise this dissertation follow a trajectory, over roughly 6 years of 
Poe’s career, that takes us through Poe’s critical engagements with the press.  This trajectory, 
however, is not chronological.  Instead, I begin by looking at Poe’s criticism of Longfellow, 
especially the texts where Poe worked out his understanding of plagiarism, and the relationship 
of plagiarism to what is perhaps Poe’s most famous work, “The Raven.”  This is followed by two 
chapters that study Poe’s experience working for journals; these chapters look especially closely 
at Poe’s Marginalia, and the relationship of this critical work with Poe’s engagement with the 
press.  The dissertation ends, in some sense, where it began: with a notion of creation in relation 
to plagiarism, and with Poe’s “The Raven,” although, in this final chapter, I discuss this poem as 
Poe elaborated it in “The Philosophy of Composition.”  The trajectory of this dissertation, 
therefore, moves from a historical discussion of plagiarism, to a discussion of the spatial 
dimensions of Poe’s writing as he worked in the margins of texts, to the temporal dimensions of 
the Marginalia, and finally, back again to a historical discussion of Poe’s fiction and criticism.  
This trajectory serves to fashion an understanding of spatio-temporality in distinction to the 
scientific, linear-chronological model of history that is dominant in order to form an 
understanding of the discontinuous as it relates to the creative imagination in Poe’s literature and 
criticism. 
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The first chapter, “Plagiarism and the Raven’s ‘Nevermore,’” begins, therefore, with the 
problem of plagiarism because plagiarism brings together at least three prominent problems and 
lines of inquiry that are active in Poe’s criticism and fiction.  The first of these problems 
concerns the most practical aspects of publishing, and the preoccupation of publishers with 
obtaining new material and selling it.  The first task of this chapter, therefore, is to describe the 
tendencies toward marketing that Poe ran up against, and that he sought to change.  Publishers 
influenced the salability of books, magazines and papers with marketing campaigns, which 
unreservedly lauded new American works.  These marketing ploys published claims for the 
establishment of a national literature as they “puffed” writers, and built reputations.  Poe 
intervened in these kinds of marketing ploys by attempting to halt unrestrained praise, and by 
pointing out the flaws in different works in order to establish a rigorous criticism rather than 
strategic marketing for sales and reputation, especially those built around the questionable claims 
for national literature.  Poe felt that, first and foremost, if a national literature was to emerge, it 
would do so only under the illumination of a rigorous criticism, which was necessary before any 
talk of a national literature should begin.  What is interesting and important about this claim is 
that Poe did not see a national literature as the natural result of a nation, but understood the 
literary as a development of a critical investiture. 
Poe’s investment in criticism, and his caution to the nativists and narrow-minded 
nationalists that saw the possibility for literature in some kind of naturalized American genius, 
challenges the myth of the American Adam, which has been important in explaining American 
character.5
                                                 
5 Edward Davidson, in his book Poe: A Critical Study, notes, correctly, that Poe does not 
participate in the elaboration of the figure of the American Adam that has done so much to 
  The myth of the American Adam functions by establishing America as a spatial 
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removal – a virgin land – from the historical pressures and limitations of Europe.  The American 
Adam defines the American as a new man, innocent and close to nature, who has escaped 
European oppression and is free to begin again, to name a new government, and to achieve 
freedom.  This insistence on beginning anew as a way to avoid reiterating the past – especially 
when America is figured as a virgin land, or a new Arcadia that achieves freedom in its spatial 
removal from the interventions of the state and the bias of history – suggests that the problem of 
plagiarism haunts the American mind.  Poe arouses the anxieties inherent in this myth with his 
insistence on plagiarism, with his claims that plagiarism runs amok in American publishing, and 
with his suggestion that the most famous American writers might be guilty of it and, therefore, 
incapable of the newness promised by the myth of the American Adam.  This chapter focuses in 
particular on Poe’s accusations against Longfellow, and his suggestion that the habits and 
orientation of the press, in its insistence on building reputations, created figures like Longfellow 
to establish an American literature, and that prominent American writers are not capable of 
originality. 
The main purpose of this chapter, however, resides in the opposition between originality 
and plagiarism.  By definition, plagiarism is opposed to the original and originality, but this 
chapter seeks to establish this opposition beyond the practical considerations of the press where 
literary work is owned like an object, and in which literature exists only as a finished product of 
                                                                                                                                                             
inform an understanding of American society as the society of the new world; Davidson, 
however, fails to see that the reason for Poe’s resistance of this American theme is that Poe was 
committed to creation within history – creation is possible only within the social-historical – 
rather than a withdrawal from history.  I make this point in this dissertation by illustrating Poe’s 
criticism of a naturalized readership in favor of disclosing the social-historical in creation.  Poe 
would have never subscribed to the myth of the American Adam because the loss of the past and 
of history would mean, for Poe, the loss of possibilities for creation.  See Edward H. Davidson, 
Poe: A Critical Study (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1957). 
 15 
a private intellect.  The stronger sense of originality that was so meaningful for Poe requires that 
we regard language as the imaginative possibility for speech and writing, rather than the intellect 
of the author that purportedly owns the work and the reputation for production.  Originality 
resides in the possibility of language for bringing together work and thought.  The “meaning” of 
the word “plagiarism,” as we read it in Poe, therefore, signals a transformational, creative change 
that embodies the imaginative work of the social-historical.  By imaginative work, I mean to 
indicate forms of invention that do not arise from arrangement or from sensual apperception of 
reality; imagination is a creativity that produces images that do not simply belong to the real 
products and consequences of reality, and yet are capable of changing our relationship to reality, 
or producing new notions of reality altogether.  In this sense, the meaning of plagiarism for Poe 
is the imaginative creation of a present in which language is suffocated, incapable of speaking 
anything new, because the past has become wholly present in the language we speak. 
Plagiarism is usually a word associated with the business of book producing and selling, 
but for Poe it becomes a literary problem of mind, imagination, history and origin.  The great 
danger of plagiarism for Poe is not that an author chooses to “steal” another’s work, but that the 
technological order of the press taxes the imaginative capacities of language rendering an eternal 
present in which we cannot speak.  I end this first chapter with a reading of “The Raven,” in 
which I discuss the figure of the raven as an embodiment of the past, which irrupts in the present 
without order only to block the possibility of producing a future.  Over the next two chapters, I 
address the spatial and temporal aspects of Poe’s work as a way to confront the linear 
chronological model that threatens to close the possibilities of language in this way.  Once I have 
properly addressed these aspects of Poe’s writing, and his critical investment in them, I return to 
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the problems I introduce here with respect to “The Raven” in the final chapter of this 
dissertation. 
The second chapter of this dissertation, “Poe’s Marginalia and the Leap of Creation,” 
continues to explore this notion of originality by addressing it in relation to language, and to the 
ways in which Poe’s critical language engages literature more closely.  To this end, this chapter 
explores Poe’s Marginalia carefully; the Marginalia is a cornerstone of this dissertation, and 
through a careful reading of this work, we see that the meaning for originality, and the 
significance of this term in Poe’s criticism, relates to the possibility inherent in a work whenever 
the language of criticism makes contact with it.  This sense of originality does not limit the origin 
and originality to the moment of the production of a work, but discloses what is endless in the 
work as the task of criticism.  In this sense, criticism functions as the actualization of the life of 
the work, and of its continuing possibility.  With this respect, this chapter focuses specifically on 
the spatial organization of the Marginalia
I argue in this second chapter that the form of the 
, which occur as critical notes in the margins of 
“primary” texts. 
Marginalia – the insistence of the text 
on continuously foregrounding the spatial orientation of the language of the notes to the material 
of the printed page – signals the production of the present, and of the future, as a discontinuous 
jump from the material trace of the past.  There are two figures of discontinuity at work in the 
Marginalia: first, the note itself appears as a critical appendage to a “primary” text that is no 
longer present (Poe did not include the “primary” material in the finished Marginalia).  Secondly, 
there is a discontinuity between the moment that Poe wrote the note, and the moment in which he 
read it; Poe admits that he has forgotten what he had written: it is as if the notes that he has taken 
and placed in the margins of other texts are memoranda to remember to forget.  This is an 
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important condition: the task of the critic, in the face of the stabilization of language I discuss in 
the first chapter, requires that he forget the origin as a product, as a stable “thing,” and that he 
“find” the origin in the action of forgetting, which produces a relation to that which is ceaseless 
in the work.  The goal of this dissertation of challenging the static notion of a criticism that 
arranges and finds “origin” only by pointing to the past relates closely to Poe’s critical project in 
the Marginalia: the relation between notes and primary texts is not a secondary relation, nor a 
chronological arrangement, but an investment in the language of the “primary” text.  For these 
reasons, I make much use of the term “discontinuity” in this chapter, and compare the relation 
between the notes Poe takes for the Marginalia and the primary texts he studies with the figure of 
the conversation from his colloquys.  The figure of the conversation embodies a relation that 
cannot be spatially arranged under a category of linear chronology, but produces, rather, time as 
the emergence of otherness, or alterity.  Therein lies the importance of the spatial relation of the 
leap – if we can even say that there is really a “spatial” relation there – in opposition to the linear 
chronological model of arrangement, so dominant in the rational and clearly appointed, temporal 
organization of journals that mobilize their resources and technology to report the present 
instantaneously.  Poe meant for the undated notes of the Marginalia
This chapter describes these problems in some detail through not just through the form, 
but also through Poe’s observations in the 
 to appear in dated journals as 
a way to accentuate the disjunction between the spatial time of the journals, and the irruption of 
the notes from an undefined space at the limits of such linear arrangement.  Poe intended to make 
the spatial figure of time as linear the target of his criticism. 
Marginalia, especially a long entry in which Poe 
meditates on the effect that the explosion of printing would have on education and literacy.  Poe 
describes changes in literacy using figures of incremental and linear accumulation – such as 
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figures of banking – but he upsets these calculations in order to produce confusion, and elicit 
wonder.  Poe’s subversion of the expected and familiar outcomes of the linear temporal models 
of banking seek a future that is discontinuous from the present.  These discussions of Poe’s 
interest in the irrational set this study apart from psychoanalytic understandings of Poe’s work 
that relate the irrational back to a developmental story of the individual mind.  Further, many 
studies of Poe often refuse to discuss the irrational in his work altogether; this dissertation, and 
this chapter in particular, take Poe’s interest in irrationality – especially as it appears in 
confrontation to the figure of banking here – as a serious challenge to instrumentality, and to the 
notion that any form of social-historical interest must always have a rational application within 
the functions of modern state formations.  For Poe, the leap of creation has no rational basis, and 
any notion that the creative leap might occur through a rational system is a pipe dream.   The 
rational, linear model of banking produces a future that is so tied to the rationality of the present 
that its “products” exist as a capture and subordination of the present into mechanical 
instrumentatlity.  A rational system of change, or a rational arrangement of materials, excludes 
rationality from participation in change as the agency that surveys; Poe’s notion of plagiarism in 
relation to figures of discontinuity insist on a more radical notion of change – the creative – in 
which the entire system itself needs to participate in the change as immanent and 
transformational.  With this respect, the moment of wonder has a kinship to creation: it illustrates 
the moment that a rational system cannot verify its relation to reality, and suggests that the 
possibility to articulate the present might occur only through a radical discontinuity with the past 
(ie, creation, and origin in the present). 
The third chapter, “Problems of Plot: The ‘Currente Calamo’ and the Man of Leisure,” 
continues to elaborate on this notion of discontinuity as creative, but does so, as I say above, by 
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studying the notions of temporality at work in the Marginalia, especially as these pertain to the 
experience of speed produced by the newspaper press.  A reflection on time and speed is very 
important for the Marginalia, but since each marginal note has been left undated, the Marginalia 
resists any notion of time as a linear arrangement, and does not participate in the speedy 
production of this spatial-temporal unfolding.  Poe mentions a figure – the “currente calamo” – 
in one of his entries about the speed of journalism in the Marginalia, which becomes important 
for this chapter: the figure of the “currente calamo,” which designates the writing of an 
unceasing, hurried pen, serves to imagine the relentlessness of the mechanical time of the journal 
that does not stop to reflect on itself.  Poe, therefore, displays the pressures of the press as the 
material form of this temporality, and avoids abstracting the production of time as natural or 
given.  This temporality, however, entrenches other activities and rhythms of life by constructing 
a real order around its restless insistence to report reality as instantaneously available.  Poe’s task 
in the Marginalia
I suggest in this chapter that this reflection on time is perhaps what gives critics so much 
trouble thinking Poe’s “withdrawal” and refusal of American themes because they look only for 
a representation of Poe’s moment in his fiction.  Time, which is not an object that one represents, 
cannot be made visible or intelligible through representation; instead, Poe seeks to produce an 
experience of time in relation to the mechanical time of the journal.  In conjunction with the 
incongruity produced by the containment of undated notes by dated journals, Poe illustrates the 
order of mechanical time through the figure of the man of leisure, who becomes the critic who 
 is to reflect on this order of time, and to open the possibility of an experience, 
within this order, of a time not bound to dates or clock time – Poe wishes to think the creative in 
relation to a time that we might say is no time at all.  Time, therefore, is either nothing at all, or it 
is synonymous with creation (a leap). 
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writes and prepares the notes in the first person.  Importantly, the man of leisure – a figure 
related to America’s Southern chivalric myth – signals a withdrawal from one’s surroundings, 
especially when this figure represents the South’s hostility to Northern, industrial modernity.  
Poe, however, does not use this figure in such a way, nor as a way to redeem Southern ways of 
life as they face the threat of becoming extinct, or of emulating a form that was already available 
in order to preserve it as a way of combating mechanical time.  Poe reworks the figure of the 
man of leisure, rather, from an amateur man of letters into an erudite critic as a way to pronounce 
a discontinuity within available knowledge and traditions.  In this sense, the leisure Poe 
experiences in the library as he writes the Marginalia exists as a limit within the operation of 
mechanical time.  If there is a “withdrawal,” then, the withdrawal is not from history, but exists 
as an image that arises outside of the order of clock time – insofar, too, as the Marginalia
The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation, entitled “Death and Evil as Affirmation 
in Poe’s Art,” returns to a historical study of Poe’s work, and looks in particular at the 
composition of “The Oval Portrait” over the course of 3 years, as well as, finally, Poe’s 
comments about “The Raven” in “The Philosophy of Composition.”  I return to a history of 
Poe’s compositions here, once again, after looking at the spatial and temporal features of his 
 appears 
in the journals that it intends to confront.  Falling out of clock time, out of a pre-determined, 
spatial relation of an expected outcome in the non-time of leisure, institutes for Poe a way of 
thinking about time that is not linear, but that exists only insofar as it becomes synonymous with 
creation, as I say above.  This notion of creation, and the spatial and temporal conditions Poe 
tried to describe in order to give it both intelligibility as well as a value, come together in the last 
chapter of this dissertation. 
Marginalia in order to emphatically conclude by bringing together notions of creation, art and 
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criticism that the previous chapters had been working toward.  In this chapter, by distinguishing 
between a notion of labor and a notion of work, I produce a distinction between a material 
making and a non-material making that brings together my introductory comments about the 
creative in criticism and art with the opposition between techne and poesis that informed the 
problem of creation.  The difference between techne and poesis that I describe above gives 
further meaning and direction to the spatial and temporal arguments that precede this chapter.  
Specifically, the meaning of creation that relates to poesis produces an important contrast to the 
notions of predetermined outcomes along linear, temporal coordinates.  The possibility inherent 
in the creation of new ideas, and to the potential of altering experience, resides in a non-material 
making that is proper to the continuing life of a work of art.  This stands in stark opposition to 
the reduction of an artwork to its thingly character, which would result only from intervention in 
materials that were already at hand, and with the habits, perspectives and ideas that would render 
a product as a finished object.  I call this latter notion of making, “labor,” in this chapter, and 
oppose it to the “work” of art as the non-material making that I have been discussing. 
I trace the difference between labor and work in this chapter in opposition to critics that 
tried to understand Poe’s revisions of “The Oval Portrait” over time, granting the “original” story 
a sense of firstness and centrality.  “The Oval Portrait,” however, is interesting in that its 
animating force cannot be situated in a single moment of “origin”; in fact, the story refuses any 
relation back to a reality as its source, and includes a number of de-centering shifts.  The story 
begins with the introduction of a narrator, but then becomes the story of the narrator reading 
about another story: the story of a painting that has claimed the narrator’s attention.  Even as the 
tale focuses on the story of the painter who uses his wife as the model for his portrait, it is 
impossible, I argue, to establish a central incident or source for this tale, whether one posits the 
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central incident or source as the story of the painting, the wife as model, or the portrait to which 
the title refers.  Instead, the tale is about what cannot finally be captured: the movement of 
attention and of life itself.  At each moment that we think we may be confronted with an object 
we might capture, the story responds with an accompanying image of absence, or death, and 
thereby ruins any attempts to make the story into a stable object for arrangement.  The dynamics 
of this instability integrate with the forces of art, where art must emerge from creative action, 
which is to say, that it does not find its impetus, motivation, or actuality in a material, assailable 
object or reality.  The material of the portrait, as well as the language of the story, is coincident 
with the force of art, but is not finally a pre-determinant for its expression.  This is an important 
moment with respect to the temporal and spatial aspects that I wished to elicit as the endless 
origin and critical task of the Marginalia
As important as this notion of creation is for Poe and his criticism, I end this chapter with 
a reflection on “The Philosophy of Composition,” which works to reduce “The Raven” – which I 
argued in chapter 1 was the creative expression of a radical notion of plagiarism – into a thingly 
product of labor.  Poe’s famous essay works to make of “The Raven” a manageable object, 
rendered as the property of a private intellect that produced the poem through the discreet 
application of techniques with tactical and expected outcomes and effects.  I end with this 
discussion of “The Raven,” which serves to double the figure of the poem that I produce in the 
first chapter: namely, the figure of a final creative articulation in which the creative imagination 
becomes suffocated in a plagiarism that infects all language because of the spatial-temporal 
occupation of the present by the past.  With respect to my reading of “The Raven,” Poe’s “The 
Philosophy of Composition” is the aftershock of this final articulation: this essay performs a 
 since what is endless in “The Oval Portrait,” what 
stands as the work of the work of art, emerges without clear ties to the past. 
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parodic repetition of the Raven’s empty language.  In doing so, however, it also performs a very 
important service for Poe.  In the wake of Poe’s insight in “The Raven,” and of the battle over 
plagiarism that he waged in the American journals that he worked for, such a parodic repetition 
of “The Raven” served to render “The Raven” as a stable object that Poe could lay claim to as a 
way of protecting himself from the hostilities and accusations that arose over his claims about 
plagiarism in the American press. 
“The Philosophy of Composition” and “The Raven” are doubles of Poe’s efforts at 
understanding the creative in art at his moment, and in trying to establish a life for his work both 
within the traditions that he wanted to oppose, and beyond them as well.  On the one hand, Poe 
certainly fell upon the practical problems of selling his work, maintaining a reputation, and of 
making the decision to work for money and fame, and it is within these pressures that we might 
understand the motivation for “The Philosophy of Composition.”  The dark side of Poe’s 
creativity, however, does not just stand as a refusal of these decisions as a way of agitating 
against bourgeois values for the sake of agitation itself.  Such confrontation would amount to 
nothing more than a childish form of evil that identifies a good and establishes this good as 
primary in its rebellion.  Poe’s interest in evil, as well as his mention of the “evil hour” of 
creation in “The Oval Portrait,” is an evil that doesn't even understand itself as evil because it 
expresses the infinite chance of liberty in its most extreme form: that of poetry. 
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2.0  PLAGIARISM AND THE RAVEN’S “NEVERMORE” 
2.1 LANGUAGE AND ORIGINALITY 
1845 represents an important year in Edgar Allan Poe’s career as this was the year in which he 
published “The Raven,” and also engaged in a highly public feud with friends of Longfellow 
over the latter’s poetry.  The publication of “The Raven” garnered a great deal of attention for 
Poe, and made him famous in New York literary circles.  The second set of events garnered 
attention for different reasons, but became famous nonetheless; these events comprise Poe’s 
infamous, month-long tirade against Longfellow and “Outis” in the Broadway Journal, the 
publications of which make up what critics now call the “Longfellow War.”  Both of these 
publications, although quite different in a number of ways, are, however, related in their 
engagement with journalism and the emergent capitalist publishing industry.  The “Longfellow 
War,” in particular, dealt with very pragmatic problems of publishing, specifically with willful 
literary theft and its impact on the making and breaking of literary reputations.  The final 
installment of the “Longfellow War,” where Poe reconsiders plagiarism and its practice, 
however, brings it into relation with “The Raven” under a broader theme of plagiarism.  
Plagiarism, the work of charging an author with it as well as defining what it is, formed, for Poe, 
a center that allowed him to describe the social forces that oriented around the world of print, and 
influenced the production of literature.  The term “plagiarism,” therefore, served to bring 
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together the problems of speed and journalism, as well as communication with the masses, 
wealth, fame, and the debate over a national literature, all of which measured the power of 
speech and writing at his moment.  The problem of plagiarism, therefore, involves much more 
than the detection of literary theft, willful or otherwise.  In a stronger sense, a discussion of 
plagiarism promotes the inauguration of an outlook for originality, for what “originality” might 
mean, and how it may be possible. 
In fact, the problem of originality seems to be everywhere in Poe’s work, especially when 
he writes on plagiarism.  Stephen Rachman aptly notes that, when writing on plagiarism, “the 
trajectories of [Poe’s] arguments inevitably redirect themselves toward investigations into the 
nature of creativity and defenses or apologies for literary plagiarism.”1  Such investigations 
sometimes hinged around the categories of “genius” and “talent,” terms that, alongside the 
question of originality, form a recognizable pattern that critics have often lumped into the 
romantic tradition.  Rachman, as well as critics like Florina Tufescu, however, have noted that 
Poe’s investigations of originality through the topic of plagiarism – which, Rachman goes so far 
to say, becomes central to Poe’s modus scribendi since he didn’t just detect plagiarisms, but 
frequently committed them as well – was a way of challenging the private ideal of romantic 
inspiration as well as originality in literature.  Rachman, in particular, argues that Poe’s 
obsession with plagiarism, which results from his own plagiary, aligned traditional notions of 
authorial intention with more recent destabilizing concepts of intertextuality in order to rework 
“originality,” and influence; this reworking, however, doesn’t seem to add up to much more than 
a revision of another’s text.  Rachman makes his argument with respect to Poe’s Marginalia
                                                 
1 Stephen Rachman, “’Es lasst nicht schreiben’: Plagiarism and ‘The Man of the Crowd’” in The 
American Face of Edgar Allan Poe , eds. Shawn Rosenheim and Stephen Rachman (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1995), 51. 
, and 
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argues that the Marginalia can be nothing more than this intertextual revision since it begins at 
the margins of other texts, which finally equates Poe’s “origin” with plagiarism2; Rachman 
claims that “Poe’s preoccupation with plagiarism functions as a question of the origins of his 
language and a problem with his own ‘originality.’”3
Although challenges to romantic inspiration as well as common conceptions of 
“originality” certainly stand in Poe’s interest in plagiarism, and in his own practice of plagiary, 
these arguments about “origin” and the aim of plagiarism in Poe’s work are, at best, incomplete 
understandings of these terms in Poe’s work and what they bring together.  At worst, such 
conclusions move incompletely from the world of the private author – which terms like “genius” 
indicate as the locus of creation – to the public, or social, since it identifies Poe’s work only as a 
trivial and private (what could it mean for Poe to have his language?) operation that produces a 
fleeting newness, rather than a demonstration that might illustrate how creation can only emerge 
through the social-historical realm.  The studies I mention above fail to see in language the 
constant creativity emerging from conglomerations of groups – societies – through history: 
societies themselves are neither natural nor elemental, but emerge in different ways, places and 
times in the act of coming together.  In fact, the great problem in studies of plagiarism, as we see 
in Rachman’s work on Poe, is that the term “creation” – the manifestation of an “origin” or 
“originality” – is usually either reduced to mythic origins, and therefore displaced from the 
social-historical where it finds its possibility, or it is altogether dismissed as an outright 
 
                                                 
2 In the following two chapters of this dissertation, I will argue against this understanding of 
Poe’s Marginalia and will try to give it a much different significance in Poe’s oeuvre.  My 
argument is that the form of the Marginalia allowed Poe to confront the problems of plagiarism 
and originality as I describe them in this chapter, especially since the notes he collected in these 
publications produced a disengagement from the dominant temporal forms of the journal and 
magazine. 
3 Rachman, 50-1. 
 27 
impossibility.  An important example of this occurs in Alexander Lindey’s landmark work on 
plagiarism, in which he does not oppose the terms “plagiarism” and “originality.”  Rather, 
Lindey dismisses the possibility of originality as creation, stating quite simply that, “There are 
few platitudes as trite as the one about there being nothing new under the sun.  There are few as 
comprehensively true.”4
Robert Macfarlane’s more recent work on plagiarism defines what he calls two “theories” 
of originality, “creatio” and “inventio,” to situate more comprehensively what “originality” in 
literature might be.  The bulk of his work on plagiarism and originality serves to dismiss the 
former as mythic creation, which he reduces to the paradigm of “something out of nothing.”  The 
latter term, “inventio,” favored by Macfarlane as the proper condition for literature, describes a 
process of repetition in which language produces new significations, finds new referents, but 
does not “create” in the strong sense.  Such work is important in that it displaces originality from 
the work of the author’s private interiority (and, hence, from the notion of romantic genius and 
originality as well) and finds it, instead, in language.  However, the creation out of nothing that 
Macfarlane desires to deny is still there even as “inventio,” for even if we say that this constant 
“corruption” of language is only a characteristic of its signifying or indicating function, to say 
there is no “creation” would mean that language must be limited in its significations to the 
objects and referents already existing in the world.  The world, then, would be nothing more than 
a stable set of referents, or meanings, available throughout history, which language might freeze 
into particular configurations at different times.  As we will see, Poe’s reflections on plagiarism 
do not allow such a reductive understanding of language, in which language stands only as mere 
exchange in communication.  What matters in Poe’s conception of “plagiarism” is that it arises in 
 
                                                 
4 Alexander Lindey, Plagiarism and Originality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 14. 
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affinity with the institutions of his moment not as a referent to these, but as a creative expression 
that forms with his moment. 
While it is true that origin in Poe sometimes has the trivial sense of newness Macfarlane 
attaches to it, Poe also gives it the stronger notion of something unknown cohering, for the first 
time, into an expression, not in the sense of discovery, but in the sense of creation, or of 
acquiring being.  Although Poe sometimes discusses combinatorial effects, in which the 
compositional process seems to consist of nothing more than choosing among materials and 
techniques available to him, infinite as they may be, he also suggests, with greater emphasis in 
his fiction, that composition does not choose, whether that choice be between referents, 
techniques or effects.  Composition, rather, is origin in the sense that it creates what it needs at a 
particular moment to institute completely new forms.  There are, of course, numerous difficulties 
with this process since there are no protocols of understanding in place to describe or analyze an 
origin at its moment of irruption.  Poe attempted to reflect on this radical notion of origin in the 
colloquy “The Power of Words,” in which the work of speech does not just refer to what exists, 
but produces new worlds for existence through its ability to bring together the productivity of 
action in language.  This story figures the emergence of origin – through the “power” of words – 
as enigmatic: “not in knowledge is happiness, but in the acquisition of knowledge!  In forever 
knowing, we are for ever blessed; but to know all, were the curse of a fiend.”5  This statement 
depicts “know[ing] all” as the “curse of a fiend,” not, as some critics have argued, because Poe 
wished to promote the over-production of knowledge in the capitalist world of print,6
                                                 
5 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Power of Words,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 6, 
ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965). 139. 
 but 
6 These are the questions that organize Whalen’s book, Edgar Allan Poe and the Masses 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999). 
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because to “know all” would end the possibility of not knowing.  There can be no accurate 
description of the conditions for the emergence of origin, of how it creates its coherence, because 
this would bring into causal relation all historical moments, and close off the possibility for 
origin altogether.  Origin, therefore, passes through a moment of not knowing, in which its result 
is not pre-determined by past forms, but finally coheres into a new form. 
“The Power of Words” introduces some important qualifications for thinking “origin” in 
relation to the importance of plagiarism in Poe’s work and thought.  First, the colloquy itself, as 
an exchange between two speakers, posits the locus of “not knowing” in the action of speaking, 
in which any clarity that a speaker might acquire might be reworked, turned back into obscurity, 
in a response.  Language, therefore, is both the mediation that embodies this action, as well as 
the chasm through which the interaction reworks itself, and perpetuates its action.  This, already, 
begins to rework the simple notion that language acquires significance only through the 
accidental reference to an object.  Language, its continuing possibility, resides in action.  The 
problem of originality, therefore, requires that we think language in relation to the social-
historical realm, rather than treating language, on its own, as the isolated location of change at 
the level of word-signification.  At Poe’s moment, the temporal entrainment produced by 
journals affected labor and the experience of time, and, consequently, the possibility for creation.  
This temporal entrainment shows that the possibilities of language must confront the social-
historical realm and the institutions that give it form; or, more concretely, that language itself is 
the institution that forms society and history.  To ignore the human action and labor that 
accompanies changes in the meaning of language is to ignore how violence, manipulation or 
mechanical entrainment might promote or reduce historical emergence.  A change in language, 
therefore, is not reducible to a word or a set of words whose meanings may change: change, 
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rather, is immanent and transformational.  We can see in Poe’s investigation of plagiarism the 
possibility of origin in relation to institutions of writing and their relation to social life. 
Poe’s obsession with plagiarism and his search for “originality” arise, first, in the midst 
of the dominance of a voluntary memory that unfolds only along spatial connections and 
relations, and which preserves terms and usages that exclude the possibility of alterity, or 
change.  With this regard, the speed of the press and its insistence on urgency configures this 
linearity, as a speedy journalism threatens to turn “time” into a chronological compilation of 
events, and obscures the understanding of time as the manifestation of something other coming 
into being – creation.  Further, the strong emergence of plagiarism in Poe’s criticism, almost as 
the dominant sign of the publishing industry, also signals the danger that language may no longer 
participate in the process of change, and that it may no longer express the productivity of human 
labor as historical emergence through creation – a meaning for plagiarism that becomes more 
clear at the end of the “Longfellow War.”  For these reasons, the term “plagiarism” does not 
function solely as a technical term in Poe’s work, but illustrates a changing potential in language.  
It is true that Poe goes to a great deal of effort to accurately define the term, and to make sure it 
is adequately and effectively employed in practical matters.  But the emergence of plagiarism in 
Poe’s work also relates strongly to Poe’s reflections on the life of literature, especially as 
literature is printed and reprinted in the sphere of the emergent capitalist publishing industry, 
where fame and fortunes stood to be gained and lost, where critics sought to produce a national 
literature, and where the temporal pressures of journalism weighed heavily on the literary 
imagination.  Plagiarism continuously grows in Poe’s thinking, but this vital form eventually 
does violence to itself.  In this sense, plagiarism is a “final origin”: it articulates a change that 
announces a suffocation of language, a notion that another “origin” cannot “occur.”  Even as the 
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emergence and changing significance of plagiarism takes on particular force over Poe’s career, 
the significance of plagiarism ultimately signals a termination of that force, and of further 
signification.  This “final” notion of plagiarism arises in Poe’s thinking for the first time at the 
end of the “Longfellow War,” and finds its culmination in “The Raven.”  This chapter, therefore, 
will trace the changing meaning of plagiarism, which is especially well documented in the 
“Longfellow War,” and will examine how it comes to its dominant standing in “The Raven.” 
2.2 TOOLS, LABOR AND THE LOSS OF COMMUNITY 
Perhaps the most important work on the subject of plagiarism, and as a point of departure, is 
Foucault’s essay “What is an Author?”  This essay discusses the particularization of a work to an 
author, and begins to ask how and why one would begin to think of possession of the literary by 
an author.  Of particular importance is the ideological function that Foucault understands the 
author to serve.  The essay asks, “How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with 
which fiction threatens our world?  The answer is: One can reduce it with the author.”7
                                                 
7 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. 
Faubion (New York: The New York P, 1998), 221. 
  This 
passage is very valuable to begin a reflection on the history of plagiarism, and it illuminates 
Poe’s efforts to think about plagiarism as a problem of the press, but, more importantly, as a 
problem of creation.  To this end, it is essentially important to elaborate on what this “threat” to 
our world could mean, and what relationship such a threat could have with creation.  This 
passage from Foucault’s essay leads to these questions; Foucault notes that, in asking about the 
author, “One can say that the author is an ideological product, since we represent him as the 
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opposite of his historically real function. […]  The author is therefore the ideological figure by 
which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.”8
Following Foucault, we might begin to say, therefore, that the particularization of 
creation in the figure of the author is an attempt to manage the fear we have of the proliferation 
of meaning.  The promotion of this proliferation does not belong to an individual, but is, rather, 
the subject of our social-historical unfolding.  The threat to the world, therefore, arises insofar as 
the world – its meaning and what we know if it – is a creation of man, and the proliferation of 
meaning threatens the stability of this creation as well as the status quo.  This is the reason, once 
again, that “The Power of Words” is so important: it does not place creation in a speaker or 
writer, but, rather, in the language that brings together the productivity of action between 
speakers.  What the particularization of creation in the mind of an author reveals, therefore, is an 
historical tendency toward the loss of community as well as the obfuscation of community as the 
locus of human action and creation. 
 
This loss of community articulates a long and uncertain historical change.  Importantly, 
numerous scholars note that plagiarism – although a Latin term – is a product of European 
modernity.  In order to make sense of this, it is important to establish a number of details that 
articulate this change.  First of all, we can note that the problem of copyright arises in Europe 
with the appearance of the printing press, which divides labor into clearly appointed activities, 
often exteriorized into, and guided by the function of machines or the application of tools.  It is 
important to note that the printing press initiates the problem of copyright through its visibility as 
a tool that changes the possibilities of labor.  Governments rewarded the invention of this tool, in 
all quarters of Europe, with privileges, patents and copyrights because what is protected is not a 
                                                 
8 Foucault, 221-2. 
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set of ideas or the language of a book, initially, but the mode of production itself.  Bruce Bugbee 
notes the differences, but also the kinship, between patents and copyright: patents were given to 
inventions in order to stimulate and promote industry.  Copyright, on the other hand, occurs later, 
when authors brought new works to the press for publication.  In the 15th century, therefore, 
when the introduction of printing presses to numerous cities in Europe began, local governments 
offered patents to printers to encourage them to establish their operations.  These printers, at least 
initially, could print books by authors long since dead and therefore did not need to worry about 
copyright; the point of the patent was that these printers would not encounter competition, and 
would be free to perfect the function of their operation for the growth of industry and the local 
community in which they worked.9
These patents for printing cause a shift, first of all, from the labor of the scribes copying 
in the scriptorium, to the laborer working with machines.  In this movement, which places 
precedence on the visibility of labor, we begin to arrive at a clearly delineated and appointed 
labor time.  When the tool, the machine, becomes the measure of labor, we see more clearly a 
shift into modernity of the kind that Georges Bataille described in his work on political economy.  
The primacy of the tool, compounded by Max Weber’s insights in 
 
The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, led Bataille through his reflections on the rise of communities in the wake 
of feudalism that had lost their sense of community.10
                                                 
9 See Bruce Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law (Washington D.C.: Public 
Affairs P, 1967). 
  This is an important point with relation to 
Poe’s interest in plagiarism insofar as it illustrates how the individual is contained in the tools 
that give it form, and how this formation of the individual displaces him from the intimate 
continuity of community under which historical emergence and creation become possible.  The 
10 See Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, Volume 1 (New York: Zone Books, 1991). 
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relationship of a single person to his surroundings through the tool or the machine – which 
subordinates one’s surroundings to the goals and activities established in the tool and the 
machine – submits an individual’s sense of self to projects and definitions which make every 
present moment available to a static conception of economic and moral order. 
A further distinction arises in this insistence on the tool: one of the great distinctions 
between the modern classification of man with that of the ancients resides in the modern 
classification of man as homo faber, or the animal that uses tools.  This is quite different from the 
Greek description of man as the animal with rationality, or the animal with language.  Although 
this distinction is quite common in fields of Anthropology, I am thinking, in particular, of the 
significance that Castoriadis gives it: in the insistence on tools, and the labor attached to them, 
we get only a material sense of creation as craftsmanship.  This insistence on tools produces the 
notion of a purely material making, and ignores the immaterial creation that, for instance, I 
mention above with respect to “The Power of Words.” 
The history of copyright, therefore, as it implements the notion of the work of art as a 
product of labor by a single author through production and the use of tools, produces, also, a 
notion of language that cannot speak beyond its stabilization in a particular product.  This 
stabilization is of particular importance in understanding the problems that arise for Poe as he 
tries to think of plagiarism.  The danger of plagiarism exceeds the problem of one author stealing 
from another – which is already serious enough under the conditions for publishing in Poe’s 
moment.  Plagiarism also becomes a bigger problem than having the present merely reiterate the 
past.  Beyond this, the danger of plagiarism becomes that the past might reiterate the present 
when poets can no longer speak a language that is different from a predetermined host of 
meanings that it has been worked into. 
 35 
2.3 THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE OF PLAGIARISM IN POE’S THOUGHT 
Although Poe discussed plagiarism and its widespread occurrence in the literature of American 
and English journals as early as 1836 when he was editor of the Southern Literary Messenger,11
The increased publicity Poe received, although important, was secondary to the 
obligation he felt for criticizing the best-known authors and works of his time.  First and 
foremost among his responsibilities, Poe repeatedly claimed that it was the task of criticism to 
point out the flaws in a work rather than its merits.  This method, in many ways, resulted from a 
strategic engagement with the critical practices that abounded at the time; the reason for this was 
that Poe wanted to engage with literature as an opportunity, a crossroads, that would inaugurate 
critical reflection on literature.  Importantly, the method of beginning with “demerits” was a way 
to counteract most American journals, magazines, and book sellers’ commitment to fabricating 
literary reputations, especially as a result of the claims from England and elsewhere that the US 
was incapable of producing its own literature.  Poe believed that the dominant practice of 
pointing out the merits of a work promoted holding on to what critics branded as the “good” in a 
 
the most hard-fought exposition of the practice occurred in his reviews and criticism of 
Longfellow.  The reason for this is that Longfellow had many friends that effusively rushed to 
his defense as soon as Poe’s accusations against him began to circulate.  Longfellow was an 
important target of Poe’s accusations because he was so well known, and the antagonism Poe’s 
criticism initiated brought Poe, as well as the publications he worked for, into the spotlight of 
American literary criticism. 
                                                 
11 An especially important discussion occurs in the introduction to his “Pinakadia,” published in 
the Southern Literary Messenger, August, 1836, where Poe not only notes the widespread 
occurrences of plagiarism, but cites common sources for the American authors that commit it. 
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text, as one might hold onto a technique or a tradition, and carry it forward in imitation or, worse, 
plagiarism.  Pointing out “flaws” in a work, however, produced an ongoing engagement with 
literature and inventiveness that was otherwise absent from an industry consumed with the 
problem of a national literature.  Poe noted that the watchword at the beginning of the 1840s was 
“a national literature!” and that “we found ourselves daily in the paradoxical dilemma of liking, 
or pretending to like, a stupid book the better because (sure enough) its stupidity was of our own 
growth, and discussed our own affairs.”12
Poe’s campaign against one of the more popular poets in America at the time, therefore, 
served to illustrate how a popular poet, more often than not, won and maintained his reputation.  
Plagiarism, at least superficially, became an unpleasant abuse of power by poets that achieved 
renown: lesser-known authors, because they had trouble publishing, were easy targets for 
plagiarists when their work appeared in obscure journals or books.  Moreover, under the 
pressures of producing a national literature, critics were wary of detracting from established and 
popular authors, not to mention the fact that the public tended to defend a popular author as a 
matter of course.  In fact, once Poe took on the position of editor at the 
  Poe’s charge was that the prominence of many 
authors, therefore, was a mere staging – an exercise of popularity supported by what Poe called 
the “puffing” system, in which critics and reviewers unreservedly praised national works to 
produce authority and reputation.  Most of the criticism that circulated in the journals of his day 
engaged only in the task of “finding” a national literature, hoping that it would occur naturally as 
a native product of a nation, since the resources or conditions for producing it seemed displaced 
from the practices of “puffing.” 
Broadway Journal
                                                 
12 Edgar Allan Poe, “Exordium,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 11, ed. James 
A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 2. 
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began his long discussion of Longfellow’s plagiarisms, he described what he felt was the plight 
of these lesser-known poets when a reader, offhandedly, encountered similarities between two 
texts: 
We meet a certain passage in a certain book.  We meet a passage nearly similar, in 
another book.  The first book is not at hand, and we cannot compare dates.  We 
decide by what we fancy the probabilities of the case.  The one author is a 
distinguished man – our sympathies are always in favor of distinction.  “It is not 
likely,” we say in our hearts, “that so distinguished a personage as A. would be 
guilty of plagiarism from this B. of whom nobody in the world has ever heard.”  
We give judgment, therefore, at once against B. of whom nobody in the world has 
ever heard; and it is for the very reason that nobody in the world has ever heard of 
him, that, in ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, the judgment so precipitously 
given is erroneous.  Now then the plagiarist has not merely committed a wrong in 
itself – a wrong whose incomparable meanness would deserve exposure on 
absolute grounds – but he, the guilty, the successful, the eminent, has fastened the 
degradation of his crime – the retribution which should have overtaken it in his 
own person – upon the guiltless, the toiling, the unfriended struggler up the 
mountainous path of Fame.13
 
 
I cite this long passage because it illustrates a number of points with regard to both Poe’s 
accusations against Longfellow as well as the problems of plagiarism.  It is important to note that 
this series was the last of Poe’s examinations of Longfellow’s work.  Poe had published a 
number of reviews of different works by Longfellow over the years, usually praising his work for 
the most part, but also strongly faulting Longfellow’s didacticism14 and his tendency to imitate, 
“sometimes verging on downright theft.”15  The passage above, however, comes from the first of 
his five entries from his month-long series on Longfellow and plagiarism in the 
                                                 
13 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Longfellow War” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol. 12, 
ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 54-55.  For the remainder of this chapter, I 
will refer to this text parenthetically as “Longfellow War.” 
Broadway 
14 Poe’s notion of the “heresy of the didactic” from “The Poetic Principle” is well known, but he 
developed this notion in specific reviews and critiques, and developed it strongly in his reviews 
of Longfellow’s work.  See, in particular, Poe’s review of Longfellow’s Ballads. 
15 Edgar Allan Poe, “Chapter on Autography” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 
15, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 191. 
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Journal.  Rather than a review, or a study of Longfellow, these entries took the form of direct 
responses to publications in defense of Longfellow, especially to a pseudonymous article signed 
“Outis” (Greek for “nobody”).16
Poe’s response, therefore, is motivated by two important goals that we can begin to note 
from the passage I quote from above: first, Poe wished to make it very clear that he understood 
the consequences and the difficulties of accusing an eminent American poet of plagiarism, and 
that doing so was incidental to the process of exposing how the publishing industry built 
reputations, how it destroyed them, and the constraints this produced on setting the foundations 
and conditions for literature to flourish.  The puffing system could bring an author to 
prominence, and that author, because of the distinction he attained, might then plagiarize with 
  Poe felt particularly obligated to respond to Outis because 
Outis suggested offhandedly in his defense of Longfellow that one might accuse Poe of 
plagiarism, as well, since there are similarities between Poe’s work and Coleridge’s; Outis 
concluded, however, that such accusations would be rash since similarity is often the result of 
coincidence rather than theft. 
                                                 
16 For a detailed account of the events leading up to Outis’s defense of Longfellow, see Sidney 
Moss, Poe’s Literary Battles (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1963).  Further, there has been much 
speculation over who “Outis” may have been, some critics arguing that Poe, himself, wrote 
“Outis’s” article to set up a straw man that he would then destroy in the series he published for 
the Broadway Journal, known as the “Longfellow War.”  There is much to support this claim, 
especially the fact that Outis’s remarks appeared just before Poe became editor of the Broadway 
Journal, where he had a stake in the ownership of the publication and held enough authority to 
publish what he liked.  The appearance of Outis’s publication just before this event – had Poe 
indeed written it – would suggest that Poe planned, in advance, the series that would appear from 
March to April, 1845, as a systematic exposition of his thoughts on Longfellow and plagiarism.  
Killis Campbell, however, has refuted such claims.  See Killis Campbell, “Who Was Outis?” in 
University of Texas Studies in English, VIII (1928), 107-109.  In this article, Campbell claims 
that “Outis” was, in fact, a friend of Longfellow’s, and suggests that Poe responded in length 
over 5 issues of the Broadway Journal not because of a pre-planned program, but because he 
genuinely felt insulted by Outis’s article.  In any case, there is no definitive proof that settles the 
question of Outis’s identity. 
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impunity.  The practices and criticism of the day, including the “puffing” system, not only 
restricted the development of literature, and of the authors that produced promising literature, but 
it also concentrated attention and productive energy on marketing rather than on criticism or 
poetry.  This is the reason that Poe spent much of his life trying to found a journal that could 
survive independently of sponsors, so that it might study and observe “the purest rules of art,”17 
rather than adhering to the derivative practices of marketing.  As part owner of the Broadway 
Journal
Central to the impetus of the “Longfellow War,” Poe wished to detail the process by 
which he detected, and then accused a poet of plagiarism.  Poe is more clear about this second 
point in the final installment of “The Longfellow War,” where he states, for clarification, that 
“Having brought the subject, in this view, to a close in the last Journal, I now feel at liberty to 
add a few words of postscript, by way of freeing myself of any suspicion of malevolence or 
discourtesy.  The thesis of my argument, in general, has been the definition of the grounds on 
which a charge of plagiarism may be based, and of the species of ratiocination by which it is to 
be established: that is all” (“Longfellow War,” 105).  This series of publications on Longfellow, 
therefore, served to overturn Outis’s unsystematic and hurried accusations against Poe, as well as 
to define plagiarism through a detailed demonstration, rather than through a generalized set of 
, Poe saw this as his first opportunity for such an endeavor, and inaugurated his editorship 
of the journal with this series against Longfellow.  A careful demonstration of how one of the 
most popular American poets might be guilty of plagiarism would serve to denounce many of the 
“puffing” practices of criticism and journalism, and perhaps turn criticism toward a more 
rigorous engagement with literature. 
                                                 
17 This was Poe’s guiding mantra for the magazine he wished to found, which he outlined in his 
“Prospectus for the Penn Magazine.” 
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conditions.  Both of these goals, however, aimed toward a further objective, which, for starters, 
meant to bring the outlook for originality into sharper focus; Poe’s point, of course, is that, for 
the most part, the prominent American poets were incapable of originality, and that the criticism 
of the age was equally incapable of reflecting on, or directing the forces cohering around the 
publishing practices of the period.  Under these conditions, it becomes more clear why Poe 
decided that a month-long series on plagiarism, as an inaugural project for his Broadway Journal
The project of detecting plagiarism and accusing an author of the offense was mundane, 
even banal, and, in the end, quite difficult to prove, but necessary to begin such a movement.  
The passage from which I quote above illustrates the initial requirements, and the steps toward a 
demonstration of plagiarism.  Initially, the hypothetical reader detects only “similarity,” which is 
no more than what Outis discovered in comparing Poe’s texts to Coleridge.  The step, however, 
from detection of similarity to the charge of plagiarism requires an analysis that links the texts as 
identical, and then imposes on one of them the chronological category of firstness.  To prove 
identity between two texts, Poe carefully enumerated similarities in theme, ideas, and figures 
and, more importantly, similarities in the elaboration of these, which moved the demonstration 
from the possibility of coincidence, which would involve only chance, to a stronger likelihood of 
deliberate theft.  The final step for an accusation of plagiarism, however, involves what the 
hypothetical reader did not have available: publishing dates.  Poe’s demonstration, therefore, 
, 
may have been necessary to disabuse the habits of critics and readers that reacted blindly, as a 
matter of course, against the critical principles he wished to institute. 
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required the chronological arrangement of publication,18
What does Poe detect, therefore, when he detects a plagiarism?  Ultimately, Poe must 
detect a date around which he might arrange publications.  This date must serve as an indication 
of an origin, but this notion of “origin,” in order to provide a basis for the accusation of 
plagiarism, must acquire a very specific significance: the “origin” takes on the force of legal 
property to provide impetus for the accusation.  The crime of plagiarism in terms of theft occurs 
when a reputable author can “steal” from a poet and push him further into poverty.  Poetry, 
however, is not something that one might own in the sense of “having” an object.  The most 
important demonstration of ownership usually hinges around the material fact of possession, 
after which one might begin to argue the more difficult notion of rights for possession, and 
whether the fact that one can show possession means that one might also claim rights to it.  
Rather than material possession, however, demonstrating “ownership” of poetry becomes a 
 solidified by the temporal rhythms of 
journals and magazines. 
                                                 
18 Meredith McGill, in her book American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, argues that 
an accurate chronological arrangement of publications would have proved next to impossible 
during Poe’s time, regardless of the popularity and ubiquity of periodicals.  Her work attempts to 
show the errors of anachronism into which twentieth century scholars fall when they try to 
organize a chronology of Poe’s work, or, indeed, other authors’ work, out of temporally and 
spatially de-centered antebellum publications – what she calls the culture of reprinting.  What 
McGill means by temporal and spatial “de-centralization” is that texts circulated in different 
regions of the country (even internationally) and at different times without ever referring back to 
a moment of origin, or author as originator, especially since copyright laws were not fully 
enacted.  Journals, therefore, did not publish authors, but borrowed literary forms: genre.  Editors 
chose material from numerous sources that could be readable in the common terms of their 
audience, and reprinted these materials in different journals at different times, making accurate 
reference back to an “original” publication nearly impossible.  Although this argument might be 
useful in illustrating isolated errors in the demonstration of a particular plagiarism, the point I am 
making, however, is that the periodization of literature and thinking that occurs through the 
journalistic press promoted the category of linear-chronological time as the highest order under 
which “origination” takes on organizational priority.  The practice of “decentralized” printing in 
the wake of Romanticism, far from undoing “origin” or “authorship,” awakened a legal interest 
in the idea of the ownership of poetry, to which Poe’s obsession with plagiarism attests. 
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temporal problem.  Ownership – the “propre” of the author – requires, therefore, a notion of 
authorship in which a private intellect, the author’s thought, “expresses” a poem, and must go 
hand in hand with the chronological memory strongly established by the dates of journals.  The 
“origin” of the poem – when it takes on significance under the legal terms of ownership inflected 
by poverty, “Fame,” and financial remuneration – is an author’s private intellect, which is then 
firmly arranged in the public memory by periodicals.  The origin of a poem as the property of a 
particular intellect seems to amount to no more than the romantic notion of private intellect that 
creates in isolation. 
This definition of plagiarism, which defines the private intellect as the origin of literature, 
is quite important in the arena of the emergent publishing industry, not only with respect to the 
making and breaking of reputations, but also with respect to the pursuit of wealth.  Although Poe 
may have been one of the first American critics to aggressively denounce the practice of 
plagiarism, such outrage is part and parcel of the value that the romantic tradition confers upon 
individual authorship.  That such a formulation would arise here is not unexpected – in fact, the 
romantic notion of inspiration and imagination provided, on the one hand, the notion of the 
private intellect that produces work, and the influence of the press provided, on the other hand, 
the strong chronological configuration of time that continuously functions toward spatial 
connections and relations.  These relations do not establish a higher necessity or consistency, but 
are merely a means of ordering phenomena under an overarching model of historicism. 
A complication begins to arise, however, with the latter notion of time.  Although the 
goal of uncovering plagiarism seems to reside in establishing “origin” in an author – what 
belongs to whom – the temporal arrangement and the label of dates required in the demonstration 
of plagiarism expand this problem beyond a private and isolated intellect.  Dates are such 
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important indicators of “origin” that we might go so far as to say that Poe’s demonstrations show 
that the work belongs not just to an intellect, but also to a date.  Beyond a crime of theft, then, 
plagiarism produces a further disruption: that an item of the past might stand is if it “belonged” 
to the present.  Poe does not openly denounce this disruption, but it certainly troubles his work, 
and begins to suggest a more profound and troublesome problem for which the term “plagiarism” 
stands. 
This problem arises suddenly in the final entry of the “Longfellow War.”  Up to 1845, 
Poe defined plagiarism in terms that remained very close to the juridical problem of the 
ownership of property.  In the final entry of the “Longfellow War,” however, Poe offers a new 
possibility for plagiarism, for the first time in his career, that radically upsets the work he had 
done up to that point.  Through the first four installments of the “Longfellow War,” Poe berated 
Outis and the naïve judgment that plagiarisms such as Longfellow’s could be circumstantial; in 
the final entry of the series, however, Poe considers the possibility that Longfellow might be 
innocent of willful theft, and, in doing so, proposes the following explanation for an 
“involuntary” plagiarism: 
It appears to me that what seems to be the gross inconsistency of plagiarism as 
perpetrated by a poet, is very easily thus resolved: - the poetic sentiment (even 
without reference to the poetic power) implies a peculiarly, perhaps abnormally 
keen appreciation of the beautiful, with a longing for its assimilation, or 
absorption, into poetic identity.  What the poet intensely admires, becomes thus, 
in very fact, although only partially, a portion of his own intellect.  It has a 
secondary origination within his own soul – an origination altogether apart, 
although springing from its primary origination from without.  The poet is thus 
possessed by another’s thought, and cannot be said to take of it, possession.  But, 
in either view, he thoroughly feels it as his own – and this feeling is counteracted 
only by the sensible presence of its true, palpable origin in the volume from which 
he has derived it – an origin which, in the long lapse of years it is almost 
impossible not to forget – for in the meantime the thought itself is forgotten.  But 
the frailest association will regenerate it – it springs up with all the vigor of new 
birth – its absolute originality is not even a matter of suspicion – and when the 
poet has written it and printed it, and on its account is charged with plagiarism, 
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there will be no one in the world more entirely astounded than himself. 
(“Longfellow War,” 105-6) 
 
With respect to everything leading up to this entry, this constitutes a very surprising conclusion 
to the “Longfellow War.”  These concluding statements are unexpected because they reverse the 
goals Poe had set up to this point: if Longfellow was not guilty of “meanness,” then the literary 
reputation he achieved was not a planned sham, or a product of the “puffing” system, but, 
perhaps, an impotence of a deeper and more pervasive nature.  In any case, much of this 
diminishes the urgency and sternness with which Poe might level the charge of plagiarism 
against his target.  Why would he choose to soften the blow of the accusation as he does at this 
moment, after having spent a month bringing his accusations and proof to a head?  If his goal 
was to punish reputations wrongfully and maliciously built, why would he end his month-long 
exposition of Longfellow’s plagiarisms, quite blunt and forceful up to this point, in such a way? 
In this analysis, Poe reverses the temporal disturbance caused by plagiarism in which 
materials of the past wrongfully stand as if they “belonged” to the present.  Under the sign of 
plagiarism, these materials still belong to the past, but now take possession of the present, rather 
than the other way around.  Poe’s revision of intention in plagiarism revises the notion of 
“origin” and “possession” altogether.  Authors in the present no longer commit a transgression, 
but fall prey to these past materials inadvertently.  In the legal view of plagiarism, the author’s 
intellect was the origin of literature; in this final entry, Poe claims that language takes possession 
of an author’s intellect: “What the poet intensely admires, becomes thus, in very fact, although 
only partially, a portion of his own intellect.”  This view of plagiarism undoes the idea of a 
subject whose ground is an ontology that gives it the possibility of making choices, which in turn 
become the agency for change (intellect as origin).  In fact, an intellect cannot be an origin if 
language forms it: language becomes the origin of intellect, in which everything is decided anew 
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in the distinct, material context of the acquisition of language.  The origin of poetry, therefore 
must be language and not rational volition.  It appears that, rather than a continuous and rational 
subject, we are left to think of the complexities in which language is given, and, indeed, rethink 
what we have up to now called the “intellect” in terms of such a complexity. 
Poe claims, however, that this formation is only “partial,” which may continue to suggest 
a volitional control in the intellect of the author as he searches for “origin.”  In this sense, Poe’s 
argument might appear close to Harold Bloom’s conception of literary history, where the 
“origin” of history resides in a poem, and history progresses along a dialectical course in which 
art is superseded by other art, bypassing any social, political or public sphere, and where, finally, 
the author’s intellect (genius) serves as the arbiter between links in the dialectical chain.  
Although Bloom tries to characterize a historical development of art with this dialectal process – 
whereas Poe was trying to explain the conditions of plagiarism – the similarities between the two 
should be noted, particularly the notion that art begins in other art and finds its continuing 
possibility in genius, in order to point out the important discrepancies.  Central to these 
discrepancies is the sudden disavowal of volitional control in Poe’s argument, which changes the 
very nature of Poe’s understanding of history and his moment.  In Poe’s description from the 
passage I quote above, the absence of agency in the intellect insofar as it is inadvertently formed, 
opens the dialectical link between art and art that decides Bloom’s system.  It further disrupts the 
private interior of the familiar romantic agency that Poe seems to have used up to this point.  In 
his final comments, the experience of art “spring(s) from its primary origination from without.”  
This “primary origination” might be the equivalent of “the sensible presence of its true, palpable 
origin in the volume from which he has derived it,” but the memory of this “origin” is activated 
by a chance encounter with the world in which the poet’s memory awakens involuntarily and 
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with new force: “the frailest association will regenerate it – it springs up with all the vigor of a 
new birth – its absolute originality is not even a matter of suspicion.”  This involuntary memory 
orients poetry and art to the world in which it is embedded, which is to say, that art is oriented to 
the present world in which the poet finds himself, and finds its life and meaning there, rather 
than “in” the “origin” or time in which the poem was written. 
Such a description of the experience of art, or of poetry, in which art forms the intellect, 
and sets an involuntary memory into action, opens up numerous possibilities for thinking about 
the relationship between the past and the present, and the meaning of “origination.”  In 
particular, this reading comes quite close to Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire – through a 
reading of Freud – that involves a notion of consciousness that is opposed to memory.  
Importantly for this discussion, memory is that which an object activates by chance, and which 
one may or may never discover.  Conversely, that which consciousness experiences directly 
becomes sterilized in the experience, and comes under the control of consciousness for the 
service of the intellect (the intellect is only “partially” formed), which can then arrange the 
experience by recollection (the active memory of publishing dates).  The essence of the matter, 
therefore, is that only that which does not enter into consciousness may put memory into motion.  
This is not to say that one establishes a causal connection between the past event and one’s 
current moment; the relationship is decided in a moment of arrest.  One example of how this 
might happen is in Benjamin’s use of Proust’s “mémoire involontaire” in which a chance 
encounter with an object, in a single instant, allows time to be re-experienced.  In this single 
moment, the tie to the object generates an active memory and a unique recovery of the past. 
All of this goes to show that Poe might have found, in his descriptions in the final 
installment of the “Longfellow War,” a mobile memory for which language may have served as 
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an incarnation.  Poe, indeed, gives language priority, but the problem is that it takes this priority 
under the sign of plagiarism: the past takes possession of the present.  Instead of the creative 
movement Benjamin finds in Baudelaire and Proust, Poe sees a past that is altogether there, in 
the print of the original journal or book, of which the plagiarizing poet “cannot be said to take 
[…] possession,” so much as the plagiarist “is thus possessed by another’s thought.”  This 
language springs up from the past into the present to produce parrots rather than authors or poets.  
So even as this “primary origination” – the volume that the plagiarist first read – springs up by 
chance in relation to the world, this “new birth” fails to produce an origin in the present.  What 
this produces for him, finally, is a present in which one cannot speak, as journalism and 
reportage loom large over his imagination in a language “locked” into an origin that doesn’t 
belong to his present. 
What is perhaps most important in this meaning of plagiarism is that it has arisen 
unexpectedly – almost with the force of an involuntary memory, when Poe was culminating his 
argument against Longfellow and Outis, causing Poe to retract the force of his accusations – as a 
sign of Poe’s moment.  It is true that Poe faults a strong “poetic sentiment” for this “involuntary” 
plagiarism, and claims this problem a fault not of his own age, but of all great poets of all times.  
The argument, therefore, seems to continue to appeal to a particular and universal function of 
intellect, but the dynamics of the argument do not finally allow this.  If language forms the 
intellect, then the “origin” of the intellect is not a universal “poetic sentiment,” but language 
itself.  Only an intervention at the level of language, its circulation and usage, may arrest this 
process.  Ultimately, then, there may be no origin in an intellect, only in the material context in 
which man encounters language.  The poetic sentiment, therefore, is not so much a faculty, or an 
element in the life of an intellect, as it is an eddy in the life of language.  Poe universalizes the 
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problem of plagiarism at this point because of the peculiarity of its temporal dimension, which 
amounts to the inability of his age to separate from the past. 
Importantly, this notion of plagiarism does not simply stand as a representation or 
referent for his moment.  The meaning of plagiarism does not exist as mere representation 
because it does not have an anecdotal exterior, as in the reportage of the newspaper press.  The 
press, under its temporal pressures, understands the work of imaginative literature only as a lie.  
For journalism, the imagination works voluntarily, and only with respect to a real dimension that 
is decided before it works.  It has a strange capacity, however: it can produce that which it knows 
is not real.  This type of imagination works on a volitional and representational level: it can 
produce falsities with respect to a real, but only insofar as it knows the real before it begins its 
work.  Journalism, with its insistence on the simultaneous incidence between word and referent, 
reduces the literary imagination to a relationship to a previous reality.  The imaginative 
transformation devolves from a pre-existing sphere of reality that delimits what one creates 
imaginatively.  This notion of plagiarism in Poe’s work, however, appears as an involuntary 
memory, but what appears does not appear to consciousness, is not phenomenal – its referent is 
thought, an expression and representation of thinking. 
With this respect, plagiarism as it occurs in Poe’s thinking at this moment is creative 
expression – an origin that does not simply devolve from reality, and which does not result from 
a volitional choice of signification from available referents.  Interestingly, this creative 
expression is, itself, an origin, but unlike the one Poe sought through the voluntary memory of 
dates in journals: it is, instead, a signification that emerges in the particular configuration that 
occurs in the wake of the romantic tradition and the rise of the capitalist print industry.  The 
emergence of this signification for writing relates closely to the institutions at work in Poe’s 
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moment, but stands apart from them in the sense that this signification expresses a creation.  This 
creation, however, is ironically a “final” creation: it forms an origin that inserts itself as an 
interruption, or a disarticulation of further origins.  
2.4 “THE RAVEN” AND THE CURSE OF THE ETERNAL PRESENT 
The notion of plagiarism that Poe elaborates at the end of the “Longfellow War” might produce a 
different significance with respect to the morbid aspects of Poe’s writing than what critics have 
usually given these, often lumping these characteristics as relations to the Gothic tradition from 
which Poe borrowed.  Regardless of whether Poe did, indeed, borrow these elements, what is 
important to note here is the relation these have to Poe’s thinking, and how these find their 
significance there.  There is a feeling in Poe’s fiction of a past rushing up to the present, with 
forces that have been directed with the materials of tradition; these materials, however, “arrive” 
in the present as materials of the past, that inhabit the present, but cannot confer order or 
meaning to the present.  Narrators of Poe’s tales, therefore, are often at a loss as to how to 
explain the present or give it meaning with respect to the traditions that had existed up until the 
recent past.  For this reason, there is, everywhere in Poe’s fiction, figures of dead bodies, 
premature burials, images of suffocation, diseased minds in lost libraries, and sons of historically 
vast lineages who are no longer able to remember their family name. 
The plagiarism Poe describes at the end of the “Longfellow War,” which configures the 
difficulties between relationships of the present with the past that we see in much of his fiction, 
however, is best figured in “The Raven,” whose publication anticipates the “Longfellow War” by 
only a matter of months.  The description of plagiarism as a problem that “origin” is always 
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elsewhere (another time), and that the present is not an “origin” – it is unable to begin again – 
takes on powerful significance through the temporal aspect of the raven’s speech: “nevermore.”  
This is important leading up to the “Longfellow War,” but it is also of great importance in much 
of Poe’s fiction, as well as in relation to his Marginalia.  The entries Poe prepared for the 
Marginalia, in particular, struck a strong discord with the clearly appointed temporality and dates 
of journals by refusing such dated organization; the marginal comments, therefore, did not 
respond to such temporal arrangements, but attempted, rather, to speak the present without 
temporal/spatial relations to other moments.  The Marginalia attempts this by writing in the 
present as if the present figured as something intermediary that participates in a continuing 
process, without clear outcomes or pre-determinants, in which the thought of the present is 
pending, rather than speaking the present as reportage or journalism.  The entries that appear in 
the Marginalia, therefore, force what would normally be the “object” of literary analysis into 
intermediary status – something from which the finishedness of an object is withdrawn.  
Plagiarism suggests that the possibility for “origin” is in language – not intellect – so the 
Marginalia
Poe further elaborates this “space” of suffocation in “The Raven”; the “where” of this 
space becomes more clearly the sphere of language, which the speaker of the poem cannot 
finally locate: this “space” is not assailable.  “The Raven” begins with the speaker’s introduction, 
alone in his study, reading “forgotten lore,” in order to forget his sorrow: the death of his 
beloved, “Lenore.”  The poem, however, distances itself quickly from the problem of solitude, of 
a lone intellect thinking and representing his thought in art.  Further, the narrator’s failure to 
 are interesting in that these entries are situated in the margins of texts, but the 
margins represent a “closing space,” the space of suffocation, that Poe figures with particular 
force in 1845. 
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separate from the object of his sorrow is only a symptom of a greater problem.  The problem of 
the poem – the failure of the narrator to articulate or create a present that could produce 
separation from the past – arrives as an approach from the outside: a “rapping at my chamber 
door.”19
Upon returning to his chamber, the narrator is approached again, this time by a knocking 
at his window, from which the figure of the raven appears, and whom the narrator identifies as 
belonging to “the saintly days of yore.”  From its very first appearance, the raven takes on the 
significance of the past irrupting in the present.  The narrator has a sense of that past, that there is 
something of the raven that does not belong to the present, but he is ultimately unable to 
articulate what that difference is.  This impotence marks the present, and condemns the present 
with the inability to begin anew, or to obtain direction or coherence.  This inability characterizes 
the state of the narrator, who cannot distinguish between what he does and what he can’t begin to 
do: although he notes a difference between past and present, he cannot confer validity to that 
separation by explaining it or making it intelligible.  What is particularly important in this poem 
is that the present did not arrive as a linear-chronological event that the narrator can recount 
through the emplotment of cause and effect (as one might in journalism); the present “arrived” in 
the form of this very impotence, which remains its foremost quality.  The emplotment of the 
  In fact, when the narrator rises to confront his visitor, he opens the door to discover 
“Darkness there and nothing more.”  The darkness the speaker encounters – the “nothing” of the 
darkness at his door – as well as the arrival of the problem from elsewhere, signals the 
unassailability of the curse that the raven will bestow upon him, and his inability to intervene in 
the force that binds him to it. 
                                                 
19 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Raven,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 7, ed. James 
A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965). 94.  For the remainder of this chapter, I will cite this 
poem parenthetically as “The Raven.” 
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present in a linear chronology would serve only to aggravate the problem; the impotence of the 
present occurs, in part, because such emplotment may be the speaker’s only recourse to 
intelligibility.  Poe decisively discards any notion of progress that would arrange the materials of 
the past in such a linear chronological way as to give them meaning; the result is that these 
materials, without arranging them into linear model of progress, exist as scattered materials, none 
of which, finally, grant the present any new material with which to begin anew. 
The past, in the form of the raven’s appearance, has a “saintly” character: it has order and 
intelligibility.  The speaker, however, belongs to a present that is excluded from this 
intelligibility; therein lies the curse of the raven’s speech: nevermore.  Importantly, this word 
itself – which is key to the organization of the poem and the significance of the narrator’s plight 
in an eternally sorrowful present – resounds without meaning.  The raven repeats it like a parrot, 
without intent or significance, so its repetition serves only to collect, in a disordered present, 
language to which the speaker cannot confer meaning or order.  The speaker realizes that the 
raven intends nothing and means nothing by repeating “Nevermore”:  
Startled at the stillness broken by reply so aptly spoken, 
“Doubtless,” said I, “what it utters is its only stock and store, 
Caught from some unhappy master whom unmerciful Disaster 
Followed fast and followed faster till his songs one burden bore –  
Till the dirges of his Hope that melancholy burden bore 
    Of “Never-nevermore.” (“The Raven,” 97) 
In this stanza we see that, beyond the narrator’s reflection on the absence of meaning of 
“nevermore” in the raven’s “speech,” the speaker also speculates about the raven’s master, and 
what may have prompted him to such extraordinary repetition and insistence on this particular 
word.  The repetition is a “burden” inaugurated by a disaster that follows the raven’s owner.  
This condition repeats a number of problems: in the first instance, the disaster, like the knocking 
on the chamber door, is an approach from elsewhere, rather than an impotence of the raven’s 
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master – himself a writer – whether we might call that impotence lack of imagination or even 
“writer’s block.”  The “master’s” songs bear the burden that follows him from elsewhere, “fast” 
and “faster,” touching everything and yet leaving everything untouched.  This strange condition 
affects writing, what it has been up to now, but without granting the writer the ability to 
articulate how it changes from this moment forth.  The writer continues writing, as he had done 
up until the moment of the disaster, but with the incapacity for language to begin anew.  If 
anything, the raven’s repetition of “Nevermore” – which reverberates the arrest of time as a word 
that is hollow of meaning – signals a curse in the present in which a disaster has reduced the 
possibilities of language in much the same way that Poe describes the problem of plagiarism at 
the end of the “Longfellow War.” 
In his reading, the speaker is looking for separation – “surcease of sorrow” – from past 
objects, through mourning, but also through forgetting (which is what the critic of the Marginalia 
is able to do in distinction to the speaker of “The Raven,” or even the speaker of “The 
Philosophy of Composition”).  But the raven is an image from the past that materially inhabits 
his study, and blocks this possibility of separation.  Poe, however, in “The Philosophy of 
Composition,” argues that the word “Nevermore” does, in fact, acquire a range of meaning and 
possibilities of signification: “I resolved to diversify, and so heighten, the effect, by adhering, in 
general, to the monotone of sound, while I continually varied that of thought: that is to say, I 
determined to produce continuously novel effects, by the variation of the application of the 
refrain – the refrain itself remaining, for the most part, unvaried.”20
                                                 
20 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Philosophy of Composition” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan 
Poe, Vol 14, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 199. 
  Poe goes on to claim that he 
chose the speaker’s questions insofar as they would elicit the “nevermore” response to increase 
 54 
the tone of sorrow.  The speaker, therefore, proceeded from ordinary questions, to excited and 
desperate ones that might even suggest a desire on the part of the speaker for self-torture, as the 
raven’s response becomes expected. 
It’s not clear, however, to what extent we may believe Poe’s claims in “The Philosophy 
of Composition.”  Rather than “novel effects,” we have a situation in which the speaker of “The 
Raven” not only expects a particular response to his questions, but, in expecting a particular 
response, belabors the misfortune of the possibilities inherent in asking.  What becomes of great 
importance is the reason the speaker engages the raven’s “nevermore” as a set of questions.  
When one asks a question, one elevates the terms of the question to the heights of their 
possibility: one cannot be sure what the terms might capture.  The question raises its terms to the 
level of possibility of creation and imaginative elaboration.  “The Raven,” however, collapses all 
of the narrator’s questions into a particular answer that signals the arrest of asking.  The 
“nevermore” of the raven’s answer, each time the speaker asks a new question, destroys the 
possibility of what it asks: the “nevermore” fixes the terms of the question, ends the asking, and 
ends the possibility of asking again. 
The poem ends with the image of the raven casting its shadow over the speaker’s floor, 
and with a final repetition of “nevermore,” announcing that the raven will never lift its shadow.  
The final image, once again, dispenses with any notion of seeking recourse in the poet’s – the 
speaker’s, in this case – agency.  The possibility of poetry, therefore, cannot reside in volitional 
control over composition – the agency I mention here – or romantic inspiration; the possibility of 
poetry resides in language.  If this language, however, oriented to a mechanistic time as Poe 
elaborates it in his confrontation with journalism and in “The Raven,” permeates us and 
articulates us, then the eventful being that strives to emerge from the world is itself deadened for 
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we can no longer name it in language.  The disaster that looms over the speaker of “The Raven” 
is the threat of an eternal present and the terminus of history. 
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3.0  POE’S MARGINALIA
3.1 CREATION AND THE LEAP OF “NOT KNOWING” IN THE WORLD OF NEWS 
 AND THE LEAP OF CREATION 
Poe began experimenting with the form of the colloquies in 1839, when he published “The 
Conversation of Eiros and Charmion” in Burton’s.  He would publish “The Colloquy of Monos 
and Una” a year later, and would finish the third and fourth tales in this grouping, “Mesmeric 
Revelation” and “The Power of Words,” in 1844 and 1845, respectively.  The dates are of 
importance because Poe finished his third and fourth tale in this form roughly around the time he 
was publishing his first installments of the Marginalia, with which these colloquies, I would like 
to argue, hold a deep affinity.  These stories hold a number of similarities for which they are 
often grouped together, including a strong thematic resemblance.  Eric Carlson notes that these 
stories actually belong to different “categories” in Poe’s thought, but share a kinship in that they 
represent the development of Poe’s thought into the metaphysical and transcendent.1  Further, 
these tales share a common interest in death, decay and destruction of apocalyptic scale; indeed, 
Poe appears in Douglas Robinson’s American Apocalypses as an author of “definitive forms of 
the American apocalypse.”2
                                                 
1 See Eric Carlson, “Frames of Reference for Poe’s Symbolic Language” in Critical Essays on 
Edgar Allan Poe (Boston: Hall, 1987) and “Poe’s Vision of Man,” in Papers on Poe, ed. Richard 
Veler (Springfield OH: Chantry Music P, 1978), 7-20. 
 
2 Douglas Robinson, American Apocalypses (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1985). 
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Surprisingly, however, the form of the colloquy itself, which consists of a dramatic 
exchange with no narrative, and for which these tales are generally grouped together in the first 
place, garners much less attention than the themes of these tales.  The themes are certainly 
important, and prepare Poe for writing Eureka, especially “Mesmeric Revelation,” which 
anticipates much of what Poe would discuss toward the end of his life in his prose poem.  I bring 
up these stories with respect to Eureka to address the figure of historical emergence and 
creativity that Poe offers in his prose poem to think about his own moment and the possibilities 
for the future.  In particular, I am thinking of the introduction to Eureka – which Poe would adapt 
for another tale, “Mellonta Tauta” – in which a letter from the future discussing the pursuit of 
truth, looks back retrospectively at the history of science and claims that “the progress of true 
Science […] makes its most important advances – as all History will show – by seemingly 
intuitive leaps.”3
I wish to reflect on the colloquies, and especially their form, rather than on “Mellonta 
Tauta” or the introduction to 
  This introduces a number of complexities, most importantly that history does 
not progress in a simple, linear mode with a clear, locatable agency, nor can already existing 
knowledge contain the “intuitive leap” out of which history emerges.  The leap is a figure of 
discontinuity; more, it is action – a physical exertion – that reaches beyond. 
Eureka, however, because these colloquies not only anticipate the 
figure of the leap in Eureka as a figure of historical emergence, but they also indicate a more 
radical possibility of discontinuity than this passage from Eureka
                                                 
3 Edgar Allan Poe, Eureka, in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 16, ed. James A. 
Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 189. 
.  The form of these colloquies 
as a conversational exchange, which takes place without narrative frame, occurs between two 
speakers whose proximity to one another is sometimes very close – intimate even (“The 
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Colloquy of Monos and Una,” for instance, is a conversation between two lovers reunited in the 
afterlife) – and yet their separation is also infinite, unbridgeable, lost in the “expanse” between 
life and death (the stories take place in the afterlife, or, as in the case of “Mesmeric Revelation,” 
at the “point” of dying).  Importantly, only speech fills this relation of intimate closeness and 
infinite distance between the characters.  Within such a relation, their only recourse is to speak to 
one another in an unreal time of death, which the tale announces as the condition of renewed 
possibilities for speech and language.  “The Colloquy of Monos and Una,” for example, 
addresses the problem not only as a renewal, but also a rebirth: “for the infected world at large I 
could anticipate no regeneration save in death.  That man, as a race, should not become extinct, I 
saw that he must be ‘born again.’”4
This allows us to qualify the notion of the leap much more cleary (as well the “infection” 
of man that “The Colloquy of Monos and Una” mentions), which has nothing to do with the way 
that popular science describes its advance as in “leaps and bounds,” suggesting only a spatial, 
developmental relation.  This notion of the leap in the introduction to 
  The conversation occurs in this time of death as a new 
opportunity for man, and Poe places what man can create in this exchange as a world that opens 
without measure.  The relation between speakers spans the measurelessness that exists between 
life and death; the timeless and placelessness of death expresses the infinite distance between the 
speakers, which becomes the relation of speech.  This measurelessness is the very measure of the 
unkown, not in the sense that what is not known belongs to a sphere of the not yet known, but in 
the sense that what is not known belongs to the measureless expanse of creation: therein lies the 
significance of the afterlife and the conversation in these tales. 
Eureka
                                                 
4 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Colloquy of Monos and Una” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan 
Poe, Vol 4, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 205. 
, rather, develops 
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through the notion of language between two speakers, as in the colloquies, in which there is no 
direct relation between speakers, which are sometimes close, but also infinitely separate, as I say 
above.  To leap, therefore, is akin to speech here in that neither leaping nor speech are held back 
by a predetermined relation, or by a result, but play between firm ground (what Poe calls 
“knowledge” in these colloquies) and undefined space (the action of not knowing).  The passage 
from “The Power of Words” that I discuss in Chapter 1 of this dissertation bears repeating here: 
Agathos, in speaking to another angel, Oinos, corrects Oinos about the relation between 
knowledge and happiness.  Agathos declares that, “not in knowledge is happiness, but in the 
acquisition of knowledge!  In forever knowing, we are forever blessed; but to know all, were the 
curse of a fiend.”5
This notion of the leap might also clarify the mention of “infection” in man in “The 
Colloquy of Monos and Una” from which man needs to be saved.  More specifically with regard 
to this infection, Monos mentions in the tale that “Art – the Arts – arose supreme, and, once 
enthroned, cast chains upon the intellect which had elevated them to power.”
  To know all is a curse because, as I say in Chapter 1, it would end the 
possiblilty of passing through moments of not knowing; it would end, as it were, the possiblity of 
the leap or of the exchange in the conversation as I describe it here. 
6
                                                 
5 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Power of Words,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 5, 
ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 139. 
  It seems, 
therefore, that man is in the strange position of having transformed the celebration of his own 
self-creation, art, into the means of his own enslavement.  In this sense, the notion of art, of that 
which man creates, bears a relation to the importance and development of nihilism in Nietzsche.  
The nihilism to which I refer has to do with, first, the devaluation of God; in God’s absence, it 
6 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Colloquy of Monos and Una,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan 
Poe, Vol 4 , ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 203. 
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becomes man’s task to create the world and its meaning, which opens up boundless possibilities 
for man.  The problem with nihilism, however, is that it “infects” other fields of meaning and 
activity: science, technology, art, and other human domains of activity – even in the face of the 
responsibility of creating the world – fail to open the world as possibility and move, instead, to 
dominate it.  This is the case Heidegger makes in his reading of Nietszche7, and in his analysis of 
the difference between the Greek terms “techne” and “poesis,” as opposed to their modern 
counterpart, “technology.”8  It is in this sense that we might understand Monos’ lament in “The 
Colloquy of Monos and Una,” and in this sense, too, that we might begin to understand the 
project of Poe’s Marginalia
Despite all of this, Poe saw much potential in the magazine and journal, and was 
committed to using these media to institute an independent criticism, and support literature in the 
US.  Many of his goals for the magazine corresponded to the early purposes of the newspapers, 
which often had as their goal the circulation of unofficial knowledge as a challenge to statist and 
religious power.  An example of this occurs in 18th century France, when numerous printers were 
.  Poe’s attempts to publish, and to promote literature as an editor, ran 
up against, first, the “magazine prison house” that kept most writers in poverty, and the tendency 
of the magazine and newspaper press to safeguard an “eternal” image of man (naturalized man, 
moral man, etc, as well as the eternal present of plagiarism I describe in my first chapter, 
“Plagiarism and the Raven’s ‘Nevermore’”), which would chain him to the present and not allow 
the jump, the leap, that would be the sign of self-creation.  
                                                 
7 See Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).  In this 
lecture series, Heidegger discusses Nietzsche’s statement about what is most thought provoking 
in our own time is that we are still not thinking, and that man embraces only the platitudes of his 
existence after the death of God. 
8 I am referring to Heidegger’s famous analysis of techne in which he compares the thought of 
techne as someone standing by a river and hearing the river, to someone with the thought of 
technology standing by the same river hearing only “standing reserve.” 
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driven into exile at the time of the Encyclopédie.  These exiled printers helped publish 
newspapers to spread the ideas of radical thinkers, and to damage the authority of the king.9  In 
the US we see some counterparts to this example as early as 1721 in the form of the New 
England Courant
                                                 
9 See Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, The Coming of The Book: The Impact of Printing 
1480-1800, eds. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and David Wootton (London: NLB, 1976). 
, edited by James Franklin – Benjamin Franklin’s older brother.  One of the 
goals of this paper, and of Benjamin Franklin’s contributions to it, was to establish a free press, 
independent of the state, church, and even the universities.  These goals changed quickly, 
however, as the journals became a dominant source of transmission, and the masses were defined 
more clearly as the subject and target of this transmission, rather than the king, for instance.  
These organs of mass circulation became a timely and well-placed means of eradicating any 
alterity, rather than a means of engagement with official symbols of power.  In the nineteenth 
century in the US, these organs of mass circulation became primarily concerned with time, such 
that their existence was no longer motivated by the creation of knowledge or opposition, but by 
the instantaneous mobilization of its resources to secure and report the present.  The tools of the 
penny press to present news as quickly as possible – the “scoops” – included stopping the 
presses, and interrupting their own stories with updates in a single edition of a newspaper, to give 
the sense that events were instantly available to readership.  This created a style of engagement 
with the world in which reporters were on constant standby, waiting passively for what they 
would report.  This also brings up the relevance and importance of Hiedegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche again: the experience that each present moment passes quickly creates a 
“ressentiment” against this linear structure of temporal passing.  The constant standby on which 
media outlets were placed focused on capturing the present, and made any deviations from the 
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ordered and expected frightful; the entire real order was mobilized to react to them under a 
pervading mass hysteria, fear, anxiety and alarm. 
This style of reportage was inimical to the notion of a passage through not knowing that I 
discuss above.  In order to report the world instantaneously, the world must present as if it were 
self-given, so that any deviation from this “self-givenness” is already the mark of its own self-
exclusion.  By excluding the moment of not knowing, knowledge takes on the illusion of 
permanence, of its not having been constituted, and of its being eternally continuous with the 
world it would understand.  For this reason, Poe published the Marginalia as a way of 
encountering the possibility of thinking this form differently, or as a way of finding a 
discontinuity within its insistence on instantaneous reportage.  Poe writes the Marginalia from 
the library of a critic who publishes, in journals and magazines, the notes he has organized from 
his library.  It is important, therefore, to reflect on Poe’s project in relation to the journals that he 
worked for, that he criticized, to better illustrate the direction of Poe’s criticism, and the 
importance of the Marginalia for thinking the problem of language in relation to these journals.  
It is important to point out, first, that Poe conceived of this project in the absence of a national 
culture; the US did not respond to traditional projects of national culture in which literature and 
language formed national citizens.  The unifying tendencies of culture, instituted by the study of 
language, were absent in the US.  Culture as that which permeates every aspect of life, as 
techniques and forms of understanding that situate citizens in relation to each other and their 
surroundings, did not exist pervasively in the US to establish a universality.  The US at this 
moment was fragmented into states, local communities, and nationalities lifted from their native 
soil and transplanted to America. 
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Poe noticed, however, that in the US, many of these distinct communities, regardless of 
this distinction, articulated a larger assemblage.  Instead of a universality exhibited by culture, 
and founded on studies and institutions of language, Poe noticed a homogenization of individuals 
in the US that occurred as a result of the temporal rhythms of the journal, which solidified the 
present, and the relationship between its attendant reality and the language meant to represent it.  
The organization that produces homogeneity in the American population, therefore, is temporal, 
and not merely the surveillance of territory by force.  Poe’s project, therefore, requires 
illustration of the linear chronology and solidification of the present that the journal institutes, 
rather than merely taking it as given or natural.  To do this, Poe attempted to disclose the non-
identity between language and “reality” in order to reveal an animation, characteristic of 
language, that did not respond to the temporality of the journal, and its ontological petrifaction of 
the present.  Poe composed the Marginalia to achieve this; this chapter, therefore, will focus on 
Poe’s Marginalia
3.2 CRITICAL NOTES: FUTURES OF INFINITE ERROR 
, which produced a complex of signification in confrontation with the imaginary 
institutions of time figured by the journals in which it appeared. 
Poe achieved the requirements I refer to in the section above through the form of the Marginalia, 
which consist of notes that are mainly characterized by their unfinishedness, and insist on their 
utter uselessness, thereby refusing a totalizing image of the present that journalism might 
describe and name.  Perhaps most importantly, the Marginalia occur at the margins of other texts, 
which breaks the seamlessness between language and reality by orienting language not to a real 
referent, but to other language.  This language of criticism, oriented to other language, bears a 
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relation to the figure of the leap, which I have elaborated above through the conversations in the 
colloquies.  The notes that comprise the Marginalia always begin in other texts, as if the notes 
themselves are in conversation with the texts that exist in the critic’s library.  More importantly, 
however, Poe describes a different figure of conversation that lies at the center of the 
organization of those notes: the critic announces, in the introductory installment of the 
Marginalia, that in the notes that follow, “we talk only to ourselves.”10  What is interesting in this 
announcement is that the notes do not seek the mass audience that journals usually addressed.  
These notes, therefore, are not merely reports written by the journalist in passive wait for the 
events that he will deliver to the press.  Further, the author of these notes who is talking only to 
himself, reads his notes after having forgotten them.  This dimension that splits the author of the 
Marginalia
The first installment of the 
 into the writer and the reader as the two figures of conversation echoes the 
importance of the conversation as the figure of historical emergence.  With this regard, Poe 
represents the action of speech through shifting possibilities in writing and reading, and orients 
the leap beyond the stories of simple development and universal reportage that dominated the 
newspaper press. 
Marginalia, published in the November 1844 edition of the 
Democratic Review
                                                 
10 Edgar Allan Poe, Marginalia, in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 11, ed. James 
A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 2.  For the remainder of this chapter, I will cite the 
Marginalia parenthetically by its title. 
, begins this project quite forcefully.  In this installment, Poe includes an 
entry about readership in which he discusses how the increase in the number of publications and 
of reading material affects reading.  Poe attends in particular to the capacity for reading, and 
wonders what the limits are for erudition after such a vast increase in publication and explosion 
of disciplines and learning.  He begins by noting: “I have seen many computations respecting the 
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greatest amount of erudition attainable by an individual in his life-time; but these computations 
are falsely based, and fall infinitely beneath the truth.  It is true that, in general, we retain, we 
remember to available purpose, scarcely one-hundredth part of what we read; yet there are minds 
which not only retain all receipts, but keep them at compound interest forever” (Marginalia
Poe continues with the figure of banking, and tells us that “even physically considered, 
knowledge breeds knowledge, as gold gold; for he who reads really much, finds his capacity to 
read increase in geometrical ratio.”  The reader who trudges through the vast reading material 
will eventually learn to move quickly, until “The helluo librorum will but glance at the page 
which detains the ordinary reader some minutes,” and the helluo, “will have winnowed the 
matter of which the tyro mumbled both the seeds and chaff.”  Such speed and the ability to 
glance over pages of text characterizes a reader who has become perfectly accommodated to the 
urgent writing of the press: for this reader, reading becomes immediate consumption.  The two 
figures here – of banking and of eating – designate an activity of readership that must process 
language for the sake of growth, in both organic and economic terms, and leave behind what is 
not usable: the “chaff.” 
, 13).  
The language of economics and banking here indicates that reading obtains value in functional 
increments, proportional to time and measurable by amount.  Further, it indicates a memory like 
a repository that “retains” to “available purpose,” and the best of which will “retain all receipts.” 
Poe ends the entry with the image of a future that illustrates how current computations of 
attainable erudition must be wrong, “falsely based”: 
A deep-rooted and strictly continuous habit of reading will, with certain classes of 
intellect, result in an instinctive and seemingly magnetic appreciation of a thing 
written; and now the student reads by pages just as other men read by words.  
Long years to come, with a careful analysis of the mental process, may even 
render this species of appreciation a common thing.  It may be taught in the 
schools of our descendents of the tenth or twentieth generation.  It may become 
 66 
the method of the mob of the eleventh or twenty-first.  And should these matters 
come to pass – as they will – there will be in them no more legitimate cause for 
wonder than there is, to-day, in the marvel that, syllable by syllable, men 
comprehend what, letter by letter, I now trace upon this page. (Marginalia
 
 13-14) 
The passage suggests that the attainability of great erudition will pass through the possibility of 
reading syllable by syllable, word by word, to reading pages at a time.  All of this seems to 
hinge, at first glance, on the notion that there is something substantive in reading, something to 
which reading yields access and remains with the reader – something beyond language, and for 
which it is the function of language to transmit.  In the most perfect of circumstances, then, 
language would be transparent to the substantive meaning it is meant to transmit so that readers 
would not need to go syllable to syllable, or even page to page, to “reach” meaning.  The 
readership Poe seems to describe here must find ways to reduce the resistance language puts up 
against the attainability of erudition.  Language, in these formulations, seems to act as a burden, 
as an imperfect medium to what is really desired.  Language, after all, leaves behind a chaff as 
the helluo and the tyro attempt to approach the “matter,” the real object of reading.  What, then, 
are we to think of the “chaff” that remains after reading? 
To think through these problems, it is important to mention again that this entry occurred 
in the first installment of the Marginalia where Poe included an introduction to these notes, and a 
short explanation of their project and purpose.  “In getting my books,” Poe tells us, “I have 
always been solicitous of an ample margin […] for the facility it affords me of penciling 
suggested thoughts” (Marginalia
This making of notes […] is by no means the making of mere memoranda – a 
custom which has its disadvantages, beyond doubt.  “Ce que je mets sur papier,” 
says Bernardin de St. Pierre, “je remets de ma memoire et par consequence je 
l’oublie;” – and, in fact, if you wish to forget anything upon the spot, make a note 
that this thing is to be remembered. (
 1).  Poe notes quickly, however, that, 
Marginalia
 
 1) 
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Such a description for his marginal notes, in which the writer writes not for the sake of 
remembering, but under the assumption that he will likely forget what he has written, might 
strike an odd chord with the description of a memory as a repository that, in the best of cases, 
may hold “all receipts.”  Further, if the purpose of reading is to “winnow the matter,” what 
purpose could the notes Poe includes in the margins of his books possibly serve?  Poe mentions 
that he decided to publish his notes only after having reread them, and, having forgotten them, 
found them amusing; he states, further, that “I found myself at length forming a wish that it had 
been some other hand than my own which had so bedeviled the books, and fancying that, in such 
a case, I might have derived no inconsiderable pleasure from turning them over” (Marginalia
In fact, Poe’s imagery in the entry on reading leads to complications that the notion of 
banking cannot settle, especially when this image is placed beside the figure of consumption: an 
activity that leaves behind the “chaff” of language.  Poe’s figures seem to organize reading along 
entirely predictable paths, but fail to reach the predictable outcome.  The logic of regular and 
systematic growth implied by banking, as well as the notion of “computation,” stray away from 
an ordered, predictable course into the future and turn toward infinite error.  These computations 
 3).  
The relation that Poe describes here, between a writer who forgets what he has written, and that 
writer, in a future moment, reading over his work as if someone else had written it, troubles the 
simple notion that reading grants “access” to erudition.  The fact that he wrote notes not to 
remember what he had written, but for some indiscernable purpose (for “no” purpose, in fact), 
further obscures what the goal, the “matter,” of reading might be.  Poe, as the reader of his own 
work, does not “hold” what he seems to suggest other readers can hold at compound interest.  
But, in any case, in forgetting his own writing, what has Poe failed to “hold”?  The intent of the 
writing?  The referent of his descriptions?  Poe does not offer answers to these questions. 
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are not only “falsely based,” but “fall infinitely beneath the truth.”  Such a phrase indicates that 
we are either confronting an exaggeration for the sake of discrediting more conservative 
estimates of attainable erudition, or we are being asked to think a different relation to the truth of 
reading – one that has no “real” computation. 
The notion of infinite error forces us to examine the latter possibility more carefully.  
Infinity of error steers us away from predictable computations to results that are infinitely far 
from the truth, and brings us from a clear course of temporality, where past, present and future 
align in a clear understandability through computations of interest, to uncharted, unforeseeable 
possibilities.  The language of banking and economics introduces a logic of exchange, where an 
abstract notion of value – money – brings any and all objects into relation.  This language of 
economics, this logic of exchange, doubles the value of exchange that journalistic writing gives 
language, where language can have meaning – value – only when it gives over the reality for 
which it is a sign.  This sort of value for language, where language must say everything without 
being anything – like the abstraction of money – fails at approaching the truth.  More, the figure 
of banking, and interest growth computed through the function of time as spatial coordinate, 
enters into a disorder that disables its ability to predict, or to chart future states from a present 
moment.  Poe gives us a figure of computation that, on the one hand, leads to infinite failure: it 
cannot give us the “truth,” which takes on the meaning of a predictable outcome from present 
conditions.  On the other hand, the sign of infinity points in another direction: to the temporal 
horizon of “forever,” where time has no definition or units, and therefore cannot be followed or 
charted.  Poe’s entry here, in fact, asks for an order of temporality that is incompatible with the 
linearity of the journal, or with the simple notion of simultaneity that produces the value of 
exchange between reality and language. 
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In short, we cannot trust that we are thinking of actual computations that deal with “real” 
amounts in this entry, and we cannot assume a future bound to computations that would result in 
a traceable trajectory from initial conditions.  Instead, it is the generation of error that is 
important, since the entry begins with terms of accuracy and calculation, yet leads to open 
possibilities that “computation” can neither track nor deliver through its formulations.  The error 
of calculation dismisses the constraints of verifiability with an objective and stable reality, but 
also produces infinite possibility.  Further, it does not situate the possibilities of reading with 
respect to a faculty of intellect, nor does it place a material determinism in reality or the “reading 
material” – the initial conditions for computations of interest.  Instead, these figures produce the 
future through a radical discontinuity with the present that inherited knowledge, and the 
“presentness” of reality, cannot anticipate. 
Embedded in the temporality of linear chronology – “Long years to come” and the 
assurance that the time will, without doubt, arrive – is a figure of relation that is not simply 
linear-chronological.  Poe mentions this relation at the end of the entry on reading; this relation is 
the relation between the letters one writes and the syllables one reads: what I write “now,” letter 
by letter, will be read, syllable by syllable.  At first glance, Poe meant this relation to embody the 
tyro, who could not attain great erudition because he simply took too long to read and fell behind 
the helluo.  The relation between a writer who writes letters, and the reader that reads syllables, 
however, troubles the easy notion that the reader discovers in the reading a clear or stable 
meaning.  This relation disconnects a linear continuity and the logic of simple exchange, 
especially since neither letters nor syllables are semantic units or signs.  Words are the basic 
units that offer a concept or idea, and that hold semantic or symbolic value.  But if the reader 
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reads syllable by syllable what the writer has written letter by letter, what is it that the reader 
reads?  What is it that the writer has written? 
Such minute attention to the language itself, to its material inscription and material 
characteristics, turns our attention to language before and beyond its reference to a “reality” it 
would tell, and enters into that reality itself.  At such a moment there is no “exterior” to the 
language, nothing to “verify” it in terms of its exchange with something that it is not: a “real” 
object.  This language, at the first moment of writing and reading, is empty of a referent, so that 
the writer and the reader must feel the material resistance of the language itself.11
The relation between what the writer has written and what the reader reads does not exist 
as a mere temporal relation because time is not a higher category here that explains or captures 
the relation.  Further, time does not animate the reading, nor does it deliver, over time, the object 
to which the language of the text referred.  The language itself decides the material relation, 
which through accidents and manipulations give language its complexity, allow it to enter into 
complexity, and form the then-there of the reader.  Poe attends to the materiality of language so 
that we don’t exclude it from reality as the sign that refers – as that which is not included within 
  This language 
delivers a meaning, not in the sense of a communication of exchange, but in the sense of a 
communication of relation – material and contextual.  In this resistance, in this experience of a 
language emptied of reference, we have an infinite possibility because exterior reference can no 
longer limit, measure or verify the word.  At this moment, what is it that one reads? 
                                                 
11 We might also understand this “resistance” in relation to Poe’s emphasis on the sound and 
rhythm of poetry over its conceptual or symbolic content, which he works out in some of his 
better-known critical essays such as “The Philosophy of Composition.”  The musical qualities of 
poetry, although they could be measured mathematically, produce indefinite effects that suggest 
heavenly or otherworldly delights.  Such emphasis on sound and rhythm led Emerson to 
disparagingly call Poe “the jingle man.” 
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the sphere of referentiality – but as a material that both affects its surroundings, and whose 
surroundings, in turn, also affect it through language’s capability to enter into complexity.  The 
material contexts and conditions in which a reader confronts language decide this complexity. 
Poe pays particularly close attention to the materiality of language, but also to the 
material modes of transmission in which readers encounter language, in particular to the fact that 
students now read by pages as other men by words.  What is important in this entry is that Poe 
ignores the verifiability of language through reality and instead focuses on readers.  The purpose 
of this entry is not to find a referent for what the writer writes, but for language to find a reader – 
one who reads either syllable by syllable, or page by page.  In any case, the reader is not a 
guarantee of language’s status as a placeholder for the referent.  The act of reading, confrontation 
with language, does not ensure referentiality.  The technique that students are now perfecting 
may become the method of the mob of the future, a matter that is sure to come to pass, and which 
indicates a change in the material context by which language is communicated to the reader.  We 
move from reading the “syllable,” constitutive of words, which we have come to think as the 
element of meaning, to reading the page, which indicates a particular form for the word, printed 
by the machines of the printing press and transmitted by the temporal operators of the journals.  
The page frames the word, and announces a particular mode of transmission for it, a particular 
context for its material inscription and communication.  The modes of its transmission establish 
how readers understand language, how they will come into relation with it, and this 
understanding and relation to its mode of production and transmission is taken for granted: “there 
will be in them no more legitimate cause for wonder” at how one reads.  The readership that 
reads pages rather than syllables or words is a readership that belongs to the emergence of the 
journal, which reads pages at the rate that the newspapers produce them.  It is a readership that 
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may not have the “time” to reflect on the world, and is therefore excluded from its constant 
constitution. 
Poe refers to this danger almost in passing: he notes how we do not have legitimate cause 
for wonder today that a reader may comprehend, syllable by syllable, what he writes now, letter 
by letter.  This loss of wonder over students reading by pages will come to pass as soon as 
reading by pages becomes common habit: the method of the mob.  The insinuation, of course, is 
that Poe can still wonder, at his moment, that a reader can read page by page what he writes 
letter by letter.  The notion of wonder is important: it signals awe, surprise, and perhaps even 
confusion.  The moment of wonder is a moment that is not expected: the infinite error in our 
computation.  A moment of wonder illustrates the moment that a rational system, through 
“computation,” cannot verify its relation to reality, and suggests that the possibility to articulate 
the present might occur only through a radical discontinuity with the past that we might describe 
as creation.  In such a moment of radical discontinuity, the standards for judgment that had been 
available to describe and reflect on the world are suddenly inadequate and require a 
redistribution and revaluation.  The inability to wonder, therefore, signals a danger in which the 
instantaneous actualization assumed of reportage reduces the world to a self-evidence that 
eradicates any articulation of alterity.  The moment for wonder, its possibility, closes more and 
more quickly: how can one wonder about time when even wondering about time is rushed, 
hurried, by the urgency of news? 
With this respect, an important figure of reading appears here: the reader is a figure of a 
present that may have no past, even though he reads what Poe’s critic has written letter by letter 
for him.  This reader may have no past if the moment of reading produces wonder, or an infinite 
error in computation, which Poe could not account for in his entry on reading.  The action of 
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reading itself resists any attempt for representation, has no “accurate” or “inaccurate” standing, 
and figures only as possibility. In the notes Poe adds to a text – motivated by a reading that 
cannot be present to us (the activity itself cannot be present or represented) – the writing, letter 
by letter, does not deliver the presence of the moment of inscription: “something” to memorize.  
In the infinite error of computation, the reading does not offer economic or organic growth, but 
emergence of the unexpected – creation.  The marginal note itself that arose from Poe’s own 
reading in his library stands for such creation: the activity of criticism is therefore tied to such 
emergence. 
3.3 THE MARGINALIA
Critics that study Poe’s 
 AND ITS PENDING THOUGHT 
Marginalia are quick to point out that most marginalia are compiled by 
scholars who study an author’s work, and are published posthumously by such scholars as 
appendages to the primary texts they study.  Marginalia are generally not considered a separate 
publication; they are, rather, supplements that serve to follow an author’s thinking and work as 
he prepared a text for publication.  This is the reason that critics that work on Poe’s Marginalia 
show some surprise at his obsession with them, and with the fact that Poe prepared them for 
publication in journals, and planned to assemble them into a book.  Such an odd use of 
marginalia, that they should comprise an independent volume of work, prompts Stephen 
Rachman to claim that Poe’s decision to publish his marginalia “remains one of the more 
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singular enterprises in literary annals.”12
We know from the work of numerous critics, however, that these marginal notes 
probably did not exist in Poe’s library.
  Numerous explanations serve to manage such surprise, 
however, among them the notion that Poe published what he could, or whatever he might have at 
hand, for whatever wages he might acquire. 
13  A number of critics note, for example, that Poe’s 
library – which he describes in mock humility in the introduction to the Marginalia as “not a 
little recherché” – was actually quite small.  We know, also, from Poe’s letters, that because of 
his pecuniary situation and frequent relocations, he read what he could from borrowed material.  
We also know that Poe sold many of the books he acquired as an editor for extra money, and 
never amassed anything approaching a large collection.  Further, a number of critics have noted 
that the system for assembling and taking marginal notes that Poe describes for the Marginalia is 
not an accurate depiction of the way Poe actually took notes.  These gestures suggest that the 
Marginalia are a performance, which means we should not read them as mere appendages to 
Poe’s criticism that he published opportunistically, but as a work of art.  I suggest this in 
objection to the notion that Poe published the Marginalia for the immediate benefit of acquiring 
payment, but especially in opposition to critics like Robert D. Jacobs, who refer to the 
Marginalia only as an aid to explicate statements that appear in Poe’s criticism, assuming that the 
Marginalia
                                                 
12 Steven Rachman, “’Es lasst sich nicht schreiben”: Plagiarism and ‘The Man of the Crowd’” in 
The American Face of Edgar Allan Poe, eds Shawn Rosenheim and Stephen Rachman 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1995), 60. 
 are a forum in which Poe, finally, spoke genuinely and straightforwardly about what 
he really believed.  To suggest that such communication is possible, and that Poe desired it, is 
part and parcel of programs of literacy that I describe above as related to figures of banking, 
13 Importantly, Thomas Ollive Mabbott, Poe’s bibliographer, notes this after careful examination 
of Poe’s work and publications. 
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which Poe overturns.  To assume such communication as the goal of the Marginalia is to treat 
Poe’s criticism and fiction as obscure or cryptographic texts that could be made to deliver their 
meaning with more precision and clarity than they do.  To read the Marginalia
In the opening entry of the 
 this way is to 
ignore it as a work of the imagination that may institute new thought. 
Marginalia, Poe explains the purpose of the entries that follow 
in ways that avoid reducing the entries to projects with anticipated outcomes.  He tells us that, 
“the purely marginal jottings, done with no eye to the Memorandum Book, have a distinct 
complexion, and not only a distinct purpose, but none at all” (Marginalia, 1).  There is no 
purpose at all, then, for writing the marginal notes, especially not to remember something of the 
texts the critic reads.  The occasion for reading in his library, and writing, is not to remember so 
much as it is to forget: in writing in the margins of other texts, the critic frees these texts from 
voluntary recoverability in memory.  The act of writing in the margins of other texts, of bringing 
language to other language, releases language from a verifiable or practical use and gives it, 
instead, the character of creation.  Criticism in the Marginalia
If the original text is an occasion to forget, to not know, then the marginal notes 
themselves intensify this experience.  Poe employs “marginal” comments as the form of this 
criticism because the defining characteristic of the 
, therefore, serves to engender the 
possibility of separation from the self-evident standing of reality in language, to a passage into a 
moment of “not knowing” where a voluntary exercise of memory will not serve to accommodate 
what one reads. 
Marginalia is the unfinished nature of the 
notes.  A marginal note, usually, is the intermediary between the text the critic reads and the 
criticism he produces.  In this case, however, it is the intermediary that Poe publishes, and not 
the “final” product (in fact, there can be no “final” product since Poe refuses a purpose for the 
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notes).  This intermediate state signals a moment of separation, in which the future figures as a 
pending possibility, which may relate to what might not yet be known – where the future’s 
horizon is always otherness – and move away from the presumption that communication might 
always deliver what is to be known because its horizon is stability.  A thought that arises in a 
moment, that belongs to a moment, might not have a clear connection to that which precedes it; 
its determination passes through a moment of “not knowing” in which its becoming is neither 
temporal nor reducible to a pre-existing, clear order of knowledge.  The fact that marginalia are, 
by definition, intermediate and therefore unfinished, denies them the stability of things, or 
objects.  Their unfinished nature, and character as non-objects, gives them the sense of an 
ongoing project, one that need not necessarily end, and one that is not bound to a predictable 
course.  This characteristic of the marginal note gives criticism the figure of an immanent 
possibility. 
Such possibility is the foundation of the Marginalia, but the event of their composition is 
neither haphazard nor careless.  The critic describes the marginal notes as “hav[ing] a rank 
somewhat above the chance and desultory comments of literary chit-chat – for these latter are not 
unfrequently ‘talk for talk’s sake.’”  The marginal notes, rather, are “deliberately pencilled” only 
at the moment in which “the mind of the reader wishes to unburden itself of a thought [that] 
however flippant, however silly, however trivial [is] still a thought indeed, not merely a thing 
that might have been a thought in time, and under more favorable circumstances” (Marginalia , 
2).  These thoughts are thoughts “indeed,” not that which would be “merely a thing,” which is 
not a thought “indeed,” but, rather, a “thought in time.”  A thought in time can be “merely a 
thing,” or an object that one can exchange in a simple and discrete act.  Literary chit-chat is such 
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a “thing”: it occurs hurriedly, in an off-handed way, much like the press of the penny papers 
reported its news. 
A thought “indeed” is not “in time” because, first, such a thought does not respond to the 
urgencies of clear verifiability, and, secondly, the thought may have no relation to past thoughts, 
or future thoughts through clear chronology: it does not occur “in time.”  A thought “indeed” 
stands alone at a certain moment, and may have connections to other moments only in a moment 
of arrest.  The figure of the reader, who may read by syllables, words or pages, embodies such 
arrest since the relation between such a reader, in the future, and language, may lead to wonder – 
the unexpected.  The emergence of wonder signals a moment of arrest because the newspaper, 
and the habits of reading it produces, do not anticipate such moments.  In fact, the possibility of 
wonder occurs by disengaging from a hurried and readily transmittable reality to the discovery 
that language, in its participation in reality, did not deliver what a speedy press expected it to 
deliver.  Poe’s criticism sought to produce a separation with inherited thought in order to reflect 
on the representational ideas that direct our interactions with the world, and, in doing so, 
inaugurate a critical investiture that begins with a moment of wonder, of not knowing. 
Thoughts “in time,” however, always threaten the emergence of a thought “indeed” – in 
action.  A thought “in time” seems to respond to a project – its character is one of applicability to 
service.  We know this because the critic explicitly states that the hallmark of the marginal 
comment is its utter uselessness: “It may be as well to observe, however, that just as the 
goodness of your true pun is in the direct ratio of its intolerability, so is nonsense the essential 
sense of the Marginal note” (Marginalia, 3).  I read “nonsense” here as uselessness since 
“nonsense” denies application to an appointed, clear course.  To have a thought “in time” rather 
than “indeed,” therefore, means to subordinate the thought to a course established in time, to a 
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clarity obtained through a pre-condition of field or requisite of order – in this case to the 
established order of linear chronology.  In such an order, the moment cannot stand alone, as in 
leisure, but must draw its meaning from a clear application to service.  The act of thinking “in 
time,” therefore, means that present activity must take its direction from a clear goal located in 
the future: usefulness establishes the pragmatic clarity that subordinates present moments, and 
our activity “in” them, to that which one anticipates in future goals.  Such moments operate by 
denying the present and its possibilities in favor of what is already known, and what can be 
anticipated.  It is this continuity that gives the sense of time as linear relation, and which, if it is 
to be understood in its clearly appointed course, must ignore nonsensical deviations. 
The Marginalia therefore, seek a moment of separation, of discontinuity from dominant, 
linear-chronological models of time that can invest the critical work with the possibility of 
emergence and creativity rather than continuity with already existing forms.  The man of leisure 
spends his time among a vast collection of books, without thinking about wages (what his 
writing might be worth compared to other writing and other objects) and without urgency to 
publish or speak.  He may think about the literary cliques that influenced the publication of 
American literature at that moment, about an emergent national literature, about an international 
copyright law, or any number of topics of his day, but these topics themselves are not the objects 
that form or guide criticism: they are not the goal for his thinking.  The critic of the Marginalia, 
at leisure in his library, peruses the topics and debates of his age, but as if he were untouched by 
them.  Of course, the critic is, in fact, “touched” by theses topics: they constitute the historical 
protocols and knowledges that give form to his thinking, but without subordinating his thinking 
to these knowledges.  While the critic is at leisure, his thinking exists as a unique moment in the 
possibility of criticism.  Criticism becomes the possibility of separating from the terms and 
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descriptions of the world in order to judge whether these terms are adequate to it.  Such a 
separation entails a moment of “not knowing,” a moment in which one can reflect on knowledge 
rather than merely using it or preserving it.  The Marginalia, therefore, is not in-line with 
expectation or “literacy.”  In fact, the marginal comments of the Marginalia appear in stark 
contrast to the dated materials of the journal: there are no temporal connections or markers 
between the entries in the Marginalia
Most importantly, however, they appear as criticism in the margins of other books.  The 
margins are small, and don’t leave much room: they are at the limits of the seemingly unlimited 
world of print, which also doesn’t leave much “room” to speak.  The critic notes, though, that 
“The circumscription of space […] in these pencillings has in it something more of advantage 
than of inconvenience” because it forces the court, the well-placed, and yet unhurried 
confrontation with the “chit-chat” of the age.  Still, such a style is too close to the style of 
journalism that insists on the condensed and easily transmittable statement of fact.  The critic 
notes that 
 – nothing, in fact, to introduce them.  They appear only as 
a new thought, emerging without connection to temporal rhythms or dates. 
In the marginalia, too, we talk only to ourselves; we therefore talk freshly – 
boldly – originally – with abandonnement – without conceit – much after the 
fasion of Jeremy Taylor, and Sir Thomas Browne, and Sir William Temple, and 
the anatomical Burton, and that most logical anologist, Butler, and some other 
people of the old day, who were too full of their matter to have any room for their 
manner, which, being thus left out of question, was a capital manner indeed, – a 
model of manners, with a richly marginalic air. (2) 
 
The Marginalia, therefore, present an advantage, but also a limit.  Like “some other people of the 
old day,” the page fills up with such matter that it does not allow “manner.”  The spaces left by 
the frame of the page, which is the frame of delivery for the press, fills the page almost too full 
of substance; it is a space too occupied with substance to have place for a style, a mode, or a 
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technique since the urgency of reportage assumes its single method stands for everything (and is 
therefore no method at all).  The critic, like some of the figures he mentions in this passage, 
struggles for his existence against the institution that allowed him to exist in the first place.  He 
must publish in the press, but he must confront the press as he publishes; the press is at once the 
mode that threatens to silence him, but also the temporal measure for which he seeks figuration. 
This difficult situation places the critic at the limits of what might be said.  As the press 
fills up the pages it publishes almost to the limit of their space, the critic must now write in “no” 
space at all.  It is almost as if the diminished room on the page coincides with the diminished 
power of language, where speedy journalism understands language to have already said 
everything.  The notion of the creative takes on life only if it can say something that is not 
already present in the reality that fills up the pages of the press and suffocates language.  
Creativity, therefore, is not a latent energy hidden in language, but exists as a pending possibility 
for a future reader that can either occur, or not.  The figure of the reader in the Marginalia is a 
figure of such pending possibility – it is a figure of relation where the unfinished notes will either 
find a future by articulating a separation from the past, or where the inherited thought of the past 
will decide even future confrontations.  Future time, with respect to creation, is an activity in 
which readers must participate, rather than existing as a passive experience – such as linear-
chronology – in which we are subsumed.  The pending future of the Marginalia
Further, it is language itself, in its material context, that allows for this possibility.  The 
notes, written without a purpose, without the project of accuracy motivated by reality, and 
without seeking the “object” of language for which the helluo reads, maintain a difference, a 
, therefore, exists 
in action, in discontinuity, and is pending because it figures only as possibility that may not 
occur at all. 
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discontinuity, with the original text from which they arise.  This difference, this discontinuity, 
and the unfinishedness of the notes, forces open the closed circuit between reality and its 
representation in language so that the future, and time itself, can come under question.  It is 
important to note, therefore, that the future reader of the Marginalia cannot be a private 
individual to whom this discontinuity is revealed because this discontinuity cannot be possessed 
by knowledge; the Marginalia
Poe tried to produce in the 
, rather, figures the reader as the culmination of the action of 
reading who will either articulate a future or will fail to do so based only on the difference, on 
the immanent articulation of discontinuity, that is the character of language itself. 
Marginalia a writing that could confront the journalistic press 
as a writing that had no time or place, that arose in the study or the library, so that language 
itself, and not what it meant to represent as reality, would become reality itself for the reader.  
The material conditions in which readers encounter language either increase the possibilities for 
creation, or reduce them.  Such a reflection on language, in its careful relationship to the labor of 
criticism and art, might increase these possibilities against the dangers of a stagnant journalism.  
The figure of a reader, therefore, is a figure of a future that does not exist merely as spatial 
chronology; history, rather than a story of the sum total of events in society, exists here as the 
possibility for change.  The study of history, or of literary history, cannot be the study of 
localized objects that answer to the special conditions of science.  History, instead, “sees” objects 
emerge only over periods of human activity that create them out of their social, political, and 
material contexts.  This leads us to the notion that the social is what is creative, and not isolated 
individuals.  Because the thought of literature, and of Poe’s criticism, is pending on the activity 
of readers, because the critic writes now what will be read later in a new way – perhaps in 
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wonder – we participate in the continual emergence of the creative in human activities in which 
time figures as the actualization of this emergence in future readers. 
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4.0  PROBLEMS OF PLOT: THE “CURRENTE CALAMO” AND THE MAN OF 
LEISURE 
4.1 POE’S FORMALISM 
Poe’s work as an editor began, although unofficially and sporadically, in the Fall of 1835 for 
Thomas Willis White’s Southern Literary Messenger.  After a few months of submitting some 
reviews and short fiction for the Messenger, White officially announced in the December 1835 
issue that Poe would assist the proprietor of the paper in organizing and publishing the material 
that would belong to the intellectual department.  Although White did not specifically name Poe 
as the editor – perhaps because he never completely trusted Poe’s judgment or his determination 
to avoid drinking – Poe did indeed become, for all intents and purposes, editor and primary 
contributor to the intellectual department of the Messenger.  His appointment produced 
immediate results, and the intellectual department began to publish more reviews and criticism 
than it ever had before Poe’s arrival.  It did not take Poe long after claiming his position in the 
“intellectual department” of the Messenger to produce the kind of criticism for which numerous 
journals across the US would label him a “tomahawk critic,” and for which he would become 
notorious.  The December issue of the Messenger, Poe’s first as a full time editor, contained a 
review of the novel Norman Leslie, which was so aggressive and harsh in its attack of the novel, 
that it garnered national attention for White’s relatively small Southern periodical. 
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What is interesting about this attack is that its brutality and aggression have two 
particular targets: Poe attacked the novel itself directly and at length, but the aggressive tone of 
the article was also meant to issue an oblique attack on the publishing industry, especially the 
New York clique, that had engaging in a long and successful campaign of promoting such a poor 
novel.  The latter goal was achieved indirectly, through provocation, which caused a sensation 
and drew attention to Poe, to the Messenger, and to the values Poe wished to establish for 
American criticism and the publishing industry.  Despite the indirect means by which Poe issued 
such an attack, however, much more attention has been paid to the reaction, to the stir it caused 
and to the reasons Poe wished to cause such a stir, than to Poe’s discussion and analysis of the 
novel.  The reason for this, largely, is that the novel has nothing serious in it, and the reaction 
Poe sought in publishing the rash review seems a more important and serious goal than the 
discussion of the novel.  Further, the formalist terms that Poe uses to discuss the novel seem to 
address universal values that transcend time and place.  The long tradition of Poe scholarship that 
places him within romantic trends, and characterizes his “exotic” fiction as a withdrawal from 
his moment, is deeply associated with these formalist terms and the universal, trans-historical 
standing critics assume they seek.  In fact, Shawn Rosenheim and Steven Rachman argue, in the 
recent anthology entitled The American Face of Edgar Allan Poe, that these kind of formalist 
terms in Poe’s criticism, as well as the characterization of his fiction as a “romantic withdrawal” 
from his surroundings, have encouraged critics either to ignore Poe when thinking about 
literature in a cultural context, or to place him within traditions that are avowedly “timeless,” 
such as pychoanalysis.1
                                                 
1 See the introduction to The American Face of Edgar Allan Poe, eds. Shawn Rosenheim and 
Stephen Rachman (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1995). 
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Attending to the reactions caused by Poe’s essay places his work in an easy relation to the 
publishing industry, and traces a trajectory for Poe’s reviews and criticism through the social and 
intellectual influence of his day.  On the one hand, this early review has allowed critics to track 
the influence of British periodicals on Poe.2  Even more importantly, however, when critics have 
tried to think of Poe’s relationship to the publishing industry of the early 19th century rather than 
his supposed attempts to withdraw from it, two general theses arise: on the one hand, critics 
place Poe very close to the influence of the capitalist press and “mass culture.”  Terence Whalen 
notes that the harshness Poe exhibited in his reviews shows more than just the influence of 
British periodicals on Poe; Whalen notes that Poe’s desire to be noticed, as well as his 
willingness to shock with harshness in his criticism and gruesome themes in his fiction, 
illustrates a particularly keen flair for the workings of the emergent capitalist print industry, for 
which Poe showed a “willingness to adopt a calculating, aggressive stance toward literature and 
toward the mass audience whose “taste” would henceforth be measured by gross acts of 
purchase.”3
Whalen argues that Poe composed his literature for consumption by a mass audience, and 
makes of Poe’s writing nothing more than a wholesale capitulation to market trends, for which 
the ultimate consequence is the uncontrolled explosion of information.  Whalen’s thesis bears 
close association with work on the history of the book, as well as the criticism that discusses Poe 
 
                                                 
2 See Michael L. Allen, Poe and the British Magazine Tradition (New York: Oxford UP, 1969). 
These comparisons, however, are echoed elsewhere as well.  The harshness of the review recalls 
Christopher North and other famous British reviewers and critics of the time. 
3 Terence Whalen, “Poe and the American Publishing Industry,” in  A Historical Guide to Edgar 
Allan Poe, ed. Gerald J. Kennedy (New York: Oxford UP, 2001), 69. 
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as coincident with the development of “mass culture”4
Robert Jacobs’ work on Poe’s criticism exemplifies the second of the two theses I 
mention above; rather than dismissing Poe’s formalist criticism as part and parcel of a 
 as it marks the emergence of the capitalist 
print industry as the central formation for understanding Poe’s work.  This work, however, 
ignores not only the value Poe wished to give literature over and above its salability on the 
market, but, more importantly, it ignores the protracted reflections on creation and originality 
that consumed Poe throughout his life.  It is quite clear from Poe’s criticism and letters that he 
saw literature as much more than a means of livelihood (although the payment a writer receives 
for his work cannot be ignored), or as a servile tool of industry.  Poe, in fact, was very critical of 
the literature and the publishing business that dominated his moment, and was interested in 
possibilities for literature beyond the journalistic, and beyond the pressures that an urgency for 
reportage and mass circulation would put on imaginative literature.  Under these pressures, and 
in proximity to the urgency of mass print and reportage, literature loses its ability to formulate 
the world when it can only borrow from what is quickly reproduced and reiterated.  Under such 
conditions, as I argue in the previous chapter of this dissertation, literature cannot pass through a 
moment of not knowing that may stand apart from the world. 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Jonathan Elmer, Reading at the Social Limit: Affect, Mass Culture, and Edgar 
Allan Poe (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995).  In this book, Elmer works closely on the figure of the 
masses, and its relation to “the people,” to illustrate how the latter emerges as a figure, and how 
it fails to represent a “real” body.  This failure is important for Elmer because it produces an 
ambivalence on the part of individuals who are at once “I,” and also “we, the people.”  Where 
the figure of the sovereign represented a transcendent position beyond the people, the figure of 
the people as sovereign integrates sovereignty with the masses.  In this dissertation, and this 
chapter in particular, however, I describe the US as a mechanical homogeneity in which such an 
integration is ultimately untenable; further, Poe’s literature never refers to such an integration or 
imagination of a people.  Poe’s stories, especially “The Man of the Crowd,” always refer to the 
masses as a “crowd,” or a “mob.”  The crowd is not a people – no matter what it undergoes – 
because the crowd does not tend toward community, especially under the temporal entrainment I 
will describe below. 
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disengagement or abstraction, Jacobs understands Poe’s description of “universal” principals in 
his criticism as an attempt to formulate the workings of a “naturalized” psychology.  Rather than 
a capitulation to the trends offered by the rapid increase in the circulation of magazines, Jacobs 
claims that Poe’s aim for journalism and art under the conditions of a mass circulation was to 
produce a literature that would appeal to the new mass readership insofar as it obeyed the 
“natural” laws of psychology, and could therefore affect the mass readership as a whole.  This is 
an important point to make with respect to Poe’s criticism, especially in light of Poe’s well-
documented interest in phrenology, which he discussed in earlier work as a materialist 
psychology that could scientifically demonstrate the presence and activity of certain faculties of 
intellect.  Poe’s interest in the faculties of mind he discusses elsewhere might well have arisen, as 
Robert Jacobs argues, from the influence of the Scottish common sense school.  Descriptions of 
these “faculties” by the Scottish school – especially Lord Kames – were influential in the 
American Enlightenment, and it seems likely that Poe would have become familiar with this 
school of thought during his time at the University of Virginia.  These faculties included 
descriptions of cognitive functions that purported to establish common elements of 
consciousness, elements that attested to a hard-wired sensorial apparatus for the immediate 
apperception of reality.  Poe sometimes followed the common sense school to establish the 
rational illustration of these common principals of sensory apperception – “faculties” of mind. 
Identifying such terminology in Poe’s criticism, however, is part and parcel of a larger 
tendency in Poe studies that note an increasing disposition in his criticism over the years toward 
rationality5
                                                 
5 Robert Jacobs and Edd Winfield Parks note this tendency in Poe, and map his career as a critic 
as a clear development toward the refinement of this rational explanation of the creative process. 
 – very often absent, or explicitly challenged in his fiction – for the sake of explaining 
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certain characteristics of the creative process.  This has been useful for much recent scholarship 
in Poe that wishes to situate him as an American writer by demonstrating a lineage of influence 
that would tie him to his time and place.  In order to “show” such a movement toward rationality, 
however, critics often explicitly announce that they must exclude Poe’s fiction from the study, 
and they often end up excluding half of his criticism as well.  I want to suggest that, rather than a 
clear tendency toward rationality, Poe’s vacillation between rational explanations of sensory and 
intellectual functions – his study of the “faculties” of mind – and the wildly imaginative, 
represented the struggle Poe, himself, faced trying to reflect on creation in the radical sense, 
rather than creation merely as production, or as the trivially novel.  The former discloses the 
limits of the rational because rationality cannot anticipate it; further, creation might lead to 
outcomes that a rational-logical understanding of linear-chronological models of history cannot 
predict.  When Poe began with “faculties” of mind, therefore, and attempted to discuss the 
original and the creative in these terms, he discovered the possibility of a continually emergent 
otherness that these terms, finally, could not explain.  In this sense, then, creation is the 
institution of new forms that previous knowledge cannot understand or anticipate, that may have 
no clear connection to past forms, and that emerge as discontinuous. 
The problem with these two theses, then, is that they either imagine Poe as a mere effect 
of market pressures and social pre-determinants, or they continue a search for formalist trends in 
Poe’s writing that must ultimately disregard imaginative creation.  A closer scrutiny of how 
Poe’s interest in seemingly formalist terms, especially plot, in conjunction with his work in 
journals shows, however, another possibility for these terms and their relation to the problems of 
writing in the mass circulation of print.  Under the urgency of reporting news quickly, the 
ephemeral details of the empirical world could be repeated again and again until the publication 
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and circulation of print became seemingly autonomous.  The journalists, the recorder keepers of 
the everyday, could not give order to this collection – in fact, this is where the individual mind, 
depicted as “talent” or “genius” loses any kind of relevance.  Rather than a withdrawal or a 
complete capitulation, Poe’s interest in plot, and his interest in the figure of the solitary artist or 
in the man of leisure (which I will discuss below), are attempts to figure the urgency of the press 
and the incursion of its materials into inner life, and how this incursion increasingly dismissed 
the work of “genius” as irrelevant.  This chapter will discuss Poe’s interest in plot as it arises in 
his confrontation with journalism, and how this notion of plot relates to his interest in solitary 
characters, especially with the man of leisure in the Marginalia
4.2 THE “CURRENTE CALAMO” AND THE MEANING OF “PLOT” 
. 
The Norman Leslie affair represents a point of departure in the development of Poe’s critical 
career not because of the fame it acquired, but because this review begins to show how his 
questioning of art and literature was tied to the dominant forms of journalism and reportage, and 
the world these created.  The full title of this novel reveals some of the possibilities of what it 
might have said about the literature of the magazine and newspaper presses in the US in the 
1830s; in November, 1835, Harper and Brothers published the novel under the title Norman 
Leslie: A Tale of the Present Times.  That this novel hoped to tell about the “present times” 
signals an important task for literature: that in a fallen world, men must create not only the 
world, but also its meaning.  The novel, on its own, did not end up saying much; the novel, 
rather, existed as a reference to the newspaper press and to reportage, since its construction was 
heavily achieved in and through the newspaper press, but also because it reflected the practices 
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of the press.  The newspapers – especially the Mirror
When read this way, Poe’s insistence on plot as an essential characteristic for literature 
should neither surprise, nor bear claims of a relation to an a-historical formalism.  What Poe 
began to work toward at this early point in his career was for a higher necessity for literature, one 
that would ultimately represent man in his ascendancy as self-creator.  The important reason for 
this at Poe’s moment is that the press – even as it understood itself to function for promoting a 
national literature and for the circulation of literacy for large, although distinct, populations in 
the US – begins to work autonomously and entrenches the population instead of freeing it for 
new possibilities of creation.  We see Poe reflect on this problem as he discusses how the 
urgencies of a speedy press begin to condition what is published and how it forms a readership.  
In two separate entries of the 
 in New York, for which the author, 
Theodore Sedgwick Fay, worked – produced the novel insofar as they announced what the novel 
was, and how the public was to read it ahead of its publication.  If anything, then, the novel 
reflected this newspaper press and its politics, but, most importantly, the “present time” instituted 
by these journals. 
Marginalia, Poe reflects on the feeling of speed that characterizes 
his age.  In both entries, he elaborates on this experience of speed through a discussion of 
journals, magazines, and journalism in general.  The first of these entries occurs in the fourth 
installment of his ongoing project of composing his Marginalia, which he published in the 
September 1845 issue of Godey’s Lady’s Book
I will not be sure that men at present think more profoundly than half a 
century ago, but beyond question they think with more rapidity, with more 
.  Here, Poe claims that the increase of magazine 
literature does not indicate a decline in American taste or letters, but indicates, rather, a new era 
in which “men are forced upon the curt, the condensed, the well-digested in place of the 
voluminous – in a word, upon journalism in lieu of dissertation.”  Poe continues: 
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skill, with more tact, with more of method and less of excrescence in the 
thought.  Besides all this, they have a vast increase in the thinking 
material; they have more facts, more to think about.  For this reason, they 
are disposed to put the greatest amount of thought in the smallest compass 
and disperse it with the utmost attainable rapidity.  Hence the journalism 
of the age; hence, in especial, magazines.6
 
 
Poe defended American taste against the widespread publications of magazines and journals to 
define his critical project more widely, which began with an attempt to characterize and illustrate 
the pressures that the press exerted on writing.  It was important for Poe, therefore, to discount 
American taste, or private opinion, as the motor that drove the literary establishment, and 
produced the conditions of the age: for Poe, it is not taste, or a decline in taste, that produces 
literature.  For this reason, Poe is careful to note in this passage that men themselves do not think 
more profoundly than they previously did, so that we are not to confuse the characteristics of his 
era as resulting from changes in a faculty of mind or consciousness.  Instead, Poe makes it clear 
that the techniques of skill, method, etc, arise out of the “thinking material” itself, and the 
material conditions of its production and transmission.  It was this “thinking material” – 
magazines, journals and journalism – and their temporal imperatives that produced the necessity 
for the methods of reading Poe mentions here.   
A little over a year after the publication of the entry I quote from above, Poe would 
produce another entry where he continues to reflect on these problems, and, especially, on the 
requirements of the press.  In this entry, published in the seventh installment of the Marginalia
                                                 
6 Edgar Allan Poe, Marginalia in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 11, ed. James A. 
Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 82.  I will cite this work parenthetically as Marginalia for 
the remainder of the chapter. 
, 
he continues to develop his analysis of speed in journalism by describing more carefully the 
dispersion of the “greatest amount of thought in the utmost attainable rapidity.”  Poe goes on to 
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discuss the failure of the Quarterlies, which “have never been popular,” mostly because “Their 
issues […] are at too long intervals; their subjects get cold before being served up.  In a word, 
their ponderosity is quite out of keeping with the rush of the age.”  This “rush” that Poe notes 
here corresponds to the experience that everything lived passes quickly; importantly, Poe 
qualifies this sense of speed, this experience of “rushing,” with a discussion of journals.  Poe 
claims that “the greater portion of the newspaper press” has as “their sole legitimate object […] 
the discussion of ephemeral matters in an ephemeral manner.  Whatever talent may be brought to 
bear upon our daily journals, (and in many cases this talent is very great,) still the imperative 
necessity of catching, currente calamo, each topic as it flits before the eye of the public, must of 
course materially narrow the limits of their power” (Marginalia
This indifference to talent is one of the major problems that guides Poe’s criticism, and 
which begins to take precedence in the early review of 
 117).  The “currente calamo” of 
the passage is quite important: journalists, regardless of talent, were to catch, at the moment of 
their occurrence, topics and events without reflection.  The result is a reportage that insists on 
being in the present, of making the present instantly available.  The consequence is that “talent” 
does not matter; there is a general air of indifference to the work of “talent” such that it cannot 
confer a new necessity or order to the journals that are swept up in “the rush of the age.” 
Norman Leslie.  This notion of talent 
loses its force when its relations to “genius” so often lead scholars to align Poe with the 
Romantic tradition, and to characterize this reflection on indifference only as a lament for the 
misunderstood genius.  The more important problem of indifference signals the rise of the press 
as autonomous, and bears the sign of its ascendancy over human action, even when it purports to 
report and discuss that action.  What we begin to see inaugurated in the review of Norman 
Leslie, therefore, is a criticism that concentrates upon the concern for art’s own essence as man’s 
 93 
self-creation (making man present to himself), which renders art present and essential, not as a 
useless activity or passion, but as an essential activity that builds and takes part in the overall 
work of humanity.  This problem takes on force in Poe’s confrontation with journalism, in which 
the sphere of activity circumscribed by journalism and the magazine press delivers “history” as a 
set of facts by the chroniclers of the everyday.  In the reportage of journalism, history responds 
only to a chronological arrangement of the sum total of events in society.  The journalist 
disappears in this reportage as if totally irrelevant to it: he cannot give what he reports a higher 
necessity, or an order or meaning.  This is where, for Poe, the mind, depicted as “talent” or 
“genius,” becomes indifferent. 
This is also the reason that Poe condemned the plot of Norman Leslie, published as A 
Tale of the Present Times.  Poe wrote for pages summarizing the plot and ridiculing it as he went 
along.  Before getting into the plot, however, Poe notes that “In the preface, Mr. Fay informs us 
that the most important features of his story are founded on fact – and that he has availed himself 
of certain poetical licenses”7
                                                 
7 Edgar Allan Poe.  “Norman Leslie,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 8, James 
A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 52. 
 to hide the personalities of his characters.  Poe goes on to ridicule 
Fay for claiming that these “poetical licenses” that he has taken constitute transformations that 
amount to great art, and for comparing himself to Raphael, Mozart and Canova.  The 
preposterous comparisons in the “preface,” however, don’t end there, and Poe continues: “[Fay] 
goes on to say something about a humble student, with a feeble hand, throwing groupings upon a 
canvass, and standing behind a curtain: and then, after perpetrating all of these impertinences, 
thinks it best ‘frankly to bespeak the indulgence of the solemn and sapient critics.’  Body of 
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Bacchus!  We, at least, are neither solemn nor sapient, and, therefore, do not feel ourselves to 
show him a shadow of mercy.”8
Although 
 
Norman Leslie had nothing serious in it, Poe took it seriously insofar as it 
proclaimed itself to be art and yet produced a “plot [that] is a monstrous piece of absurdity and 
incongruity.”9
Poe was dedicated to the project of defining plot as a necessary condition for literary 
creation for most of his career; however, around 1844, Poe’s experiences in journalism guided 
this project more directly toward the culmination that it would reach, finally, in 
  Poe was serious in his treatment of this unserious novel insofar as it was 
symptomatic of a writing penetrated by a world of journalistic events collected by Fay without 
object, and presenting a view of life – of “the present times” – without, finally, any kind of 
higher necessity.  For Poe, art could not stand justified if it existed only as chaos, especially 
when that chaos was meant to reflect the chaos of a “real” world created by the unlimited 
circulation of the press.  The violation of literature by journalism, in which Fay lets the events 
that journalism records haphazardly invade and articulate his “plot” without order, makes the 
novel the a record of events – an intrusion of mechanically ordered, clock time into the novel – 
rather than making the novel an event or a creation of its own.  This is a literature that does not 
participate in creating reality, but becomes passively articulated by the time of the journal.  Poe’s 
insistence on the definition of plot, on its importance, derives from the need to make of literature 
something more than the passive activity of journalism. 
Eureka.  When 
Poe moved to New York and began work for Nathaniel Parker Willis’ Evening Mirror and 
Weekly Mirror
                                                 
8 Poe, 52. 
, Poe experienced first hand the kind of work that belonged to what he describes 
9 Poe, 60. 
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as “the greater portion of the newspaper press.”  Unlike his previous work, his job at the Mirror 
was mostly mundane, ranging from the writing of short, anonymous announcements, to any trifle 
that the owners might need at a moment’s notice.  During his time there, he witnessed the 
circulation of the Mirror grow to 10,000 subscribers.  Increasingly, Poe noticed how the growth 
of magazines and journals often coincided with the style of the mechanical writing and reporting 
that he performed for the Mirror
These trends in mechanical writing and reporting began to solidify saliently in the 1830s; 
where men of letters still edited the majority of periodicals up to this point, journalism and 
reportage increasingly dominated the style and content of magazines and newspapers.  This was 
especially true of the New York 
, and its tax on the “talent” that he wished to reflect on. 
Herald, run by James Gordon Bennet, which technically and 
stylistically became a precursor of more contemporary journalism.  Bennet sent correspondents 
to Washington, and even managed to have reporters admitted to the House and Senate.  To 
receive news quickly from his correspondents, he used the telegraph regularly, along with a 
variety of other techniques and technologies.  Emphasis on speed and accuracy produced the 
kind of pressures on writing and style that burdened Poe at the Mirror
The latin phrase, “currente calamo,” that Poe mentions in his discussion of the “rush of 
the age” signals this perceived co-incidence between language and the reality it reports, 
especially as the temporal gap between an event and its representation in language collapses.  
The modifier, “currente,” indicates haste in a speedy, constant movement, as in a trot, gallop or 
flow.  The “calamo” indicates a reed, or a cane, but also a reed pen, so that the phrase might be 
: announcements and 
reports appeared quickly, and editors expected writers to condense statements for rapid 
transmission.  This insistence on rapid transmission sought to close the gap between the 
occurrence of an event and the appearance of its report. 
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taken to mean a hasty, flowing pen that proceeds in a steady, but swift and unhesitating rhythm.  
The flowing pen denotes a writing that cannot stop, and that must continue in order to confirm 
contemporaneity.  The writing must be swift, urgent, so that it might achieve simultaneity with 
itself even as it writes, which is to say that it must occur simultaneously with reality, in which the 
writing not only refers to this reality, but becomes totally superimposable with it in its 
simultaneity.  This writing is not a medium, or mediator, but an immediacy that engenders a total 
transparency of language with reality at the moment of its enunciation.  Still, even as we 
understand language approaching its perfect use only as it closes the gap between event and 
representation, even as we might imagine this gap completely closed, the value of language 
becomes secondary to reality.  In reportage, language only follows an animation that springs up 
from reality, and does not, itself, participate in it. 
Further, this figure of the flowing or galloping pen indicates a writing that occurs in an 
offhanded way, as if it has nothing more to say than what it means to represent.  If such writing 
must be simultaneous with the reality it is in, always referring to a reality that surrounds it, then 
it expels its own occurrence from that reality: as the galloping pen achieves simultaneity with the 
present, it excludes its own activity from what it represents.  The galloping pen follows only the 
trail of a reality that empties language of reflection, granting it the value of a simple exchange 
between word and referent.  This value for language in journalism might shed light on the 
indifference to “talent” I mentioned earlier, as well as a greater indifference to imaginative 
literature in general.  Because reportage insists on being in the present, the present must be 
instantly available.  This means one of two things: either the present is so instantly present that 
we are not in it for very long, or the present becomes eternalized because of its constant and 
instantaneous repetition.  In either case, change either happens so fast that we cannot account for 
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it, or it ceases to happen altogether.  Regardless, the galloping pen must continue ad infinitum, 
without reflecting on itself since there is no “time” for such reflection, and since language must 
preserve its representational status from one edition of a paper to the next.  The indifference to 
imaginative literature, and to what Poe calls “talent,” is that these exist in a doubtful relation to 
the reality that the galloping pen wishes to “catch,” or, worse, writing that disguises itself as 
“imaginative” (read: Norman Leslie
Fay’s novel fails to be art, and fails to imagine the world, because it offers only a 
sequence of “facts” – much like journalism might – in which nothing is justified, and in which 
man participates only passively.  Poe’s formulation of a definition for “plot” begins to show that 
he deemed some kind of inner necessity as essential to the work of art; we can begin to see this 
in the following passage: “The word plot, as commonly accepted, conveys but an indefinite 
meaning.  Most persons think of it as simple complexity […] But the greatest involution of 
incident will not result in plot; which, properly defined, is that in which no part can be displaced 
without ruin to the whole.”
).  In these formulations, imaginative literature becomes 
simply a lie, a triviality, because it does not respond to processes of verification required of a real 
referent.  Further, writing becomes transparent to this object, and the work of “talent” is 
irrelevant when writing is to respond only to the exterior motivation of accurate representation.  
Finally, all of this suggests that the temporal mechanics of the journal constricts language insofar 
as it erodes the figural in language, and seemingly reduces it only to the possibility of saying 
something that is already present as a stable reality. 
10  Poe published this passage in a review of Bulwer’s Night and 
Morning in 1841 in Graham’s
                                                 
10 Edgar Allan Poe.  “Night and Morning,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 10, 
ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 116-7. 
.  Where Poe only ridiculed Fay in his early review for the 
 98 
Messenger
This latter point becomes even clearer with respect to the opposition Poe makes, finally, 
in 
, we begin to see here a definition of plot, and a real motivation that shows us that the 
confrontation with the New York clique that published and marketed Fay’s novel was not an 
arbitrary bid for attention.  In this more mature discussion of plot, we begin to see that Poe 
wanted to separate the popular notion of plot as linear arrangement, or “simple” complexity, 
from his understanding of it as order or necessity.  The splitting that occurs in these two notions 
of plot render, also, two notions of history: one in which history appears as a disparate collection 
of facts (as in the press), and another in which history occurs as doing and making in the human 
realm of action. 
Eureka, between the plots of man and the plot of God.  The doing and making of man, that I 
refer to above, takes precendence when the plots of man are divorced from the plot of God, 
which is the only perfect plot, but unattainable.  In Poe’s final discussion of plot, he describes the 
plot of God as beginning in the first thought – the thought of God is the thought that creates the 
universe.  In Poe’s story, once God has created, He does not remain a sentient being amidst 
creation, from which He might derive pleasure, and remain in relation to what He has created.  
God is neither an entity nor an agency in a particular place or time.  Instead, God remains the 
figure of creation in Poe’s story: the unattainable perfection for which man must aim in his own 
creations, a perfection he ultimately cannot attain if creation is to continue.  If man’s creation 
could attain the perfection of God, then creation would cease since the passage through not 
knowing that is so important for further creation would no longer be possible.  God, therefore, 
represents the beginning and end point of history, and man – the plots of man – stand in Poe’s 
story as the continuing possibility of history that open up the passage into moments of not 
knowing. 
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We might say, therefore, that it is to man’s great advantage that he is not God.  In Poe’s 
story about plot – God’s and man’s – Poe tried to illustrate a creative doing and making in 
relation to God’s creation.  In this sense, human making has as its goal the bringing into being 
what nature, on its own, could not.  In the unlimited circulation of the press, in which man 
created a temporality that was imposed universally, and therefore taken as natural, this figure is 
important to begin to reflect on the “currente calamo” as a figure of man’s making.  Importantly, 
therefore, the plots of man strip both God and nature as the primary and static values of history, 
and gives man the creative power of change, of creation, within the autonomous repetition of the 
press that reports a history that seems increasingly distant and removed. 
4.3 TIME, LEISURE, AND THE FIGURE OF THE CRITIC 
Poe’s interest in terms that have come to bear a relation to formalism and a-historical criticism 
have often suggested that his engagement with the press tended toward withdrawal, especially 
from the influence of the masses, or, as Poe called them, the “mob.”  The first person narration in 
much of his short stories, in which the narrator tells of mental derangement, or of isolation in 
aristocratic homes, libraries and gardens, further emphasizes this characterization of Poe as an 
escape from his surroundings for the sake of a literature that would be free from the pressures of 
the press and, further, the mass audience that decided the salability of what was published.  
When Poe begins his Marginalia in the first person, therefore, critics have been quick to see this 
collection of notes as the products of a vain ego in a ploy for authority, refinement and 
distinction.  This is the case Richard Gray makes by arguing that the introductory entry of the 
Marginalia is a performance in which Poe sought to imitate a Southern gentleman reading at 
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leisure in his study.  Following Bourdieu, Richard Gray argues that such imitation aims to 
acquire “cultural capital” for the sake of upward mobility and social authority.  Like Gray, 
Robert D. Jacobs and Louis D. Rubin argue that we can only make sense of Poe in light of his 
place within Southern society, and that the figure of the Southern gentleman of leisure is often at 
the center of his work.  
It is important to note that the figure of the Southern man of leisure existed in the South 
as an oppositional figure to the industrialization of the North,11
                                                 
11 Thomas Willis White, as I will discuss below, used the myths surrounding this figure as an 
appeal to his region and its difference from the North.  Later critics, especially Allen Tate, 
thought of the Southern plantation gentry as aristocratic in the old, European sense, which 
articulated the deep, social and political differences in the organization of the South with respect 
to the North.  These differences, put in terms of aristocracy, allowed Tate to describe the means 
by which modernization destroyed Southern society. 
 so these critics’ identification of 
Poe with the Southern man of leisure strongly suggests that Poe was an isolationist.  The figure 
of the man of leisure took on value as a sign and symbol of the South, whose traditions 
Southerners often believed this figure, insofar as he existed in Southern society, could preserve 
so long as he could remain “untouched” by modernization.  To this end, the Southern man of 
letters remained “amateur” in his literary career to resist the immorality of Northern letters, and 
to remain free from influences that threatened his community from the outside, as if his privacy, 
itself, was substantive of the South.  This notion of the private individual, who hides away, is a 
conservative attempt to reject and resist changes for the sake of preserving the continuity of 
community.  This private individual believes that by protecting the authenticity of his interiority 
– who he is privately – he can preserve a way of life in the face of the industrial, social, and 
political changes that were occurring everywhere around him. 
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It is no wonder, in light of this characterization of Poe, that Jacobs, as I mention in the 
previous chapter of this dissertation, took Poe literally in the Marginalia, assuming that Poe “was 
being sincere,”12 writing as himself and to himself.  It seems as though Jacobs assumes that Poe, 
at this stage in his career, abandons the editorial “we” that he uses in his criticism, for the first 
person singular, which Poe usually reserved for his fiction and poetry, in favor of a kind of 
private writing.  In abandoning “we” for the “I” in this non-fictional space, Poe would have been 
effectively putting aside his criticism for a kind of documentary of his life, or for a kind of 
personal writing like a diary.  In either case, these naïve assumptions raise striking questions: 
Who is this “I”?  Does this “I” arise in Poe’s decision – wanting to confront the press and to 
provide a figure to reflect on its temporal rhythm – to retreat into a journalistic diary where he 
recorded the events of the day?  What events did he wish to record?  Finally, what does it say 
that critics, with Jacobs as the example, wish to make of the Marginalia
The reflections on plot that precede this section might lead us to some possible answers 
to these questions.  First, Poe did not have any wish to retreat from the world as is suggested by 
the figure of isolation that he used in introducing his 
 a documentation of a 
life, the records of a life? 
Marginalia
                                                 
12 Robert D. Jacobs, Poe, Journalist & Critic  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana UP, 1969), 354. 
.  To the extent that he used the 
figure of the man of leisure, it is important to think of the internal relationship between this 
figure and Poe’s thought.  Poe’s desire to reflect on and illuminate the urgency imposed by the 
temporality of the journal, and its linear structure, hinges around the figure of the man of leisure.  
The journal, in imagining a reality that it can deliver instantaneously, gives language the image 
of transcending that reality and of not participating in it.  For this reason, the time of leisure is of 
central importance for Poe because this “time” discloses the discrepancy between reality and 
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language; further, “leisure,” which can be “slow” and empty of events, occurs in a “time” that 
journalism cannot report.  The figure of the man of leisure, therefore, serves a particularly 
important task for Poe: it reveals the extent to which the temporality of the journal and its 
reportage are not excluded from the reality they tell, but pervade it, organize it, and articulate its 
possibilities. 
The use of the “I” in the Marginalia, therefore, violates what journalism and even 
criticism wished to maintain as the separation between public and private life, especially in the 
South, as I mention above.  The impersonal circulation and reach of the newspaper and magazine 
accentuates this separation, in which the “public” is never a face-to-face interaction, but becomes 
only a “common” time of a linear, shared temporality.  The news, about which journalists were 
incapable of speaking in the first person, arises in the Marginalia in relation to a writing 
circulating everywhere (the numerous installments of the Marginalia Poe prepared from 1844 to 
1848, in fact, were published in different journals and magazines), and that is tied to calendar 
time and referents; but we have another writing, one that wishes almost to exit this easy 
reference and recognizability, and says something, indicates something, to which it cannot 
merely point.  This is the internal necessity of plot, which Poe achieves in the Marginalia
Poe’s experience with the Southern man of leisure came mainly from his involvement 
with Southern literature during his work in the South, especially in Richmond working for 
Thomas Willis White at the 
 through 
the temporality of leisure which makes writing sovereign, and an event in and of itself, as I will 
explain below. 
Southern Literary Messenger.  While working for White, Poe 
learned about the particular pressures on publishing, on soliciting publications, and on the 
pressure that regional magazines faced as their readership increased in number.  Poe witnessed 
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how these journals and their rise in readership affected the production of imaginative literature; 
more, he reflected on the failure of criticism and literature at this moment to provide 
communities with ideal images by which they might think about themselves and their relation to 
the nation.  Even when papers purported to represent a particular locale – or, better, embody their 
interests, customs and culture – these papers exhibited changes that came in from the outside of 
the locale, or that the centers of literary production could neither contain nor manage.  Distinct 
communities began to lose the notion of local control, and even as this occurred, they lost the 
ability to retell the story of such a loss of control.  Papers, when they could retell such stories, 
could only report them, explain them in social or economic terms, but could not create them, or 
manage them.  This often led to the failure of numerous periodicals, especially in the South, 
where editors wished to use the journal and magazine as a means to produce distinctive regional 
literatures, or simply to promote the distinct literature they assumed was present, but left 
unpublished for lack of a local press.  In the South, a number of magazines emerged with the 
goal of serving as a medium to publish such literature, although many perished because either the 
literature they hoped to publish did not exist, because the mechanics of the journal put pressures 
on its production, or both. 
Thomas Willis White’s Southern Literary Messenger is an interesting case of a Southern 
journal that managed to survive beyond its initial intention of becoming an organ of Southern 
literature.  White, like other publishers, initially wished to use his publication to promote 
Southern letters, and appealed to the Southern chivalric myth to obtain contributions.  In 
soliciting his readers for material, White acknowledged that men of letters in the South remained 
amateur, often for genteel and moral reasons, and that that they were too proud to convince the 
“professional” press in the North to print their work.  He offered his Southern Literary 
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Messenger, based in Richmond, as a medium for these amateur poets to publish.  The appeal to 
publish in a periodical, however, resulted incompatible with the literary conditions White 
assumed existed in the South, and that he hoped to promote.  This incompatibility is precisely 
what William Gilmore Simms noticed after numerous attempts at starting a literary magazine; in 
1842 he wrote, “[An editor’s] contributors – men, generally, in our country, devoted to other 
professions, – can only write for him at moments of leisure […] He is necessarily compelled to 
wait upon them for their articles, which, good, bad or indifferent, he is compelled to publish.  
The constant drain upon himself, enfeebles his imagination and exhausts his intellect.”13
A journal’s potential for large distribution, and the availability of fresh material at 
frequent intervals, especially in the case of Southern journals, would become detrimental to the 
literature Southern editors hoped to promote.  In binding the Southern man of letters to the 
temporality of the journal, the literature of the region could only become more similar to the 
conditions of the “professional” press.  The conditions for literature produced by the size and 
  One’s 
“amateur” status, in many ways, comes by way of leisure, when the man of letters can think on 
his “own” time, a time that is not bound to publishing dates, the popular press, or the constant 
flux of news.  A periodical, however, can hardly survive if it must wait for publications from 
amateur writers.  On the other hand, soliciting work on a timely basis would change not only a 
contributor’s “amateur” status, but the “leisure” of the Southern man of letters: to publish in 
journals is to succumb to the journal’s temporality, its steady urgency for projects and news.  An 
editor “waits” on men of leisure because editors are necessarily bound to the temporality of 
journals. 
                                                 
13 Quoted in Richard J. Calhoun, “Literary Magazines in the Old South” in The History of 
Southern Literature, eds. Louis Rubin et al. (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State UP, 1985), 157. 
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speed of distribution were incommensurate with the literature the Southern Literary Messenger
Such homogenization occurs through the journal’s insistence on dates that binds it to an 
external time, the “common” time of the “currente calamo” (and imposes on it a linear 
chronology).  A journal might publish book reviews, criticism, literature and journalism together 
in one edition,
 
wished to promote and represent: this shows that journals produced an experience of temporality 
that affected the possibilities and organization of entire populations, and pronounced the demise 
of certain literary expressions coincidently with their representation in journals.  Journalism 
exists in a “time” that is incompatible with the “time” of leisure: the former seeks clarity through 
the instantaneous exchange between its forms and reality, while the latter does not have a clear 
connection to the time or world of news.  When published in a journal, however, literature must 
answer to the external constraints of verifiability, and to the clarity and regularities of clocktime.  
The journal, therefore, was not a passive conveyor of stable information pertaining to a stable 
reality that was already present, but an operator that instituted temporal rhythms, which lead to a 
homogenization that exceeded local or regional control.  In this sense, the “currente calamo” 
seemingly becomes automatic, and exceeds any attempts at manageability despite the fact that it 
is a figure that arises out of institutions of human labor. 
14
                                                 
14 In fact, the Southern Literary Messenger did not perish as quickly as did other Southern 
journals for want of quality, literary contributions; its survival depended largely on abandoning 
its intent to concentrate mostly on belles lettres.  To this end, the Southern Literary Messenger 
became more like its Northern counterparts in content as well: it published political, travel, and 
historical essays, as well as literary criticism, fiction and poetry. 
 all of which it groups under the emblem of its title and the date.  This group of 
work finds its cohesion under the emblem of the date through the spatial figure of time: the work 
becomes located in the sum total of events named coincidently with the date.  The common time 
of the date works in a sphere of reality in which the journal names what is present, only to signal 
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the passing away of what is present in its next edition.  The journal, then, produces an experience 
of temporality that registers an indubitable ontological state for each present moment in which 
objects and provinces of human activity exist seamlessly alongside each other until they pass into 
the nothingness of linear temporal pastness.  Even as these activities or objects pass away, their 
simultaneous presence “in” a language that reports them gives them an equivalent ontological 
status, the image of recoverability as stable objects, and even their present recoverability through 
the logical-linear extension of cause and effect.  Papers and journals, therefore, were incapable of 
reporting the changes that attended the change of reporting: language in the periodicals became 
incapable of figuring its own collapse for it was the figural itself that became increasingly 
impossible to reflect on. 
In this sense, we might say that the journal produces a temporal entrainment, which 
institutes a behavioral regime in the nation at large.  Although the nation was fragmented socially 
and culturally at this moment, we might say that the experience of temporality instituted by the 
organs of mass communication established a material and mechanical homogeneity.  Because 
journals institute a temporal rhythm in which they name a reality that is present at a certain 
moment, the journal produces a temporal measure, and an experience of time, by which one 
might count or account for the passage of time.  Such units, and their lived experience, are 
neither eternal nor universal, but are produced through interventions at critical points,15
                                                 
15 I am thinking, in particular of Manuel DeLanda’s central term, “entrainment,” in War in the 
Age of Intelligent Machines, to describe these interventions and critical points.  The intervention 
I refer to here involves the temporal rhythm of publication.  What is of primary importance here 
is to note that material rhythms produce temporality, and that these material conditions extend to 
the possibilities of language.  To be more clear: the emergence of a particular experience of time 
I discuss here does not so much institute new units of time, but gives these units more dominant 
force in the experience of time to the degree that they pervade and condition durations that were 
not necessarily commensurate with them.  The temporal rhythm of the journal makes clock and 
 which 
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breaks with a previous organization and experience.  Temporality, however, presents a particular 
difficulty: at the moment that such an organization of time emerges, it represents the past as 
coterminous with its present organization, and therefore must deny the break that caused it.  The 
journal, therefore, produces an experience of time – an experience of how that which is present 
“in” time passes – but cannot necessarily define or describe how the journal itself produces and 
participates in the changes it has created.  Further, because of the success of such organizations – 
their effectiveness for instituting regimes of behavior – we must conclude that there is no faculty 
of mind – no natural, hard-wired operation – that resists these material interventions, or remains 
untouched by them in some kind of naturalized readership or private interiority.  Language does 
not deliver a reality to the senses, but this “delivery” itself has a history. 
This is the temporality that Poe wished to confront, and to make intelligible for the sake 
of criticism, by illustrating that which is incompatible with it: the time of leisure.  As a figure 
that forms in relation and response to the material conditions of its moment, the Southern 
gentleman gathers together the protocols by which Poe could think historically about change in 
and over time.  More, it allows him to think “time” itself: the figure of the Southern man of 
letters brings into contrast the time of leisure with the linear-chronological figure of time.  Poe, 
therefore, did not intend to use the Southern man of letters to configure a regional antagonism, 
although the figure is important as a connection to an organization of life that no longer exists; 
rather, he intended to use it as a figure that allowed him to think the problem of creation.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
calendar time dominant for even activities of thinking.  More, the journal conditions how one 
experiences clocktime, especially with respect to the production of the creative arts, which it 
periodizes in each of its issues.  At this moment, therefore, the image of a nation state or culture 
did not centralize the production of literature; instead, individual readers enter into organization 
when the temporal singularity occurs.  The result is a versatile information flow from de-
centered “sites” – publication centers – that reduce the possibility of creation as the emergence of 
other possibilities. 
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Southern man of letters is both a figure of the local that emerges out of local materials and 
activity, which the regional press seeks to promote, but also a figure of the past, that is no longer 
contemporaneous with the modes by which journals reach, and therefore form, the masses.  This 
is an important condition: the journal wishes to give meaning and value to the local, what exists 
as regional, but destroys the contemporary validity and vitality of that form as it seeks to 
represent it as that which is present, and that which language might deliver as a stable object.  
The Southern man of letters, therefore, is a sign and symbol of the South, of its social and 
political organization, but also a mode that is incompatible with the new forms that seek to 
represent it as such.  The representation of the man of leisure in the Marginalia
The amateur writer’s “leisure,” therefore, is much more than just his free time from his 
livelihood, and it is much more than a desire to remain private.  It designates a condition in 
which the writer is free from social and political projects and may, without hurry or urgency, 
reflect on nothing in particular.  Social and political projects, or the pressures of reporting 
, therefore, is not 
the representation of a “real” object that is present and verifiable: the figure of the man of leisure, 
when represented in the journals, destroys “leisure.”  The figure of the man of leisure in Poe’s 
work, therefore, is not a representation in the sense of handing over a stable reality for 
verification, and does not have a clear connection to an object that exists in reality; rather it is a 
figure of intelligibility for a temporality that has no standing in the press of the “currente 
calamo.”  It is important to stress that, for Poe, this figure does not serve a reactionary function 
that announces the recovery of a lost South, or of something from the past with which Poe 
wishes to identify or save.  The Southern gentleman, rather, is a figure of incommensurability 
with the temporal forms of the journal, and provides a protocol by which Poe intended to make 
the temporal experience of the journal intelligible, and possible to reflect on. 
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quickly, are not the standards by which leisure can become knowable for a readership.  
Reflection on nothing in particular, during a temporality that has no clear connection to projects 
that might quantify it or produce an anticipated objective, perhaps, is what causes such difficulty 
for critics that cannot locate Poe “in his time”; time and leisure are not objects that a writer or a 
critic represent, and which, although they form in relation to social, technological and political 
conditions, emerge as figures that may have no real referent.  To this end, the work produced 
during leisure has no connection to a literacy that wishes to report reality, or to deliver a message 
as one would deliver an object. 
The figure of the man of leisure is central to Poe because without illustrating the 
discrepancy between language and reality, and without destroying the notion of “time” 
understood simply a succession of objects, criticism cannot reflect on the forms of the journal.  
To be able to write about the journal critically, it is necessary to write what previous knowledge 
will not appropriate, and what will not merely appear as coterminous with the forms of 
journalistic time.  This is the task for the figure of the man of leisure in Poe’s Marginalia: in the 
midst of a language that responds everywhere to projects of clarity, and to computations in which 
the future arrives as predicted in simple stories of development, the man of leisure turns away 
from these predictable courses of charted time to a different exigency, one in which a reflection 
on nothing does not find representation in reportage or journalism and finds, rather, in the midst 
of this mechanical homogeneity, the advent of infinite improbability.  The moment of leisure 
does not enter into reportage or journalism because these cannot represent it as continuous with 
everything that is already an object of knowledge.  The time of leisure, therefore, is either 
“nothing,” or it is synonymous with creativity in which creativity, what emerges from creativity, 
is not coterminous with what preceded it: it is a time of passing into “not knowing.”  In this 
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“time” of leisure, therefore, we have the notion of a temporality that corresponds to the 
emergence of discontinuity and otherness, rather than a temporality that serves only to relate past 
moments to the present and future through logical-linear arrangements that must exclude 
anything that these fields cannot arrange into order. 
The man of letters that Poe uses as the critic of the Marginalia does not report the news, 
but neither does he withdraw from the world.  The man of leisure illustrates the incursion of the 
mechanical time of the journal into his inner life, which means that he cannot simply withdraw 
from it.  The time of leisure, however, affords a deliverance from the temporal continuum of the 
press, and the commonality of its calendar time.  The temporality of leisure is embedded in the 
world, much like the temporality of the “currente calamo,” so, rather than a withdrawal, it 
affords another experience of stories, news, which can only happen when the “time” of the 
journal can be freed from its commonality.  This is no withdrawal because the critic of the 
Marginalia
For this reason, Breton saw Poe as a precursor of Surrealism.  Some of the experiments of 
Surrealism confused the difference between narration and information; Poe experienced the 
“real” of the press, and related it in the 
 does not offer only useless bits of private speculation, but an experience of the world 
as an arrest, in leisure.  For Poe, “plot” was not a temporal problem (not necessarily the 
development of a story in linear-logical unfolding), but a problem of relation that attempted to 
achieve unity through deliverance from the common temporal continuum; leisure, rather than the 
time of a withdrawal, becomes a time incommensurate with “common” time. 
Marginalia to the imagination of a critic that forgets what 
he writes as he writes it.  This is the kind of writing that might be linked, too, to the automatic 
writing in which the Surrealists were so interested.  The “currente calamo,” although it works 
mechanically, is not an automatic writing because it does not make language solitary and 
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sovereign, but always relates language back to referents and to calendar time.  The man of leisure 
is much closer to this automatic writing in that he responds to the world in a way that what 
happens, what he writes about, happens pervasively and articulates him.  This event, however, is 
not simply a private matter: what happens to the man of leisure, as his time of leisure faces the 
time of the press, cannot be described simply as an event that is happening to someone.  The 
event, rather, in a leisure time that the critic does not remember, is an event he articulates only as 
an involuntary memory, in which the past is re-experienced anew. 
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5.0  DEATH AND EVIL AS AFFIRMATION IN POE’S ART 
5.1 EVIL BEYOND CHOICE 
 
I have been arguing in this dissertation that Poe’s work for magazines, newspapers and journals 
placed him decidedly within the clear urgency of the goals of prosaic labor, which he understood 
as an operator that reduced art to the status of an instrument.  This is one reason that Poe so often 
criticized didacticism as a goal of literature, or censured any attempts to elaborate moral 
understandings or principles as the task of criticism.  In a clear attempt to refuse these 
instrumental understandings of literature, Poe wrote a number of stories that explored perversity 
as a fundamental element of human nature.  Tales such as “The Black Cat,” or “The Imp of the 
Perverse,” foregrounded a strange impulse that would overtake narrators and push them to refuse 
rationality and even their own welfare.  It is important to understand that Poe did not appropriate 
this impulse – despite the fact that I call it a “fundamental element of human nature” – as a 
faculty of mind in relation to other faculties; this impulse, rather, exists in man as an element of 
chance that Poe’s stories can neither explain, account for, nor anticipate.  Further, what Poe calls 
perversity exists as an impulse for destruction that would show that the real order of prosaic 
labor – its values, its major attitudes and its direction of activity – is unnecessary. 
It is also necessary to clarify what I call “a clear attempt to refuse” the dominant attitude 
of prosaic labor in these stories.  Although Poe chose not to follow the direction of labor in the 
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sense that he refused to subordinate his literature to predeterminants or real objects, this refusal 
also exceeded the ethical motivation of a choice.  In making a choice, Poe would have only have 
been avoiding the established order, rather than creating something which could have taken its 
place.  Although we cannot ignore the fact that Poe did, indeed, make a choice to refuse the 
clearly appointed labor that, for instance, his step-father wished for him to take part in, the 
possibilities inherent in his stories are not merely reactionary.  For this reason, Poe’s exploration 
of death and evil in his stories are attempts to reflect on the in the trenchability of operations of 
knowledge.  One way of thinking this problem is to understand, for example, the possible to be 
anything that gives life: with this respect, any thinking that is thought about life becomes 
subordinate to it in the sense that it is the condition under which its thinking is possible.  With 
this respect, the impossible is death; upon facing death violently one faces what was impossible 
to think under the conditions of life. 
The task of this chapter, therefore, is to think about the work of art in relation to evil and 
death without qualifying this sense of evil as the dialectic with good that pushes history toward 
its terminus.  Under the conditions of journalism that I have been describing, the possibilities of 
evil and death in Poe’s fiction are ways by which he attempts to think the work as its own 
measure, rather than the measure of goals that have been set for it beforehand.  In a world in 
which all activity is subordinate to the measure of efficiency, the place of literature and art seems 
to become attached to this process as well.  This notion of evil shows us Poe’s understanding of 
the work of art puts at stake: the freeing of life from its entrenchment in operations which would 
make it appear as an unfulfilled promise, always existing as what it is not now, but what it must 
become by submitting its present moment to projects of intelligibility and instrumentality.  This 
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chapter, therefore, will concentrate on Poe’s “The Oval Portrait,” which attempts to think the 
possibilities of life in relation to evil and death. 
5.2 THE LIFE AND DEATH OF “THE OVAL PORTRAIT” 
Poe’s “The Oval Portrait” appeared for the first time in the April 26th, 1845 edition of The 
Broadway Journal, and was a revision of what many scholars consider a less successful version, 
originally titled “Life in Death,” which was published approximately 3 years earlier in Graham’s
I am referring to Seymour Gross and Richard Dower’s work on the revisions to “Life in 
Death” when citing a “central incident” in these tales.  Gross and Dowell both concur in 
identifying the “central incident” of “The Oval Portrait” as the story of the portrait itself, that 
tells the relation between its subject and its artist.  The story of the portrait is an account of how 
.  
The critical interest in the “less-successful” “Life in Death” bears importance within Poe 
scholarship because critics take the history of the story, from its publication in 1842 to its 
revision as “The Oval Portrait,” as an example of Poe’s execution of “unity of effect.”  This 
compositional principle appears throughout Poe’s criticism, and often holds as a central concept 
of artistic form that guided the production of Poe’s fiction, and influenced how he understood 
literature.  In tracing how Poe accomplished a “unity of effect” in his final version of this 
particular story, critics note that he eliminated some mistakes and lack of polish that weakened 
the original.  But, most importantly, critics have noted that Poe accomplishes unity in the 
revision by eliminating passages about the narrator’s state of mind (of his use of opium, in 
particular), and thereby brings the “central incident” of the tale more directly into focus, a move 
that equates unity to a focused centrality. 
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the subject of the painting, who happened to be the painter’s wife, died as she sat for the painter.  
Both tales introduce this story of the portrait with a first person narrative spoken by an injured 
man, who makes his way to an empty chateau to rest and heal.  In this empty chateau, he 
discovers numerous artworks, but becomes mesmerized by the image in the oval portrait.  After 
contemplating it for a long while – Poe reduces the four hours he spends looking at the painting 
in “Life in Death” to just one hour in “The Oval Portrait” – the narrator discovers a small book 
with the story of the painting.  The text of this story – what Gross and Dowell call the “central 
incident” – concludes Poe’s tale.  In citing this story as the “central incident,” both of the articles 
I mention here address the importance of the introductory narrative only as a way of focusing 
attention on the story of the portrait.  Gross, for instance, goes so far as to say that, in “Life in 
Death,” “the narrator’s mind is irrelevant, for once the story of the painter and his wife begins to 
emerge, the narrator is forgotten.”1  Dowell, in much the same vein, claims that “The basic 
weakness of ‘Life in Death’ is that ultimately […] the opium […] has [nothing] to do with the 
central incident of the story.”2
The insistence on a centrality by which to read both stories – and particularly “The Oval 
Portrait” – constricts the life of this story and obscures its historical significance, but this 
  Both critics agree that the story of the wounded narrator has 
nothing to do with the story of the oval portrait, and fail in thinking the relation between the two.  
This failure allows these critics to follow one section of the story with greater insistence, which 
produces the “centrality” they seek, while at the same time diminishes the experience of the work 
of art that animates the tale. 
                                                 
1 Seymour L. Gross, “Poe’s Revision of ‘The Oval Portrait,’” Modern Langauge Notes, vol. 74, 
No. 1 (January, 1959): 17.  For the remainder of this chapter, I will refer to this article 
parenthetically as “Gross.” 
2 Richard W. Dowell, “The Ironic History of Poe’s “Life in Death”: A Literary Skeleton in the 
Closet,” American Literature, vol. 42 (January, 1971): 482. 
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obfuscation brings to bear another line of inquiry that is active in the story, especially in the 
wounded narrator’s experience of the work of art.  Inherent in this critical interest in “Life in 
Death” and “The Oval Portrait,” there is a desire to turn “Life in Death” into an object, fixed as 
an antecedent to “The Oval Portrait,” in order to place the life of Poe’s writing into an historical 
framework organized around the principle of “unity of effect.”  These critics share in the desire 
of the story’s narration by a wounded traveler to clearly understand art in a way to make it 
manageable, and to subordinate art into a lower activity on the level of platonic imitation, or of 
craftsmanship.  The critical interest in these stories, therefore, repeat the legal problems of 
plagiarism in which the labor of an isolated intellect produces a story, and subsequently 
possesses what it produces.  I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation that literature or art 
cannot grant an experience of community as long as they “belong” to the private mind, and that 
this particularization of the work as the sole province and possession of the private individual 
produced a present that could never begin anew.  The history of “The Oval Portrait,” in 
confluence with the critical reception that desires to locate unity as centrality, illustrates a related 
problem in which the work of art fails to begin anew in relation to the private author that 
possesses it, but also in the reduction of its existence to an object accommodated into a historical 
framework that gives the meaning of this object in advance as the product of labor time.  
Ultimately, however, these two stories refuse accommodation into such an historical framework 
because they resist the notion of possession or property in the act of creation.  “The Oval 
Portrait,” in fact, does not refer back to an antecedent, nor does it submit to easy manageability 
in some kind of “central incident,” but, rather, opens the question about the limits of the work as 
a particularization by the author.  This, perhaps, is not as clear in “Life in Death,” but if we are to 
think of “The Oval Portrait” as a revision of this first tale, what becomes clear after a careful 
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reading of these two stories is that the revision that takes place cannot be reduced to a number of 
compositional decisions applied to a central incident.  The “effect” of “Life in Death,” held by 
critics as the antecedent for which Poe sought a “unity of expression,” does not carry over to 
“The Oval Portrait”; what “The Oval Portrait” refers to, and where it finds its beginning, 
therefore, become two questions that defer the possibility of an answer.  These problems are 
particularly significant in Poe’s career during the period between 1842 and 1845 since these 
dates represent an important period for Poe’s work on plagiarism, as well as his experiences 
working as editor for a journal that sought a labor from its workers for which “talent” was 
unnecessary.3
Rather than fixing a central incident for either tale, therefore, I wish to proceed by asking 
about the relation between the narrative frame and the story of the portrait.  To begin, then, it is 
important to examine several components of “Life in Death” that Poe elaborated, but then left 
out of the revision.  The first, which is perhaps the most important and significant alteration, is 
the omission of the long explanation of the narrator’s use of opium.  “Life in Death” begins with 
the narrator explaining that he has been wounded after an encounter with banditti, and that these 
wounds have resulted in the interruption of travels that were underway before the story began.  
The narrator, therefore, is obligated to stop at a deserted chateau with his valet to rest and 
  The importance of talent exists only to the extent that it is not subordinated to the 
prosaic world of labor, which means that the framework that settles “The Oval Portrait” in a 
“central incident” would seek to direct it to an incidental relation, or to goals for its composition 
that remain beyond it. 
                                                 
3 I am referring to Poe’s observation in the Marginalia that the work of “talent” was irrelevant to 
the production of journalism and other writing for the press.  This occurs as the work of printing 
falls from the work of the cultivated, humanist printer and editor, to the mechanistic production 
of reportage.  I discuss this history in more detail below in section 5.4 of this chapter. 
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recover.  A long section follows in which the narrator remembers that he has opium, announces 
his intention of taking the drug, and explains that the reason for taking it is to induce calm, and 
perhaps sleep, in order to aid in his recovery from the wounds he has suffered.  Further, the 
narrator details his short history with and limited knowledge of the drug, and, finally, the 
experimental mode of ingestion he intends to use, all of which leads the reader to believe that the 
narrator perhaps ends up ingesting an enormous dosage. 
The long discussion of opium describes the capacity of the drug for producing “mental 
derangement” that could reach “alarming” levels.  This mental derangement is one feature of the 
drug experience Poe included in the original story; another feature, even more extraordinary, is 
the magical influence of the drug: as the narrator gazes at the artwork around him in the chateau 
in which he is resting, he states that “I felt that in [the drug’s] magical influence lay much of the 
gorgeous influence and variety of the frames – much of the ethereal hue that gleamed from the 
canvas – and much of the wild interest of the book which I perused.”4
                                                 
4 Edgar Allan Poe.  “Life in Death,” Edgar Allan Poe Society of Baltimore – Works – Tales, 
<http://www.eapoe.org/works/tales/ovlprta.htm> 
  In eliminating the drug 
experience altogether from the revision, Poe eliminates not only the effects of mental and 
sensory derangement, but also this more difficult notion of magical influence.  Gross explains 
that such a revision accomplishes the task of bringing greater emphasis to the oval portrait and its 
story, rather than on the narrator’s deranged experience of it; Gross notes that in light of the 
focus on opium, “the reader naturally expects the significance of the subsequent action to lie in 
its impingement upon the tortured mind of a desperately wounded man in the throes of a 
‘voluptuous narcotic,” (Gross, 17) which is, in fact, not the case.  For Gross, the withdrawal of 
the drug theme from the story makes of the narrator only a point of view: “The narrator, then, is 
 119 
a point of view as in ‘The Fall of the House of Usher,’ rather than a directly involved participant 
as in, for example, ‘Ligea,’” and orients the story only to the aim of bringing attention to the 
story of the oval portrait (Gross, 17). 
Gross’s work on the story emphasizes a revision which amounts to the movement from a 
story of an isolated mind in “Life in Death,” whose wild imagination creates without order since 
it is under the influence of a narcotic, to an ordered intellect that serves as nothing more than a 
point of view with the potential to be neutralized into a more objective account.  This produces a 
particular problem: that the availability of a “real” object (the painting itself) puts pressure on the 
perceiving intellect to either demonstrate correctness in its apperception, or to make obvious 
some kind of error, which, in either case, become “effects” of the narration with regard to the 
portrait.  In any case, such a diminishment of the narrative frame into a “point of view” makes it 
much easier to formulate the story as an object with a “center” – the portrait that captures the 
narrator’s attention.  Such an analysis, however, brings up a number of questions, among them, 
what such a revision would make of the portrait – perhaps only a faithful copy of reality?  Is the 
task of the artist, therefore, the formulation of correct representations that can (should) be 
verified against the reality that is already present?  This would also make of the artist, then, only 
a “point of view.”  Is the narration, then, the apperception of the life told in the story, and 
“captured” in the painting, that Gross understands as the central incident?  If the story of the 
painter and his wife is central, then the value of the narration lies only in its status as a verifiable 
confirmation of the artist’s achievement in the portrait: the accurate representation of the life that 
he held before him.  Gross’s reading, therefore, represents art only as the accomplishment of 
imitation, placing precedence on reality and subordinating labor to its reproduction. 
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The search for centrality, therefore, takes us quite far: if “The Oval Portrait” has a 
beginning in some kind of “central incident,” it is not “Life in Death,” but in “a” life that is 
antecedent even to the story.  Gross’s work on the story reduces it, finally, to nothing more than 
a platonic abolition of art, in which the artist seeks to elevate art to creation and life, but must fail 
because art can only be a shadow of a real substance.  Further, the painter and the narrator 
accomplish the same function: verification of that substance through a normalized perception.  
“The Oval Portrait,” however, dismantles such a normalized perception, and as hard as Gross 
works to point to something substantive as the beginning or origin of the story, this “origin” 
becomes scattered in the tale, for this “life” exists in the story that tells it, the portrait that 
represents it, and the narrative that tells of its perception.  The tale itself is a dispersal that does 
not contain centrality, which begins to give significance to the fact that there cannot be just one 
record of the “life” in the portrait, or even of the portrait itself.  The story of the portrait is just 
one figure of this “life,” and if it were to stand as central why wouldn’t Poe have dispensed with 
the figure of the wounded narrator altogether?  If the story of the portrait was to be central, why, 
for instance, would the narrator’s wounded condition matter for the revision? 
I want to suggest that the original story, “Life in Death,” is not as disorganized or 
incoherent as some critics have suggested although there are certainly some “weaknesses”; many 
reach this conclusion because they have wrongly identified the “central incident” of the story:  it 
is not a moral, it is not about the cost of art, and it is not about the painter.  It is, rather, about 
“Life itself,” as the painter proclaims at the end of the tale.5
                                                 
5 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Oval Portrait,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 4, ed. 
James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965). 249.  For the remainder of this chapter, I will 
refer to this tale parenthetically as “The Oval Portrait.” 
  Both “Life and Death” as well as 
“The Oval Portrait” are about life and its relation to death, where death is not the end of “a” life, 
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but a condition that makes it possible to think what was previously impossible under the 
conditions of life.  For this reason, death in these stories has an inherent connection to art.  Death 
eludes the simple notion of a particularization of creation in an author, and instead opens up 
creation to the participation in a greater movement: experience of art results in a dispersal of 
meaning rather than accommodation into a framework. 
5.3 “LIFE ITSELF”: THE KINSHIP OF ART, EVIL AND DEATH 
To liberate the story about the oval portrait, the art object in the tale, from a fixed centrality in 
“Life in Death” and its revision, we might look more closely at the story itself before bringing it 
back into relation with the narrative of the wounded narrator that is so often ignored in the tale’s 
significance.  Rather than beginning, therefore, as Gross or Dowell do, with the antecedent to 
“The Oval Portrait,” I would like to consider the story from the very end.  When we begin from 
the end, we find that “The Oval Portrait” denies a clear accommodation within the history in 
which Gross or Dowell would like to place it.  “The Oval Portrait” refuses a clear reference to an 
antecedent, and asking about “The Oval Portrait” as a revision can only disclose the difficulty of 
delineating the limits of a work of art.  This difficulty is also the positive and generative potential 
of the story, the question that calls for criticism, and finally fulfills the role of the narrator as both 
speaker in the tale, and spectator of the portrait as a work of art rather than simply a copy or a 
representation. 
The tale ends with a statement about “life itself,” which becomes an elusive notion that 
the story ties directly to the limits of the work of art.  The tale does this throughout, but brings art 
and “life itself” most forcefully into relation in the story of the portrait that the wounded narrator 
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finds in a book next to his bed.  When the narrator finds that he cannot sleep despite his wounds 
and fatigue, he spends hours reading through the book, which contains the histories of the 
artworks that adorn the walls of the chateau he has broken into.  Once he discovers the oval 
portrait, he becomes fascinated with it and looks for the story of this particular painting in the 
book.  There he finds a tale about a beautiful, young woman – the woman in the portrait – and of 
her husband, who painted the portrait.  The woman hated art because of her husband’s passion 
for it, yet the painter was set on making a model of his wife to portray her beauty in a portrait.  
The story tells us that she sat for weeks while her husband worked on the portrait until, finally, it 
was complete.  “This is indeed Life itself,” the painter exclaimed upon its completion, only to 
turn to his wife at that very moment to find her dead.  The tale ends there, with the painter caught 
between the finished portrait and his dead wife, and without coming back to the wounded 
narrator. 
This ending for the tale seems to leave the narrator completely to the side and brings the 
painter into focus, which is perhaps one reason that critics have insisted that the painter’s action, 
contained in the story of the portrait, constitutes the central incident of the tale.  Indeed, the 
painter’s position as artist configures a strong relation between the artwork and the model that sat 
for him, almost independently of the narrator.  Further, his position at the very end of the tale 
between the dead wife and the portrait seems to make of the painter a conduit through which the 
life of the woman who sits for him transfers to the portrait through his work.  Daniel Hoffman 
has written on this action in “The Oval Portrait” as a type of absorption, which the painter 
ignores, as we can see in the following passage from the tale: “and he would not see that the tints 
which he spread upon the canvas were drawn from the cheeks of her who sate beside him” (“The 
Oval Portrait,” 248).  Hoffman gives an important significance to this suggestion of absorption, 
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which he further characterizes as sort of vampirism, and which he finally attributes to the cost of 
art in Poe’s fiction: “The death of a beautiful woman, Poe’s prescribed theme for poetry, makes 
necessary that the beautiful woman die […] And […] leads the artist to become the murderer of 
his muse.”  More emphatically, even, Hoffman states that “Poe makes the artist a cannibal or 
vampire whose subject must die so that there may be art.”6
The story of the portrait prefigures the ghoulishness of this possible vampiric significance 
when it portends the wife’s death by describing the moment of the marriage as an “evil hour.”  
This “evil” element is apparent in much of Poe’s fiction, but Hoffman gives it a simpler meaning 
  Hoffman’s reading offers a 
possibility for art beyond a secondary status as imitation, or representation, and makes of it a 
primary object through the ghoulish figure of the vampire, which art accomplishes at the expense 
of a victim’s life (in other words, art is primary now that it “has” a life, and is not an imitation of 
a life).  This figure of the painter as a vampire could also acquire significance in relation to 
Baudelaire’s use of the vampire.  In his poem “Les Métamorphoses du vampire,” Baudelaire 
portrays the figure of the vampire as a prostitute, who confuses seller and the object to be sold, as 
well as turning desire and pleasure into labor.  In this poem, the vampire prostitute sucks the 
marrow from the bones of the poet, creating a fusion between work and the object made: the 
poet’s work, like the prostitute’s, becomes a ghastly living dead as it is commodified.  This 
meaning could have given greater significance to the work of art as mere object; Poe’s use of 
death, however, does not finally have this vampiric significance for the painter is never a 
vampire, but an artist that invites death through a sacrifice of the “object” that he paints.  In the 
disappearance of the wife in death, she escapes the objecthood to which she might have 
succumbed. 
                                                 
6 Daniel Hoffman, Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 311. 
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than it has in “The Oval Portrait.”  For Hoffman, or even Gross, the “evil” act is simply murder: 
it is, in the most innocent interpretation, the painter’s gross negligence for his wife’s health in his 
monomaniacal pursuit of capturing her beauty for the portrait.  In its more ghoulish 
interpretation, the painter causes the woman’s death through the transference of her life from the 
world to the work of art.  In either case, the meaning of “evil” here is nothing more than the 
breaking of a law, or its rejection, willful or accidental.  It is quite important to return the sense 
of evil in Poe’s story to its proper significance, which can be quickly confused or hijacked, 
especially by American intellectuals that use the term when describing the global resistance to 
capital.  It is important to mention Harry Levin within this group, even though his work focuses 
on literature, which he seeks to place above money, war or technology.  For Poe, however, 
literature did not necessarily serve as a fuller notion of experience since even the production of 
literature was not beyond the influence of the mechanistic and technological entrenchment of 
America.  The evil in Poe’s story “belongs” to America in a much different way: it acts “within” 
the whole not as a resistance or reaction, but as an exertion that might dissociate literature from 
its entrainment in the mechanistic that I mention here.  Evil, for Poe, is important because 
literature might not promise the “higher” experience that Levin takes for granted, and becomes 
one possibility of achieving it.  Levin’s notion of evil, on the other hand, is “within” the 
experience of the “American Dream” as simply another aspect of its logic, even if it presents 
itself as a challenge or contradiction.  Poe’s evil is clearly much different, for the “benign” 
American Dream that Levin sees as positive, Poe understood as mechanical entrainment.  The 
“American Dream” as Levin understands it is the constitution of a universal society whose goal 
is the “fulfillment of nature through material progress.”7
                                                 
7 Harry Levin, The Power of Blackness (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), 6. 
  For Poe, however, this “universality” 
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toward a common goal of “progress” signaled the articulation of a community in a temporal 
entrainment, achieved through the mechanistic activity of journalism and printing.  Levin, 
however, established this “universality” as a benign conglomeration representing world cultures 
in a new land, which American authors represented in the archetypal symbols of Christianity.  
Evil appears in this account only in a reductive, minor form that exists as a reaction to the 
primary – this may the sense, generally speaking, that American intellectuals use the term when 
describing global resistance to modernity.  This type of evil (if we can typify evil) is nothing 
more than an attendant of the good: it is operative.  This “evil” exists as an accommodation into 
a movement of mechanistic and measured gain insofar as “evil” identifies itself against the good, 
where the good is primary and “evil” has a motivation subordinated completely to goals that it 
does not set for itself.  Evil, in this formulation, is simply the negative in the inevitable goal of 
the “good” at the end of history. 
If we are to understand the more radical nature of “evil” in Poe’s fiction, we must think 
of it as more than a simple murder.  We must ask more carefully of the connection between evil 
and poetry, and between art and death in “The Oval Portrait.”  Importantly, the connection 
between art and death does not allow us to read the completion of the portrait as an absorption or 
transfer of a life.  The story of the portrait at times describes the work of the artist as a portrayal, 
a depiction, of which witnesses of the work “spoke of its resemblance [to the young bride] in low 
words, as of a mighty marvel.”  This resemblance confirms the relation of the painter’s work to 
the world, but cannot stand, finally, as mere imitation since the story stresses that even as he 
painted his bride, “he would not see that the light which fell so ghastlily in that lone turret 
withered the health and the spirits of his bride, who pined visibly to all but him.”  In fact, as he 
becomes progressively engrossed in his work, the painter increasingly turns away from the 
 126 
model that set the work in motion: “But at length, as the labor drew nearer to its conclusion, 
there were admitted none into the turret; for the painter had grown wild with the ardor of his 
work, and turned his eyes from the canvas rarely, even to regard the countenance of his wife.”  If 
we continue to believe, then, that the painter has accomplished a faithful depiction, then we must 
begin to think of this as a faithful depiction of a model that he refused to see – that he turned 
away from.  The tale further emphasizes the painter’s blindness as the young woman’s health 
continues to fail: “And he would not see that the tints which he spread upon the canvas were 
drawn from the cheeks of her who sate beside him” (“The Oval Portrait,” 248).  The emphasis on 
the modal “would” does not indicate alarm for a mindless negligence caused by the obsessive 
focus on art, but indicates quite the opposite.  To make of the painter’s passion for art the cause 
of a mindless negligence would be to give the painter and his work a minor position, to make of 
art a mistake; instead, this passion for art engenders a stern and sovereign decision to not see, to 
turn away from the imitative, from the reproduction of what is already present, and to create.  
The modal indicates this sovereign decision of the painter, which demonstrates that the origin of 
the work is the expression of the painter. 
The final moments between the woman’s life and death coincide with the last few 
brushstrokes that complete the portrait.  It is almost as if the painter’s hand holds, in the final 
moments of his work, his wife’s life in the balance: “And when many weeks had passed, and but 
little remained to do, save one brush upon the mouth and one tint upon the eye, the spirit of the 
lady again flickered up as the flame within the socket of the lamp.  And then the brush was 
given, and then the tint was placed; and, for one moment, the painter stood entranced before the 
work which he had wrought” (“The Oval Portrait,” 248-9).  The painter had worked for weeks, 
but the ultimate moment, the precise moment when the painting comes within reach of 
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completion, of entering through the work a relation between what the artist has produced and the 
model that sits, is the very moment that finally breaks with continuity or a clear, traceable 
exchange: “but in the next [moment], while he yet gazed, he grew tremulous and very pallid, and 
aghast, and crying with a loud voice, ‘This is indeed Life itself!’ turned suddenly to regard his 
beloved: - She was dead!” (“The Oval Portrait,” 249).  The story maintains the strong relation 
between the model and the painting – which is the reason critics insist on a transference of life 
from one location to another – until the very end of the artist’s activity in order to invest art with 
a notion of life that cannot be subordinated to an object.  The strong connection between the 
woman and the portrait maintains until this last moment, until the portrait faces the dead woman, 
and turns back unto itself as the sign of a curious subtraction.  The painting is “Life itself” not 
because life is an object that the painting absorbs, nor is life an object that might be delivered 
from one location to another; the painting takes on life because of the significance death gives it: 
rather than referring to a reality, it refers to nothing.  The painting is not “a life” – it is not the 
woman’s life; it is, rather, “Life itself,” which it achieves in its orientation to “a death.”  The 
beautiful woman does not live on (again, the painting is not “a life”); rather, the painting, art, 
achieves life only in relation to death, which is to say, only in relation to the impossibility of the 
creation pointing back to a reality from which it came.  The painting is neither a copy, nor is it 
the beautiful woman herself, “a” life, but it is “Life itself.” 
In this sense, the painter’s final brushstrokes take on two important meanings: the first, 
we might say, is that the brushstrokes do, in fact, kill the woman, bring her to her death, but this 
“evil moment” is not tantamount to murder.  With regard to the meaning for art that death gives 
to the portrait, the death of the woman at the hands of the artist takes on the significance of 
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sacrifice.8  As she sits for weeks as the model for her husband’s painting, she serves a purpose 
such that her present value – who she is at the moment of sitting – is subordinated to the future 
accomplishment of the finished portrait.  Death, however, releases the young woman from the 
particulars imposed by the time of labor, and into a more general movement of a different sort of 
work: that of life itself, which is creative and not merely imitative or secondary.  The work of art 
stands apart from labor and labor time in this sense: art experienced as sacrifice through the 
young woman’s death abolishes her utility, destroys her character as an object to be copied, and 
instills in the work of art an unreal, eternal duration that has no operative value.  The death in the 
work of art instills in it a plenitude beyond the empirical and everyday.  This may have been the 
meaning Poe sought in the original title, “Life in Death,” and it may have been the reason Poe 
ended this first tale with the painter’s confusion, who asked “But is this indeed Death?” after the 
announcement of his wife’s death.  Poe eliminated this last line in “The Oval Portrait,” but its 
inclusion in “Life in Death” was not an imprecision, which Gross maintains in his reading of the 
first tale.  Death, rather, reveals life in the artwork as a release from subordination to things, and 
as an emptying, or a subtraction, of the stable possession of reality that the journalism of Poe’s 
day understood language to establish.9
                                                 
8 I am thinking in particular of the significance sacrifice has for Georges Bataille, who 
understands the act of sacrifice as that which removes any status of the object from what is 
sacrificed in order to return the sacrificial to a divine immanence.  See Georges Bataille, Theory 
of Religion, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1992). 
 
9 I want to suggest this reduction of langauge in relation to the disciplinary function of the author 
that Foucault traces in his essay “What Is an Author?”  This disciplinary function does not need 
to be brought to bear on articulations that have no author.  The labor of journalism continues ad 
infinitum independently of any question of authorship, of “talent,” as Poe says, because 
reportage has already interiorized the temporality of the “currente calamo” that I discuss in the 
third chapter of this dissertation. 
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The further consequence of relating the brushstrokes to the notion of the “evil hour” and 
to sacrifice turns the inherent negativity of these notions into an affirmation.  This is an 
important reason to insist that death is not merely murder, since murder would only trample on 
the established order as a challenge that reaffirms it, and could never have the potential of 
substituting it; murder could only be a discreet act in reaction to what we must finally be forced 
to accept.  The evil of the “evil hour” in which the young woman submitted to her fate, rather, 
has the significance of an “outside” of possibility: death is the condition under which it is 
possible to think what would have been impossible under the conditions of life.  Death, therefore, 
is the condition for the continuing creativity of life.  With this regard, the painter, in refusing to 
see, does not subordinate the brushstroke to the achievement of a means – the use of technique to 
accomplish imitation.  As the painter hovers over the painting, deciding where to apply the final 
brushstrokes, he does not calculate how to finish based on what is available in regards to an 
arsenal of techniques.  The gesture of the brushstroke defines this “outside of possibility” by 
affirming what did not exist before.  It is affirmation in that it creates possibility within the limits 
of the gesture, which were not available before it was carried out.  The action is creation, and 
does not belong to the woman, but is akin, perhaps, to her death, which obliterates the 
intelligibility of localized, empirical experience of an object, and implicates art toward a larger 
movement of life. 
This meaning was especially important for Poe, who struggled against the positivism of 
reportage and journalism, which functioned always within an intelligibility that set the 
parameters for correctness and error (good and evil), and, therefore, also the moral and didactic 
inclinations of American literature and criticism in his time.  A radical notion of evil was of great 
importance, but this notion could not be turned back to into a weak challenge.  This “evil” had to 
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reside as a possibility that could offer a compelling judgment for life and art over and against the 
operative goals so clearly and deeply entrenched in the moral good. 
5.4 DISPERSAL IN “THE OVAL PORTRAIT” 
“The Oval Portrait” ends with the story of the portrait, in which the artist withdraws into the 
turret, where his wife dies as he finishes his work.  The artist’s withdrawal, however, does not 
block off art into a narrow field of interiority, introspection or isolation; the notion of sacrifice 
must have a sense of participation, which is what the narrator provides.  The encompassing act of 
sacrifice implicates a community, and the narrator fulfills this position, although his lonely 
presence in a deserted chateau brings up, once again, the crisis Poe confronts in much of his 
fiction: that the cultural materials of the past are incapable of giving life or order to the present, 
especially since they exist in lonely, forgotten chateaus.  The narrator’s encroachment of the 
chateau, however, activates the narrator’s participation in the “life” of the oval portrait.  To a 
great extent, however, the theme of the attenuation of these cultural materials for social order 
takes on significance in “The Oval Portrait” insofar as the narrator tries very hard to reduce his 
experience of the portrait to an empirically manageable object.  The narrator’s participation in 
the tale serves to explore the impulse for life in the work of art, as well as the strategies for its 
containment. 
The difficulty of Poe’s short story, as I have said above, is that it questions the limits of 
the work of art – where it begins and where it might end – especially as the notion of art relates 
to “life itself.”  This difficulty is intensified by the fact that neither the portrait nor the story of its 
composition occupy a centrality in the tale; in fact, the wounded narrator, who experiences the 
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painting and then discovers its history, serves to further disrupt any notion of such centrality, and 
begs an important question: why are there two records, the portrait and the story, of the woman’s 
life?  These two “records” illustrate the creative dispersal of “life itself,” which the experience of 
the wounded narrator further serves to illustrate for the tale.  The narrator, therefore, becomes a 
figure of a reader who is “incomplete” – wounded – and “dispersed” between the material 
figures that conduct his attention, his sleepiness, and his agitation into “waking life.”  This is the 
reason that, importantly, the revisions to “Life in Death” make of “The Oval Portrait” the story 
of a mind awakening into life, rather than the story of a mind receding into hallucinations.  “The 
Oval Portrait,” itself, is the narration of the shifts between the portrait and the story of the 
portrait, which is the movement of someone being “startl[ed] […] at once into waking life” 
(“The Oval Portrait,” 246).  This occurs upon the narrator’s discovery of the portrait, which he 
confuses for a real visage – “my fancy, shaken from its half slumber, had mistaken the head for 
that of a living person” (“The Oval Portrait,” 247).  The point of including the narrator is not just 
to give the story a viewpoint, but to make the experience of the portrait the impulse and measure 
of “life,” as well as to destroy the simplistic notion of truth and falsity with respect to the 
presence of an available reality, and of art’s secondary relation to that reality, despite the 
narrator’s idealism. 
“The Oval Portrait” is a narrative of an action caught between two material inscriptions; 
the material inscriptions, however, do not hold the action.  It occurs, rather, in spontaneous 
relation to art, and in a moment of unknowability.  The narrator discovers the oval portrait 
unexpectedly: after spending many hours examining the artwork in his room and reading the 
small book that described it, the narrator finally decides to reposition the candelabra by which he 
is reading, and in so doing directs light onto a small portrait on a section of the wall left un-
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illuminated by the previous position of the light.  He is immediately taken by what he sees: the 
portrait of the beautiful young woman.  His reaction is to look quickly at the painting and then 
close his eyes, an action which seems to surprise the weary man: “Why I did this was not at first 
apparent even to my own perception” (“The Oval Portrait,” 246). 
The action seems insignificant as it occurs, but the narrator does not ignore it, and he 
becomes occupied with reflecting on how and why he reacted as he did.  Before gazing on the 
portrait again, the narrator finally decides that the “impulsive movement” served to “gain time 
for thought – to make sure that my vision had not deceived me – to calm and subdue my fancy 
for a more sober and more certain gaze” (“The Oval Portrait,” 246).  The narrator understands 
the closing of the eyes now as a voluntary turn inward, and as a conscious movement that 
afforded a moment of reflection.  Importantly, though, it is a reflection that afforded “a more 
sober and more certain gaze,” and, this, seemingly, resulted from the voluntary closing of the 
eyes despite the fact that the narrator claims only a few lines later that the painting itself was the 
object of the sobering effect: “That I now saw aright I could not and would not doubt; for the 
first flashing of the candles upon that canvas had seemed to dissipate the dreamy stupor which 
was stealing over my senses, and to startle me at once into waking life” (“The Oval Portrait,” 
246). 
This turn inward is significant because the story of the painter and the portrait that 
follows doubles the shutting off of the visual register, but in the case of the painter, this is not a 
turn “inward.”  For the painter, who “would not see,” the refusal to look is a sovereign act linked 
at once to the meaning of sacrifice for art, as well as the originary expression of creation.  The 
shutting of the eyes at this early moment in the tale, on the other hand, occurs as chance in a 
moment of unknowability, despite the fact that the narrator strives to accommodate the act into a 
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voluntary and intelligible framework.  The narrative, despite the fact that it is given in first 
person, does not follow the chance occurrence from the point of view of a consciousness that can 
devolve the story in frameworks of intelligibility.  Instead, the narrating consciousness, once it 
begins to gain retrospective control of the chance event of the closing of the eyes, finds itself 
confused.  The importance of the story itself, therefore, is not consciousness, but the situatedness 
of an eventful character within the material inscriptions that “awakened life,” and then, perhaps, 
guided it.  Still, the retroactive accommodation of the chance action into the narrative is an 
attempt to place a human faculty ahead of the event to flatten the narrative into a linear 
chronology.  The moment of the closing of the eyes surpassed the human mastery – in the form 
of the assailability of an object – that the retroactive glance seeks to impose, thereby affording 
the event a stability that it perhaps does not have.  Further, the stability of the event captured 
snugly in the linearity imposed by the narrative dissimulates the spontaneous, non-substantive 
animation that the story calls “waking life.”  The faculty that the narrator imposes in the story, 
therefore, can never be an agent, only a retroactive accommodation.  In any case, the action of 
the weary traveler ultimately eludes the pathetic attempts to cover over the negativity of his own 
consciousness. 
Ultimately, the narrator domesticates his awakening into life as a trick or technique of the 
artist.  The narrator attributes his feelings of wakefulness to the “lifelikeness” of the portrait, the 
accurate imitation of reality – a characteristic of the painting that the ensuing story of the painter 
undoes – which he calls the “secret” of the painting, and the source of his agitation.  
Understanding the “secret,” however, does not dampen the experience of agitation, which 
continues to suggest a deeper mystery in the experience of art.  Before the narrator can turn to 
the book he has been reading to discover the story of the portrait, he “replace[s] the candelabrum 
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[to] its former position” to “shut from view […] the cause of my deep agitation” (“The Oval 
Portrait,” 247).  The refusal to look at the painting in this later case is still quite different from 
the painter’s refusal to look at his wife: with respect to the narrator, the refusal to look is an 
attempt to deny the work of art, to return it to the ambit of objecthood.  The narrator fails to grant 
significance to the painting, and reduces it only to the application of a technique, or to the history 
of its production.  The gesture of the artist, however, as we saw earlier, did not rely on the 
application of paradigms or techniques, but founded the limits of the work within the gesture of 
the brush on the canvas; those limits, however, lie beyond the canvas, and took form in the 
weeks heading up to those final brushstrokes, during the time in the turret, in the initial look at 
his wife, and, certainly, in the agitation the artist felt and that, consequently, the narrator would 
feel in the experience of the portrait.  The artwork “works” in the gestures of the artist, but well 
beyond them, too.  The brushstroke that we can locate in the artist’s hand, therefore, does not 
belong exclusively to that act, but doesn’t belong to what precedes it either.  It exists as a relation 
between the moment of the painter and the moment of the narrator, which inscribes the present 
moment of the narrator with a particular possibility and exigency: to speak in relation to the 
experience of the painting.  Poe’s fiction, however, always seems to configure the conditions for 
the failure of this inscription in the present, and to the suppression of the possibilities of art.  In 
this case, art acquires an intimate relation to life, but the failure of actualizing these possibilities 
lie with the narrator, who seems incapable of fulfilling its movement for growth. 
Importantly, the story does not end with the narration of the movements of awakened life, 
and with the clumsy attempts by the narrator to control these, but with the figure of the beautiful 
woman’s death.  The force of this abrupt ending estranges the portrait’s closeness to things, and 
gives it the final force of affirmation, in that the portrait can only stand for itself, and does not 
 135 
enter into an exchange.  The fact that the narrator can hover between the story of the portrait and 
the portrait, in some respect the same way the painter might hover between his wife and the 
painting, reveals, finally, only an alterity that sometimes gathers these together, and sometimes 
disperses these into new forms.  In any case, and despite the narrator’s attempts, the work 
awakens an understanding of art that has no goal, no object, which Poe increasingly understood 
as the destiny of art in a social-historical moment dominated by involuntary plagiarism and the 
mechanics of the journalistic press. 
5.5 WHAT IS A WORK? 
The question about the limits of the work that I have insisted “The Oval Portrait” raises resounds 
also with the problems of plagiarism that Poe dedicated so much time to exposing, and which I 
write about in the first chapter of this dissertation.  Plagiarism, of course, relies on the 
particularization of a work as the sole province of an author, which he then possesses within a 
system of property rights.  The emergence of the author in this sense is an important 
phenomenon, and one that I tried to reflect on earlier in this dissertation in relation to Foucault’s 
essay “What Is an Author?”  I would like to reflect on this essay again as a way to discuss not 
just the author, but how the work appears and disappears in relation to how I discuss art in “The 
Oval Portrait.”  Foucault’s essay has garnered much attention, and has focused work on “author-
centered” studies, where scholars have questioned the validity of the category of the author as 
sole creator of a work.  The events sponsored by the Society for Critical Exchange, and that took 
place at Case Western Reserve University and The Washington College of Law at The American 
University, are an important example of this, since these events formed an attitude that became 
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prevalent through a number of works on the subject, beginning with the papers collected from 
those meetings by Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi in The Construction of Authorship.10
This collection of essays centers on questions of writing practices, and purports to 
examine texts in which the act of origination does not “belong” to an individual.  In such cases, 
this collection of essays shows how copyright laws are inadequate to the conditions of the 
writing practices that produce certain texts and meanings.  In particular, Woodmansee and Jaszi 
cite the “polyvocal collaborative situations like the nineteenth-century women’s groups 
described by Ann Ruggles Gere, in which texts were generated and revised in an atmosphere of 
sociable interetextuality” (Woodmansee and Jaszi, 11), or the collaborative practices of Samuel 
Johnson as examples that exceed the strict limits of copyright as an “author-centered” work.  
Some of these examples are quite promising in that they locate the possibility of creation in the 
public act of coming together and speaking, where speech itself is action, but Woodmansee and 
Jaszi do not ultimately capitalize on these rich possibilities.  Instead, they seem to locate each 
participant in collaboration as an individual and, insofar as these individuals work together, they 
produce difficulties in definitively attributing to any one of them the privileged position of author 
as creator. 
 
Despite this failure to examine the public as a center of action in relation to the creation 
of texts, Woodmansee and Jaszi’s work is important and quite useful on the subject of the 
emergence of the author, a subject that Woodmansee claims has “received relatively little 
attention despite Michel Foucault’s observation” on the importance of examining how this 
formation of the author arose in our culture.  What seems missing here, however, would relate 
                                                 
10 Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, eds, The Construction of Authorship: Textual 
Appropriation in Law and Literature (Durham: Duke UP, 1994).  For the remainder of this 
chapter, I will refer to this text as “Woodmansee and Jaszi.” 
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more essentially to the question of the emergence of the author as Foucault poses it in his essay.  
I am thinking especially of one of the reasons Foucault gives at the end of the essay on why a 
focus on the author is important, and, implicitly, what it might lead to: “There are reasons 
dealing with the “ideological” status of the author.  The question then becomes: how can one 
reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world?  The answer is: 
One can reduce it with the author.”11
With this respect, Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art” is apropos, and 
introduces what is at stake in this discussion.  Heidegger notes at the very beginning of this essay 
that the work of art, once it is finished, becomes an object, or a thing.  Any questioning of the 
work of art, therefore, must question this thingliness in which it resides.  The essay, at that point, 
takes on the question of the thing very seriously, and spends many pages trying to address what 
the thing is in the work, but, ultimately, can never attain a closeness with what seems most 
available in the work.  Things themselves, or objects, therefore, are not what the work of art 
finally gives us; what we gain from this kind of making, rather, is our way of relating to these 
  Critics like Woodmansee and Jaszi take Foucault’s essay 
as an opportunity to trace this “ideology” in the visible form that arises as the author, but, in so 
doing, ignore what I addressed in the first chapter of this dissertation as the animating questions 
behind this task, namely, what danger does the author reduce?  What is the danger with which 
fiction threatens our world?  Foucault advances the formation of the author as a measure of 
limiting the proliferation of meaning, which arises in relation to this danger that remains 
unthought.  The question of the author, therefore, should take us to another question embedded in 
the text of “What Is an Author?”:  what is a work? 
                                                 
11 Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed James D. 
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 221.  I will refer to this essay parenthetically as 
“Foucault” for the remainder of this chapter. 
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things – the form that is our reality, that gives the content of our reality.  The work of art is not 
the thing in itself, but the work of form, of the creation of a form that would contain the reality 
that one might experience.  There is such a thing in the work of art as an object, or a thing, but 
the making of this thing affects the immaterial as well, and, in this sense, changes what it is that 
we receive of the object, what the object is, what aspects of the object can be known and can 
become close to us.  This represents not an objective relationship to reality, which would amount 
to positivism, but to the potential of an altering experience. 
For all of these reasons, the question of the work seems essential, especially since, if the 
author is a reduction of the danger with which fiction threatens our world, then the danger 
belongs to the work he produces as the possibility of alterations in experience.  In asking about 
the work, we can continue to elaborate a distinction that began to arise in “The Oval Portrait.”  
The notion of the work as art – the artwork – arose with the affinity of the artwork, its 
origination, to life and death.  In this sense, the work of art must be differentiated from a 
different kind of work, which we can call labor.  This latter kind of work is also productive, but 
its limits are generally much clearer and consist of a subordination of a present moment into 
alignment with future goals.  The idea of work as labor might corresponds to the subordination 
of a worker, of his present state, to a relation with a goal, or an object, through the mediations of 
a tool.  In this respect, the painter of “The Oval Portrait” produces only a painting, something 
that labor renders as an imitation of an object, and produces another object to be looked at.  Since 
artworks also tend to have the character of an object, of a thing, then they can hold this relation 
to labor, or to the activity one does in order to produce an object.  The wounded narrator, to a 
great extent, tried to reduce the oval portrait to this standing, but in order to do so he had to 
abolish the experience of waking life, which could not belong to an object or to the idea of labor.  
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Seymour Gross, interestingly, in order to maintain a centrality for “The Oval Portrait,” had to 
make a similar distinction, and removed any experience of work from the artwork to recognize 
only the time of labor.  Gross accomplished this by turning the painter’s passion for art into a 
moral failure, and into an inability to attend to his wife, the real object of the oval portrait.  In 
doing this, Gross reduces both life and the artwork – essentially linked in the story – to mere 
objects.  The painter’s passion, however, cannot be an object since it cannot be experienced from 
the outside by a subject, but belongs to the work of life as it emerges as action in the story. 
What Gross manages to do – and what the wounded narrator attempts but does not quite 
manage – is the reduction of the danger Foucault mentions in the quote above.  In terms of the 
story, this danger is akin to “evil,” which also has a relation to life and art.  Both Gross and the 
wounded narrator make of the painter an isolated artist – the author – of the portrait.  This 
reading, of course, is not difficult, since the painter already exhibits the characteristics of such a 
figure of isolation, especially in his retreat to the lonely turret.  The real force of this reduction, 
however, occurs in coincidence with how the work of art shrinks from its passionate and 
dangerously evil potential, to a trivialized product of labor time.  The disciplinary function of the 
author, therefore, must arise in conjunction with the reduction of the work into an operative labor 
time.  Foucault notes that “Texts, books, and discourses really began to have authors (other than 
mythical, sacralized and sacralizing figures) to the extent that authors became subject to 
punishment, that is, to the extent that discourses could be transgressive” (Foucault, 211-2).  
Before the author became the originator of the work, and the transgression of a work became his, 
however, both booksellers and printers were the object of inquisitions, torture and executions 
throughout Europe.  For the most part, these humanist printers were scholars who knew ancient 
languages well, and could act as editors ensuring that the works of the ancients were accurately 
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printed.  They were also confidantes to writers and other scholars, often acting as the protectors 
of learned men, as well as editors and critics of their work.  The object of punishment shifts from 
the printer to the author only as printing becomes operative, and the text can be reduced to the 
status of an object. 
After the 30 years war, printing in Europe – with the exception of Holland, where the 
figure of the printer as humanist scholar still held – came under guild control, and began to 
garner print privileges and copyrights from the state.  In England, the printer formed part of the 
Stationer’s Company, and became the enforcer of monarchal censorship.  One of the important 
details of this shift resides in the move from the educated, humanist scholar, to the relatively 
uneducated guild printer.  Because of the war and because of economic turmoil in much of the 
continent, the attitude of printing became one of survival, and the work of printing turned from 
the scholar to the laborer.  During the years of the great humanist scholars – from such figures as 
Gryphe, Aldus or Robert Estienne – the book gathered together the work that would give it a 
status beyond a mere object: it held together erudition and experience that, in turn, would 
continue to do work as it circulated.  With the guild laborer, however, the book loses its status as 
a work in this sense, and becomes, rather, the object produced under privileges and under the 
protection of the guild.  The printing press and the laborers who operated it produced books as 
one would produce any other good for circulation, or for use, granting the book a “thingliness” 
arising from labor time. 
The author, now an inhabitant of salons rather than a visitor of printing houses, comes 
under the attention of legal authority only as printers lose their status as scholars; even when 
printers printed “transgressive” texts, these were the “result” of the author.  The book, therefore, 
approaches the status of a mere object despite the fact that it could have a “transgressive” 
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potential, but this neat division of labor, in which the work of creating a book belongs to the 
province of clearly appointed labor time, makes this transgressive potential a private matter of 
the author.  Poe noticed these effects especially as they became manifest in another, related shift.  
I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation that, in the US, the spread of magazines and 
journals produced a temporal entrainment in the population.  As the printer emerges as a 
relatively uneducated laborer, for whom books are only objects with exchange value, and for 
which all language exists on an even playing field, from poetry to textbooks, the field of printing 
begins to produce, in conjunction to its products, the practice of reportage and journalism whose 
main objectives are representations of stable realities.  Poe sees this in the journalist, who 
emerges as an “uneducated” writer, and for whom “talent” is irrelevant.  The journalist, like the 
printer, works in a clearly appointed temporality that is incommensurable with the sacrifice of 
the painter of “The Oval Portrait.”  This clear temporality and division of labor demarcates a 
particular position for the “creative author,” as well, as he withdraws – as the painter does to the 
turret in “The Oval Portrait” – into his own narrowly defined field, from where the work of art 
can no longer express community even through the experience of sacrifice. 
For Poe, this configures a very particular problem: the experience of the artwork still 
holds the measure of life, as we can see in “The Oval Portrait,” but Poe often has trouble 
expressing this experience.  The work of art, which is expressive of community, often finds its 
disaster in the withdrawal of the artist into isolation in much of Poe’s fiction.  Still, this did not 
diminish the fullness of the experience of poetry and art for Poe, an experience that often figured 
as a potential, as it did, for instance, in “The Domain of Arnheim.”  In this story, the artist cited 
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both “the contempt of ambition,” as well as “an object of unceasing pursuit,”12
The distinction between the artwork and labor finds an important significance in Poe’s 
“The Philosophy of Composition,” where Poe makes the surprising claim that he can remember 
and explain every decision that he made in any and all of his compositions.  To demonstrate this 
claim, Poe describes the composition of “The Raven,” which I argued in the opening chapter of 
this dissertation, held a close relation to Poe’s work on plagiarism.  The problem of plagiarism, 
of a work belonging to a particular mind, disarticulated the expression of community in 
literature.  With respect to “The Raven,” the speaker of the poem inhabited a present that could 
not begin anew, that threatened to remain eternally present – a threat embodied by the raven who 
 as two conditions 
for bliss.  This description is important since it gives art a state of permanent un-satisfaction, 
something that cannot hope to be achieved by ambition, and something that remains beyond 
reach, although one must endlessly participate in the failure of never reaching the goal.  These 
conditions form a kind of work that is very different from what I have been calling labor up to 
this point, and illustrates that Poe had formed a very keen understanding of the distinction 
between what I have called work and labor.  The “work” has both a character of the unknown, as 
well as the character of moving beyond its moment, as is the case in “The Oval Portrait” where 
the work engenders life in the wounded narrator.  It is unknown in the sense what it creates 
cannot be anticipated, and the “how” of this emergence, even when localized in the artist’s 
gesture or practice, is not ultimately known.  The work of labor, on the other hand, is eminently 
knowable in the sense that its goals are clear, and it grounds the laborer in distinct relation to his 
surroundings, but not necessarily in the beyond achieved by art. 
                                                 
12 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Domain of Arnheim,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 
5, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 177. 
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repeated phrases of the past without giving them meaning or order at the moment of enunciation.  
“The Philosophy of Composition,” in some respects, is a rewriting of “The Raven,” an activity 
that repeats the original problem of the raven in the poem, but without granting “The Raven” the 
status of art.  “The Philosophy of Composition,” rather, reduces the poem to its “thingly” 
character to demonstrate how Poe performed operations on it, and, finally, to grant Poe 
possession of it as author.  Although he cites that beauty is the “province of the poem,”13
Donald Pease has written about “The Raven” and rightfully notes this problem, and 
describes the essay as “an intention to bring the reader backstage and expose the merely 
performative, the literal as opposed to the literary, quality of the literary work.”
 he 
makes this province a goal, in that he can establish “beauty” independently of the poem, and in 
advance of its composition.  The labor of the poet, then, becomes a process of craftsmanship, or 
handiwork, with the material of the poem.  Poe therefore reduces the language of the poem to its 
sonorous qualities, to the abstract sensations of sound caused by speech – in short, Poe reduces 
language to acoustic disturbances that can produce moods, but not significations or meaning. 
14
                                                 
13 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Philosophy of Composition,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan 
Poe, Vol 14, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 198. 
  Pease notes 
that the speaker of the essay does not finally provide “a ‘critical’ perspective, but only another 
staged version of the same activity resulting in ‘The Raven.’”  This means that the critical essay 
never functions critically: it never “deliver[s] the poem over to significance” (Pease, 183).  Pease 
is quite right in all of his statements, but what is missing is a very important qualification: Poe 
never promises to give “The Raven” the kind of significance that Pease expects of criticism.  Poe 
promises only to reveal “the wheels and pinions – the tackle for scene-shifting – the step-ladders 
14 Donald E. Pease, Visionary Compacts (Madison, Wisconsin: The U of Wisconsin P, 1987), 
181.  For the remainder of this chapter I will refer to this text parenthetically as “Pease.” 
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and demon traps – the cock’s feathers, the red paint and the black patches, which, in ninety-nine 
cases out of the hundred, constitute the properties of the literary histrio.”15
Poe may have had a number of reasons for writing “The Philosophy of Composition,” 
including the suggestions by Outis that he may have plagiarized “The Raven,” suggestions, no 
doubt, over which Poe was still fuming when he wrote his essay.  Be that as it may, what Poe has 
performed here is a violent reduction and domestication of the “danger with which fiction 
threatens our world,” in that by rendering “The Raven” as a concept of labor, he completely 
abolishes any appearance of the world in the poem, or, more importantly, any possibility for the 
poem to make a world appear.  The writing becomes only a set of techniques, which can be lifted 
from the world in which they took their form and that sustained them.  To this extent – and even 
though I have described labor as a sort of entrenchment – labor, too, can have a relation to the 
institution of the world, although its “life” is quite different from the creative possibilities of art, 
  Poe employs figures 
of stagecraft in an act of lifting the illusion that was his poem and to make visible, or perhaps to 
perform, the “labor time” of the author that works with craftsman’s tools.  Poe performs a 
complicated act of appropriation in which he reduces the work to a series of choices, rather than 
expressing an art formed by experience.  In revealing the workings of the stage props, Poe 
presumably reveals authorship behind the illusion, but what he has performed, as Pease points 
out, is merely the repetition of the mechanics of the raven.  The act of appropriation that is “The 
Philosophy of Composition” requires that the author appear in relation to the object that he 
produces, such that the object can only refer back to him, and does not offer a chance to begin 
anew, or to acquire a relational context or experience. 
                                                 
15 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Philosophy of Composition,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan 
Poe, Vol 14, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 195. 
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as I have described above.  The techniques of versification, of repetition, etc, that Poe describes 
in “The Philosophy of Composition,” are lifted from any material conditions that produced, 
elaborated, or sustained them.  When this is the case, they become “mere” techniques:  because 
these sets of techniques become disembodied, articulated only by an abstract intellect that picks 
and chooses, criticism can become very cerebral, and relate only to logical application.  This is 
mostly because the objects produced by such techniques, as in “The Raven,” are now just that, 
objects, rather than the experience and participation in life and work.  The reduction of “The 
Philosophy of Composition,” with its relations to plagiarism, reduce the work to such an extent 
that it does not just achieve the reduction of the danger with which fiction threatens our world, 
but also makes the “world” disappear into a logically ordered, idealist empiricism. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has asked about Poe studies in the US, and has engaged with Poe’s experiments 
with both irrationality and evil as these relate to the creative imagination and to his 
understanding of the functions of criticism.  One important question that we might begin to ask 
by way of a conclusion involves the ethics and values that are needed for criticism if historical 
emergence occurs not along a trans-historical rationality, but under a radical, creative imaginary.  
Indeed, this is a question that is not just specific to Poe studies, or even literature and English 
departments, but one that should trouble the university at large.1
                                                 
1 I ask this question in relation to Bill Reading’s analysis of the university in his book The 
University in Ruins.  Here, Readings shows how the university, often as a result of the tendency 
that is being called “globalization,” has been de-referentialized from a culture that it once 
understood itself to produce.  The crisis, then, if we want to allow ourselves to use that term, is 
the radical disjunction of the university from its own field, what we might call the organization 
and production of national cultures.  The crisis of disjunction or de-referentialization empties the 
university of the critical strength it once had, leaving it almost in a position in which it cannot 
even tell its own story of de-referentialization except, perhaps, by entering the language of 
economics. 
  Poe’s criticism has engaged the 
question quite forcefully, and his engagement with historical emergence as a problem of the 
creative imagination – and in relation to the discontinuous – configures the problem with respect 
to the special conditions of language in relation to the social-historical domain, and illustrates 
how this problem might continue to matter for literary studies and criticism.  In asking this 
question I would like to also repeat some of the arguments that I make in this dissertation in new 
ways in order to continue to highlight their significance. 
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I would like to conclude by configuring the question of creativity in criticism, and the 
notion of originality, to the problem of literary studies and how Poe’s criticism – as I have 
discussed it in this dissertation – might be important today, especially if the relation between 
creation and criticism is to matter for the study of literature.  To develop the problem specifically 
with regards to Poe and his insights on the creative imagination during the pressures of 
journalistic production, it is important to note, first, the role of language, traditionally, in the 
university and the nation state, as I have begun to do above.  The problem faced by literature at 
Poe’s moment, and the reasons that it should be of importance to us today, involves the taxation 
of the imaginative in language, and its changing significance in the embodiment of the social.  
These changes signal the eradication of the national project for which studies of language at the 
university were central: national languages, to a great extent, and national identity and the 
modern European nation state as a result, could be formed and maintained under institutions of 
literature.  Institutions, especially literature, that formed around questions of language were vital 
in deciding expressions of national community, but also of the historical and critical apparatuses 
that would ensure their continuity.  The institution of literature in the university, therefore, is tied 
closely to the development of modern paradigms of identity and history. 
One of the problems Poe faced, and which becomes important for our moment, is that 
literature seems to be superseded by the proliferation of other materials that inscribe thinking 
differently and, perhaps, to other ends.  Literature, then, is faced with an occasion in which it 
might not matter with respect to the question of the formation of mind.  There are two particular 
transformations in this regard that relate to Poe studies and that derail Poe’s critical investment in 
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language as the articulation of the creativity he could still see, at his moment,2 in groups coming 
together to form communities.  The first of these relates to the way in which literature becomes a 
commodity under the organs of mass print.  Poe, of course, reflected carefully on what happened 
to literature as the groups of people that bought and read journals began to determine the success 
of books and authors.  This is one reason, as I discuss at length in the first chapter of this 
dissertation, that critics and printers devoted so much energy to marketing rather than to the 
rigorous criticism that Poe wished to institute.  This is also the reason that fields such as the 
history of the book have focused recently on Poe’s work as an editor and critic to discuss how his 
writing confronted the politics of the literary marketplace.3
                                                 
2 I emphasize that Poe could still “see” the social in his moment to suggest, at least in a 
preliminary way, that the social may not be visible for us any longer under the current regimes of 
power in late capitalism, except, perhaps, as a sociological, positivist empiricism, as I will 
describe below.  This problem arises as the creative imaginary, especially as Poe understood it, 
became suffocated. 
  The history of the book, however, 
often does not attend to the greater transformation that was at work at Poe’s moment, and critics 
in this field often think of Poe in terms of the popular press only as an effect of popular culture, 
and place primary significance on the formation of the masses as the focus for the value of 
literary production.  I would like to suggest that this interest in the masses, however, is one 
characteristic of the transformation Poe tried to engage with his criticism, and one of the 
3 There are many works on Poe in this vein, but most apropos as an example of what I mean here 
is Meredith McGill’s American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853.  In this 
book, McGill misunderstands Poe’s desire to establish a criticism ahead of literature because she 
fails to see criticism as the actualization of the life of a work.  Because of this, she argues that 
Poe sought to create a criticism ahead of literature in order to appropriate for himself the terms 
by which the nation would understand literature, what literature would represent “America,” and 
why.  Of course, Poe was not interested in instituting dominant terms that would give criticism 
only an explanatory task.  He was, rather, interested in giving literature a historical role in the 
formation of mind, something that is completely ignored by the figure of the masses produced by 
mass journalism: that of a naturalized readership in wait for information. 
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consequences of the petrifaction of the present that the journal’s techniques and technologies 
began to produce. 
As journals began to target the masses as the judges-as-consumers of the literary, the 
masses begin to take on the character of a naturalized readership, already formed and in wait for 
information.  The critical engagement with literature, therefore, becomes secondary to studies of 
the sociology of the masses, and to a scientific and empirical study of popular culture.  Poe’s 
insistence on the primacy of criticism and of his portrayal of the masses as a “mob,” therefore, 
seems quite at odds with critics that saw in the “masses” the center of the political process in a 
democracy, and which represented for many editors of Poe’s time, therefore, the “America” to 
which Poe must necessarily relate.  This is the case with numerous democratic groups and 
journals, including John O’Sullivan and his Democratic Review.  The latter, for instance, resisted 
a copyright law – of which Poe was in favor – noting that republication was cheap and benefited 
American publishing.  As far as O’Sullivan was concerned, the growth of American literature 
was ensured in the long term: the American “masses” would impose their taste for American 
literature – a taste presumed to exist for native literature all along – so long as they kept reading, 
and cheap publication ensured that they could.4
This movement, however, has more recent effects in the study of literature, which, 
perhaps, finds its historical index in the rise of Cultural Studies in the past 20 years.  This is, 
perhaps, the best example of what I mention above as the scientific and empirical study of 
 
                                                 
4 It is interesting to note that Poe sided, only incidentally, with conservative groups in his support 
of copyright law.  The Whigs supported an international copyright law because it promised to 
keep foreign literature out of American journals, ensuring a wholesome, moral literature for 
American readers.  They believed that foreign literature was laden with licentiousness, and 
therefore threatened the proper, moral formation of American minds that only American 
literature could afford. 
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popular culture, which discloses a number of symptoms that emerge from the transformations 
Poe tried to illustrate at his moment.  I am not interested in putting forth yet another attempt to 
define “Cultural Studies,” but to illustrate Poe’s anticipation of the persistence of certain non-
productive tendencies in criticism, and their danger for the creative imaginary that Poe valued.  
What is important, therefore, is to question what might have called for a moment in which 
academics felt the need to name something called “culture” as a political and oppositional move 
because they began to have trouble finding it in the work of the academy itself.  Cultural Studies, 
however, is a reactionary; since English Departments and universities in general – like the 
journals and purveyors of information for the masses in Poe’s time – no longer see themselves as 
representing a universality, they must lay claim to cultures that have proliferated outside of their 
domain.  In part, perhaps, this explains the insistence on a differentiation between “high” and 
“low” culture, with “low” culture, of course, becoming increasingly important as the incidence of 
its consumption grows, and “high” culture seemingly becoming stiff, or pretentiously esoteric, 
since it is increasingly seen as irrelevant to questions of social order in these formulations. 
We might say, then, that the problem of Cultural Studies in relation to the problem of the 
masses – or the mob, in Poe’s terminology – of Poe’s time, is a problem in which English 
departments, and literary critics, saw themselves in a relation of possession to the literary, which 
they subsequently lost.  I make this claim because, first of all, English departments no longer see 
themselves as “having” culture, and, it might be said, Cultural Studies was a way of looking for 
it elsewhere.  Interestingly, the problem of Poe’s place in America, and of the interest in 
American Poe studies of recovering Poe within periodic and national fields, might also be 
understood as a process of re-appropriation of Poe’s work.  Importantly, this process of 
appropriation (re-appropriation?) of Poe by American Poe studies in the last 10 to 15 years bears 
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a striking resemblance to the process of appropriation that Poe, himself, effected with regards to 
“The Raven” in “The Philosophy of Composition.”  Through the study of sociology, and of 
popular influence, these studies of Poe try to engage the scientific methodologies that would 
render a mechanism to appropriate Poe, to establish a relationship of belonging to what was 
empirically present at Poe’s time.  With this respect, if one is in a relationship of possession to 
literature, the social, or culture, then one is assuming that it is being “made” elsewhere, or, better, 
that it has already been made, and, since we have been left out of its production, then we must 
now fight over the objects that are left to claim. 
This language of property and ownership is meant to illustrate the consequences at work 
in recent Poe studies, and especially in relation to the decay of the European project for the 
university that I mentioned earlier.  The tradition of the university that saw itself as making 
national citizens did not understand itself merely as “having” literature or culture, but as 
developing it, elaborating it, and setting forth the conditions under which they can flourish.  The 
university, then, had to ensure the elaboration of culture, but also its preservation, which also 
means the transmission of its culture through the formation of mind in language through 
institutions of literature, art and philosophy.  These were the critical institutions that the 
university thought with to produce culture and its attendant orders.  The moment in which the 
question of culture becomes a search outside there is no longer a thinking with.  In this 
configuration, culture becomes something hardened, a certain “madeness” pervades it, and it puts 
the Cultural Studies critic, as well as the critic that seeks Poe “in his time,” in a position of 
capture through systems and methods of engagement.  What is just as problematic is the fact that 
many of the categories of thinking – such as the individual as locus of agency – persist in these 
formulations.  In other words, in studies of Poe that locate him as an American within popular 
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cultural trends, as well as in the engagement called “Cultural Studies,” there is a need for 
thinking agency, especially in order to accrue social consequences in a very difficult moment 
(which may or may not be possible), and such agency is often located at the level of terms such 
as “subject” and even “individual,” or, alternately, in the engagement of consumption of “low” 
cultural objects, whose vast proliferation is understood as a new ground by which to rethink 
community. 
The problem with locating objects and thinking them in their consumption is that made 
objects are already subordinate to the operation that gives them.  This, too, is the consequence of 
thinking the literary as a made object, which critics understand as something “made” in clear 
connection to popular influence, for instance, that, in turn, the masses consume in journals.  To 
study consumption of objects, therefore, is to participate in the entrenchment of operations of 
knowledge.  Any engagement with an object by way of its use subordinates both the object and 
the subject to its use: the use gives an operation of duration, or, in other words, time as 
anticipation.  In such a moment, the object, as well as the subject, are in the strange position of 
becoming in which what they are now is subordinated to the anticipation of future states; in the 
engagement of time as anticipation they are bound to a process of becoming that has clear 
delineations.  The future escapes from the present in frameworks of operations in which 
becoming is always a problem of being what we are not now.  In becoming – understood within 
the parameters of a projection of anticipation – we are bound to an operation that gives a way of 
being that is incompatible with what we are.  What this means is that the notion of agency, 
applied at the level of the individual in action or consumption, subsumes the individual into the 
classifications of the operative possibilities of the object and nothing more.  This is a problem 
connected to the loss of wonder that I discuss in the section of the second chapter entitled 
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“Creation and the Leap of “Not Knowing” in the World of News,” and it is tied as well to the 
labor one does with a tool, in which the tool places the “subject” in a relationship of clear 
anticipation in relation to the materials upon which he works.  For these reasons, as soon as we 
think of the individual as agent in consumption, and not as a function within a larger movement, 
then we have expelled thinking from existence and we have bound the individual into 
classifications, categories and operations. 
Terence Whalen’s celebrated book on Poe, Edgar Allan Poe and the Masses, is perhaps 
the best example of what I mean here. Whalen’s study is important because it represents the 
symptomatic confusion of the larger critical problem I have been trying to outline.  In thinking 
the universality of the university, Whalen is wrong to locate in a “total knowledge” the ground 
for universality; he is wrong, further, in claiming that the goal of universality is for “social 
integration.”  Traditionally, universality had limits: its domain was a “culture,” and it was 
language itself that provided universal mediation within its domain.  The threat to cultural 
universality arises when language can be put to specific uses that produce codifications unique 
only to a limited province of human activity.  Literature, as an object and exercise of language, 
cannot pertain only to specified and pragmatic uses or communications.  This means that there 
can be no knowledge of a “production in general” (Whalen’s larger goal) with respect to 
literature; literature is not a product in the simple sense of a future goal (as in an “end product”) 
achieved only through the application of pre-existing techniques and knowledge.  Literature, 
through the universality of language, might pertain to activities that already existing knowledge 
might not anticipate, or to activities that are not already codified.  Such unpredictability signals 
an otherness insofar as these activities might not belong to available categories of knowledge. 
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Whalen’s confusion is illuminating with respect to the problems I have been outlining 
here, especially with respect to his reading of “The Power of Words,” which was a key text in 
my discussion of the leap and of discontinuity in Poe’s fiction and criticism, especially in the 
Marginalia.  Whalen makes much of Agathos’s statement that “[…] not in knowledge is 
happiness, but in the acquisition of knowledge!  In forever knowing, we are forever blessed; but 
to know all, were the curse of a fiend.”5  Whalen interprets this phrase as a description of the 
activity of an information gatherer, a figure that browses the surplus of information produced and 
reproduced by the capitalist print industry.  In some sense, Whalen takes Agathos to stand as Poe 
himself, who Whalen claims was an aggressive producer that scorned the burgeoning mass 
readership and ignored public good.  He continues his work by searching for the source for Poe’s 
tale; his summary of past scholarship is telling: “It could, for example, comprise a legitimate 
scientific hypothesis that Poe believes is literally true; or it could be a scientific hypothesis that 
an intrigued but skeptical Poe dramatizes; or it could be a kind of fable of Romantic power that 
Poe sincerely endorses; or it could be a fable of poetic power that a post-romantic Poe dramatizes 
with an indeterminate degree of irony and subversion.”6
Poe’s criticism remains important as it attempted to confront the entrenchment of these 
operations, as well as rational projects; importantly, Poe tried to think about the possibilities of 
criticism not in reference to a culture, which was already a disappearing domain, but in relation 
to the mechanical entrenchment of industrial modernity.  We need to ask now, however, how 
Poe’s work can provide its ongoing intention in the name of originality when it finds itself within 
  In short, it could be anything but 
literature. 
                                                 
5 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Power of Words,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Vol 6, 
ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 139.  
6 Terence Whalen, Edgar Allan Poe and the Masses (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999), 252. 
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these projects.  Poe’s work on criticism always tried to work with respect to a larger movement 
than what terms such as individuals or nation states designate by addressing the movement of the 
life of a text.  But what could it mean to enter into a larger movement that could possibly matter?  
Is the category of the individual something that should matter to us in thinking of a larger 
movement?  What does a “larger movement” beyond the individual even mean?  And, finally, do 
these questions matter to literature at this moment?  In order to enter into this movement it will 
be very helpful to think along with Poe, who has already pushed us in this direction.  To think 
with Poe must mean only to think with his writing, his literature; so to enter into this movement, 
to ask how it might matter, is, in a way, to also ask what literature itself thinks, and to ask about 
the historical being of language.  In this sense, this conclusion does not put Poe into a lineage, 
but thinks his work with respect to a genealogy that illustrates what mind can produce 
historically. 
The future of Poe studies, for the sake of literature and criticism, requires that we try to 
think this larger movement with which Poe’s work intends to participate, and whose horizon 
exceeds the arrangements and discreet shapes of lineage, as it tries to find the creatively 
emergent.  This would, furthermore, end the reductive practice of seeking Poe, of trying to find 
Poe in his characters, or even trying to find Poe in the event of the first person in his criticism.  
This latter point was of especial importance in relation to the Marginalia; I noted in the third 
chapter of this dissertation that critics have been very quick to think of Poe’s marginal notes as 
biographical material, when these should be thought, perhaps, as Maurice Blanchot thought of 
each occurrence of the “I” in literature, and especially in his friend Bataille’s work.  In his essay 
on Bataille, Blanchot does not seek any biographical context to discuss Bataille’s work, and asks, 
instead, about what the “I” could mean as Bataille wrote it.  The answer to this question, 
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however, could not be answered by placing the “I” in context, for the “I” does not exist as a 
naturalized psychology, or a biographical account, but arises as a limit experience (which we 
might say was the way in which Poe used the “leisure” of the man of leisure in his work with 
periodicals).  Blanchot states, “The limit-experience is the experience of what is outside; the 
experience of what is still to be attained when all is attained and of what is still to be known 
when all is known: the inaccessible, the unknown itself.”7  This is the reason, apropos of not only 
this conclusion, but this entire dissertation, of why Blanchot could never discuss Bataille in his 
writing.  In the rare instance when he actually wrote about him, Blanchot stated, “Permit me, in 
thinking of Georges Bataille, to think in proximity to an absence rather than claiming to set forth 
what everyone should be able to find in his books.”8
This possibility is strongly connected to the materiality of language, especially as Poe 
tried to engage it as the embodiment of action.  This also points the way for how we might think 
about Poe and the work he tried to engender in his fiction.  For instance, the Dupin stories, and 
most notably “The Mystery of Marie Rogêt,” are a case in point: the detective’s use of the press 
has lead scholars to seek source materials for the stories in the press of Poe’s time.
  This important passage expresses the 
affirmation of the discontinuous, as an absence or as the figure of death in Poe’s “The Oval 
Portrait,” that fulfills, also, the possibility of criticism as the gift of life in literature. 
9
                                                 
7 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1993), 205. 
  The stories 
themselves, however, examine the language of the press, and play with its temporalities, in ways 
that do not secure referents, but examine the reading as a chance event.  The newspapers do not 
reach Dupin and the narrator of the tales to establish the temporal habits of the press; the present 
8 Blanchot, 202. 
9 The most recent example of this is Richard Kopley’s book on the Dupin mysteries.  See 
Richard Kopley, Edgar Allan Poe and the Dupin Mysteries (New York: St. Martin’s P, 2008). 
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existed for them insofar as they dreamed it: “[…] continuing to occupy our chambers in the 
Faubourg Saint Germain, we gave the Future to the winds, and slumbered tranquilly in the 
Present, weaving the dull world around us into dreams.”10
In order to pursue this line of thinking, it is obvious that we must reflect on what thinking 
itself is, and what is at stake in thinking. With this respect, it might serve us well to note that the 
word “think” is etymologically tied to the word “thank” in English.
  The detective and his friend are not 
hailed by the linear temporality of the journals and the language of reference to the present, and 
therefore lie at the limit of the projects and applications of the press.  When they study the 
newspapers, therefore, they break the connection of the press with the referential, and reflect, 
instead, on possibilities of what language can say as a way of finding a present that might be 
otherwise, and a future that has not been determined physically.  Thinking of Poe’s stories in this 
way might lead us to articulate a different history for his detective fiction, one that is less close to 
the history of the police, for instance, and in favor of one that ties the detective to problems of 
thinking that arise under the suppression of the imaginative in language in the fallen reality of the 
press.  
11
                                                 
10 Edgar Allan Poe, “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, 
Vol 5, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS P, 1965), 3. 
  Thanking is a response 
that is given gratefully to what one receives in the manner of a gift.  If we follow the clue left us 
by this important etymological link along with what we have already been saying, what should 
become clear is that it is not the individual that thinks, or wills thinking, in isolation and from the 
wellspring of his being.  Rather, thinking is the exhibit of the moment in which his being is 
actualized.  Thinking occurs in a dual instant of actualization, in which intelligence and material 
coalesce: the intelligence expends force, and the material “responds” (thanks) by bearing 
11 Heidegger notes this in his lecture series What is Called Thinking? 
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(tolerating) the imprint in a specific expression.  The specific expression, then – in this case the 
specific expression Poe’s Dupin stories – is an exhibit of this movement as it unfolds and 
“proceeds.”  In other words, thinking occurs only insofar as it is a material articulation of a more 
general movement.  The mind, then, is a modality that arises as a function of an infinite 
movement that takes on its specificity only in the instant of its actualization; it responds in the 
instant of its actualization by becoming the determination that it is and exhibits this formation in 
the response of thinking.  In this sense, to think always involves beginnings, with respect to their 
finiteness, that will accrue consequences with respect to what is beyond them since in their 
emergence they generate other thinking that is not thought. 
What is important in this thinking is that thinking is not merely operative, but immanent 
in the very movement by which it is made and by which it accrues consequences.  It is to this 
extent that language, as material, can bear the force of intelligence, but only in the social 
gathering of action.  Now, it is very important to point out that this thinking is not presented as a 
way of reviving literature if it is dying – for the question is always to ask how we are caught in 
its movement – but to adequately understand what is at stake in the moment that these 
possibilities, or modes of thinking, face their death.  In the moment of the death of a certain 
modality or way of thinking, it should be possible to think what was previously impossible.  Or, 
is the impossibility of our moment much darker, and more impossible than this analysis lets on?  
If we are to assume that we can know intelligence insofar as it is exhibited in specific material 
articulations of its movement, then are we also to assume that the reduction of these articulations 
and of our engagement with them signals the constriction of intelligence itself? – for if we do not 
know intelligence, then it might be because it is not being expressed.  This means that the advent 
of infinite improbabilities is reduced by being bound to systems that preempt change by ordering 
 159 
what exists into a mechanical instrumentality.  Might the mechanics of an American 
reappropriation of Poe, therefore, signal the ultimate expropriation that Poe expressed in “The 
Raven,” in which a shadow from the past inhabits the present and expels it from speaking the 
future? 
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